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Defence Signals Directorate
What DSD does
344. Since 29 October 2001 DSD´s intelligence collection and reporting activities have been regulated by the Intelligence Services Act 2001, ministerial directions made pursuant to the Act and privacy rules, also made under the Act.
345. DSD´s primary function is to collect foreign signals intelligence. It produces and disseminates reports based on what it collects. These reports, which are concerned with significant political, military and economic developments in our region, are provided to key policy makers, the intelligence assessment agencies, and other selected government agencies.
346. DSD may not intercept communications within the domestic Australian telecommunications network.
347. There are also strict limitations, set out in the Intelligence Services Act, on intentional collection of the foreign communications of Australians.
348. Targeting priorities for the Australian intelligence community are established in a planning document that is endorsed and regularly reviewed by the National Security Committee of Cabinet.
349. DSD also acts as the government´s authority on all matters pertaining to communications security and information technology security.
350. Further information can be found on the Defence Signals Directorate website.
Inspection activites
351. Inspection activities involving DSD during the reporting period have included:
- checking compliance by DSD with the Intelligence Services Act and the privacy rules and, until 29 October 2001, the administrative rules then in operation. This is done daily utilising on line access to reports from a terminal in our office and also during regular visits to DSD to examine the records that DSD is required to keep for inspection;
- reviewing all submissions, including requests for ministerial authorisations, made by DSD to the Minister for Defence;
- inspecting DSD collection activities at its various Australian facilities; and
- examining DSD´s handling of applications for access to its records under the Archives Act.
352. Following each inspection activity we discuss any concerns with an appropriate senior manager or liaison officer. I have also made a practice of following up inspections with a letter to the Director outlining any issues raised during the inspection.
353. The Director and I have also agreed procedures to operate should I form the view that any matter arising from an inspection needed to be brought to the attention of the Minister for Defence or the Prime Minister. No such matters arose during the reporting year.
Intelligence Services Act and privacy rules
354. The first eight months of operation of the Intelligence Services Act and the privacy rules made under the Act are discussed in a separate chapter of this report, which contains details of relevant inspection activities.
Inappropriate reporting of Australians' communications
355. Our on line computer checking in August September 2001 alerted us to the existence of reporting on the communications of an Australian person, collected by DSD in the course of targeting foreign communications, that I considered should not have been reported.
356. This caused me to write to the Director expressing concern. DSD promptly discontinued the collection.
357. The matter later became an issue when there were media allegations about targeting Australians' communications for domestic political purposes during the Tampa incident (see Annex 2).
358. The Tampa inquiry resulted in DSD staff becoming more acutely sensitive to possible breaches of the privacy rules than previously. In the period following the inquiry DSD was inclined to follow a very risk averse approach in relation to reporting the communications of Australians, including occasionally cancelling reports that may not have been in breach of the rules.
Comsec monitoring
359. One section of DSD is devoted to Communications Security (Comsec) monitoring activities.
360. This is concerned with ensuring that the communications of Australian personnel involved in Defence operations are conducted securely, and that these persons do not inadvertently reveal sensitive tactical, strategic, diplomatic or other official information, to parties who are not entitled to receive this information.
361. DSD´s Comsec monitoring involves targeting the communications of military and civilian personnel to determine how secure their communications actually are, and where deficiencies are identified, to propose and implement appropriate remedial action.
362. Comsec monitoring activities require ministerial authorisation. All those who are subject to such monitoring, must be properly warned in advance that their communications are subject to monitoring. Comsec monitoring is not directed against members of the public.
363. Given the potential of such monitoring to intrude upon the privacy of individuals, I receive an update on Comsec activities and issues whenever I visit DSD to undertake inspections.
364. I am satisfied that Comsec section staff are fully aware of their responsibilities under the Intelligence Services Act, and discharge their duties with the utmost care.
Ministerial submissions
365. The Director, DSD maintains a register of all written submissions from DSD to the Minister for Defence.
366. DSD also maintains a database and supporting hardcopy files for all ministerial authorisation submissions made under section 9 of the Intelligence Services Act.
