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Defence Intelligence Organisation

What DIO does

393. The role of the Defence Intelligence Organisation is to provide intelligence to inform defence and government policy and planning, and to support the planning and conduct of Defence Force operations.

394. DIO also aims to develop and maintain a defence intelligence capability for use in time of crisis and conflict. DIO does not concern itself with domestic developments or situations within Australia.

395. Further information about DIO can be found on the Department of Defence website.

Accountability arrangements

Functions of the IGIS in respect of DIO

396. DIO is an intelligence assessment agency, not a collector of intelligence. This means that its day-to-day activities are unlikely, in the ordinary course of events, to impinge upon the privacy of Australians.

397. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, currently provides the Inspector‑General with quite restricted functions in relation to DIO when compared to the intelligence collection agencies. As noted earlier in this report, the Flood review has recommended changes in this regard.

398. Although this office has periodic consultations with and briefings from the Director, it has not been necessary in the reporting period to inspect DIO's activities on a routine basis.

External scrutiny

399. DIO was subjected to intense external scrutiny during the course of the reporting period by way of the PJCAAD inquiry into WMD and the Flood review (both of which are described in more detail in 'The Year in Review' chapter of this report) as well as the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee inquiry into Bali and media attention generally.

400. The PJCAAD noted that the assessments on WMD produced by DIO were relatively more sceptical and that with the benefit of hindsight this caution was appropriate.

401. Of the many recommendations made by Mr Flood, two bear directly on DIO's accountability to the Parliament and this office.

402. The first of these recommendations is that the mandate of the PJCAAD should be extended to also include DIO, DIGO and ONA on the same basis that it presently covers ASIO, ASIS and DSD.

403. Mr Flood envisages that adoption of this recommendation would widen the scope of parliamentary oversight to provide comprehensive coverage of each of Australia's intelligence agencies. Mr Flood expects that this, will in turn, enhance confidence in the parliament and the public that the full range of intelligence agencies is accountable to a senior group of parliamentarians.

404. Mr Flood also recommended that the mandate of the IGIS should be extended to initiate 'own motion' inquiries, without ministerial referral. Mr Flood explained the rationale for this recommendation, as follows:

"While it is fully understood that assessment agencies do not have the capacity to infringe the civil liberties of individuals in the way that the collection agencies do, it is still appropriate for the Inspector-General to have authority in relation to ONA and DIO. There is significant public interest in the activities of the assessment agencies, and recent cases have highlighted the questions that can arise about the propriety of the assessment agencies' activities, particularly from within their own ranks. It is therefore appropriate for a mechanism to be in place for the Inspector-General to initiate his own inquiries into the work of DIO and ONA, on a similar basis to his role in relation to the collection agencies."^[5]

405. The government has accepted these recommendations.

Complaints and inquiries

406. In the later part of 2000, an individual approached this office with several grievances about DIO. The complainant was extremely critical of certain intelligence reporting and other issues which affected him personally.

407. The individual, who was a serving member of the ADF, was advised of the jurisdictional limitations placed on the Inspector-General in respect of DIO, and directed towards the Minister for Defence in the first instance. (The Flood recommendations described above would largely overcome these jurisdictional impediments).

408. In December 2000 the then Minister for Defence formally asked Mr Blick to inquire into the ADF member's complaint.

409. The investigation concluded in February 2003 and Mr Blick provided a report to the Minister for Defence in May 2003.

410. The secrecy provisions of the IGIS Act ordinarily requires this office to protect the identity of complainants, but the Inspector-General is not in a position to stop self-disclosure by complainants, disclosures by Ministers (who possess an Executive prerogative in this regard), or disclosures by other means (ie. secondary disclosures through the leaking or release of related documents by persons unconnected to the office).

411. In April 2004, media reporting revealed that Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins had written to the Prime Minister, expressing dismay at a range of alleged intelligence failures, and had called for, "… an impartial, open and wide-ranging Royal Commission into intelligence and the influences upon it."

412. Lt-Col Collins also expressed disappointment at the investigation conducted by Mr Blick, intimating that Mr Blick had treated him unfairly and reached conclusions which were contradicted by the evidence.

413. Shortly after these matters were made public, the Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Cosgrove AC MC, asked me to consider whether there were any issues raised by Lt-Col Collins which might require consideration by me, in my new capacity as Inspector-General.

414. The Prime Minister provided Lt-Col Collins with a comprehensive response to his letter in late April 2004.

415. On 30 April 2004, the Prime Minister publicly released an unclassified version of Mr Blick's report of May 2003. A copy of this document is at Annex 3 of this annual report.

416. I subsequently examined all files associated with Mr Blick's inquiry, and a number of related documents, in light of Lt-Col Collins' letter of complaint to the Prime Minister.

417. After reviewing this material, I informed the Minister for Defence that my overall findings were consistent with those of my predecessor.

418. However, I did suggest that while Mr Blick's investigations into one of Lt-Col Collins' claims was comprehensive it was not exhaustive, and that it would be desirable to pursue this matter further.

419. The Minister for Defence agreed with my suggestion and asked me, pursuant to section 8(3)(a) of the IGIS Act to conduct an inquiry. This inquiry was on-going at the conclusion of the reporting period

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