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Performance
Performance indicators
35. The effectiveness of the office may be assessed against a range of quantitative and qualitative performance indicators, including:
- the time taken to resolve or deal with complaints;
- acceptance by ministers and agency heads of recommendations arising from inquiries;
- the level of assurance we can give that the agencies are conducting their activities legally, with propriety, and with regard to human rights; and
- the willingness of the agencies to respond positively to issues the office raises arising from inspection activities.
- Timeliness of inquiries
36. At the start of the reporting year, 2 inquiries involving ASIO remained open, while there were also outstanding cases relating to DSD and DIO (see Annex, Table 1).
37. Three of these were concluded during the reporting period. The other, while ongoing at the end of the reporting period, was effectively concluded by August 2001.
38. In addition to the 4 IGIS Act inquiries that were carried over from the previous reporting period, the office continued work on the espionage case of former DIO officer Jean-Philippe Wispelaere. It was not possible to complete the final report on this matter until after the legal proceedings in June 2001.
39. During the reporting period we dealt with 68 new or continuing complaints (compared with 49 for the previous reporting period). These contacts comprised:
- 4 cases carried over from the previous reporting year;
- 12 new complaints leading to preliminary or formal inquiries, of which 3 remained open at the end of the reporting period;
- 42 new complaints which were dealt with within a short time, without resort to a preliminary or full inquiry. All except one were closed at the end of the reporting period; and
- 10 approaches seeking review of matters that had been previously considered.
40. In the five years between 1 July 1996 and 30 June 2001, the average length of time for preliminary and full inquiries to be dealt with to conclusion was 99.39 days per case.
41. The average time taken to conclude a preliminary or full inquiry during the 2000-2001 reporting period was 166 days per case compared to 107.75 days for the previous reporting period.
42. This increase is largely attributable to some major inquiries referred by ministers that, of their nature, could not be resolved quickly. In particular, the Balibo inquiry, which was not publicly announced until several months after it began, required identifying and tracing numerous potential witnesses who had first-hand knowledge of events 25 years previously. This was very time-consuming and the length of this inquiry had a major impact on the average time taken to conclude inquiries.
43. Fortunately, this was not an inherently urgent matter. By way of contrast the ASIO inquiry described at paragraphs 141-153, which did require prompt resolution, took only 107 days to complete.
44. The office's capacity to reduce the time it takes to conclude its investigations will continue to depend on the complexity of the cases that come to our attention, the responsiveness of others and the urgency of the issues.
Acceptance of recommendations
45. Although arising from an inquiry not conducted under the IGIS Act, my first report on security issues, which was prompted by the arrest of former DIO officer Jean-Philippe Wispelaere on espionage charges, received extensive consideration during the reporting period.
46. The report contained over 50 recommendations on how to improve security measures within the Australian intelligence community and also across the wider Australian Public Service.
47. The government accepted each of these recommendations and appropriate funding was provided in the last budget to facilitate implementation.
48. In October 2000, I delivered a report to the Minister for Defence on the investigation into alleged security breaches by the late Mr Mervyn Jenkins. That report contained a number of recommendations that were directed at a range of agencies.
49. An interdepartmental committee was convened to respond to and coordinate the implementation of these recommendations. I am satisfied that this process has ensured appropriate consideration of these recommendations.
50. The IGIS Annual Report for 1999-2000 reported on a case in which an asylum seeker had been kept in immigration detention for a significant period of time as a consequence of a flawed security assessment.
51. With the intention of recommending that ASIO compensate this person I asked the complainant's lawyer to lodge a submission setting out his client's claims. Despite several reminders to the lawyer, including a face to face discussion in which the lawyer undertook to arrange an early response, at the time of preparing this report we were still awaiting this claim.
Responsiveness to issues raised in inspections
52. In the course of and following inspection visits, I made a number of suggestions on how procedures could be streamlined or improved. These suggestions were generally accepted and acted upon. In cases where they were not, I accepted that there were good reasons for not doing so. Details of some issues raised and their resolution are in the chapters of this report dealing with ASIO, ASIS and DSD.
53. The intelligence and security agencies continued to seek my views on draft policies and procedures where issues of propriety or legality arose, or were likely to arise.
54. The willingness of the agencies to seek and accept input from my office demonstrates a genuine commitment on their part to conduct their activities legally and with propriety.
Level of assurance
55. During the reporting period I found several instances where, due to technical mistakes or inadvertent human error, the agencies acted beyond their authority.
56. I have come across no evidence, however, that the intelligence and security agencies have deliberately acted, or wish to act, beyond their authority. Nor is there evidence of systemic deficiencies that would lead to breaches of propriety, the law, or the human rights of Australians.
57. Despite occasional public comments to the contrary, the Australian public can be confident that the intelligence and security agencies are:
- focussed on achieving the objectives which are set for them by the government;
- responsive to ministerial direction;
- aware of the limits of their authority; and
- concerned to conduct their business in a professional manner.