367. I regularly review these documents. I am satisfied that these submissions contain sufficient information for the Minister of Defence to make well-informed decisions.
Future inspections
368. At the end of the reporting period, I suggested to DSD that we should jointly review the information that is kept for this office, the means by which it is provided to us, and the frequency with which we meet.
369. I have suggested greater use of the secure communications link between our offices to encourage closer to real time monitoring, fewer paper records, and monthly rather than bi-monthly meetings to discuss current issues. DSD has agreed to these suggestions.
370. In addition to these suggested improvements, my office remains available at any time to offer a view or an opinion on time sensitive or contentious issues. This invitation is frequently accepted.
New collection activities
371. DSD frequently develops new projects involving different approaches to collection of intelligence. DSD regularly informs me of the nature of such projects and we discuss any issues that might arise concerning legality or propriety. My main concern in such cases is to ensure that adequate attention is given to such issues, including DSD obtaining legal advice where necessary.
372. In addition to receiving briefings at DSD headquarters, we also inspected some of DSD´s other facilities.
373. I am confident, based on these inspections, other inspection activities and discussions with DSD staff at all levels, that its activities do not involve collecting the domestic communications of the Australian community.
Archives
374. We obtain reports from DSD about the activities of its archives unit. These reports provide a statistical summary of access requests that are referred to it and the timeliness with which these requests are dealt.
375. These reports also discuss archival issues of current or ongoing interest to DSD, such as its sentencing program, manuscript clearance procedures, requests for information etc.376. In addition to these reports, our inquiries sometimes require access to DSD´s archives.
377. I am satisfied on the basis of these interactions that DSD is providing appropriate attention to this function.
Complaints and inquiries
378. The level of complaints about DSD is generally low due to the fact that DSD collects foreign signals intelligence by technical means. It is therefore unlikely that members of the Australian public would have any direct dealings with DSD.
379. During the reporting period we closed one inquiry which was carried over from a previous reporting period. This office also received six new complaints or referrals that led to either a preliminary or full inquiry, and five complaints that were handled without need for inquiry action.
380. A sample of the complaints or referrals that led to preliminary or full inquiries by this office are briefly described below.
Tampa inquiry
381. On 12 February 2002 various newspapers published allegations that DSD had illegally or improperly intercepted communications between Australian persons and the MV Tampa in August September 2001.
382. On 13 February the Minister for Defence asked me to verify the details of a briefing note he had received from the Director DSD on this subject.
383. There were also three written complaints asking me to inquire into aspects of the allegations.
384. I decided to conduct an inquiry and on 1 May 2002 provided a full report to the minister. On 2 May the minister released an unclassified summary and introduction of that report. It is reprinted at Annex 2 of this report.
Balibo inquiry
385. In June 2000, the then Minister for Defence, the Hon John Moore MP, asked me to inquire into allegations that DSD had improperly withheld intelligence information in 1975 relevant to the killings of five newsmen at Balibo, East Timor in October of that year.
386. An unclassified summary of the report of this inquiry is at Annex 3 of this report.
SIEV X
387. Following an approach from a member of the public I initiated preliminary inquiries into the intelligence reporting of ASIS and DSD, so far as it may have related to the Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel X (SIEV X).
388. Using our on line access to ASIS and DSD reporting databases, we sought to identify any intelligence reports that the agencies might have issued prior to the sinking of the SIEV X. These searches were conducted independently of ASIS and DSD.
389. The searches identified several reports referring to preparations for the departure of a vessel. The reports contained no detail that could have indicated whether it was the SIEV X, or a date or point of departure of the vessel.
390. Each report received a fairly wide distribution within official channels, and there appears to have been no effort to limit or suppress their distribution.
391. I wrote to the complainant saying that I did not consider that any of the reports could have materially assisted the Navy or Coastwatch to identify the whereabouts of the SIEV X, prevent its sinking, or assist in the recovery effort after it sank.