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Office of National Assessments

What ONA does

420. The role of the Office of National Assessments is to produce analytical assessments of international developments. ONA produces reports on international developments and strategic and economic matters in order to assist the government and Commonwealth agencies in the formation of policy and plans.

421. ONA bases its assessments on information available both inside and outside government. It draws on secret intelligence collected by other agencies, as well as diplomatic reporting and open source material including news media and other publications.

422. Further information can be found on the Office of National Assessments website.

Senior Appointment

423. Mr Kim Jones AM concluded his five-year term as Director General of ONA on 14 December 2003. Mr Jones made a substantial contribution to Australian diplomacy and foreign policy prior to his appointment, and led ONA through an intense and challenging period for the intelligence community. Mr Jones was always happy to assist this office when called upon.

424. Mr Peter Varghese replaced Mr Jones as Director General in early January 2004. Prior to his appointment, Mr Varghese had a lengthy and distinguished career in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Accountability arrangements

Functions of IGIS in respect of ONA

425. As indicated above, ONA is an assessment agency rather than a collector of intelligence.

426. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, currently provides the Inspector‑General with quite restricted functions in relation to ONA when compared to the intelligence collection agencies.

427. Although this office has periodic consultations with and briefings from the Director General, it is not currently within the Inspector-General's mandate to inspect ONA's activities on a routine basis, although this might change in the coming reporting period (see below).

External scrutiny

428. ONA, like DIO, was subjected to intense external scrutiny during the course of the reporting period by way of the PJCAAD inquiry into WMD and the Flood review (both of which are described in more detail in 'The Year in Review' chapter of this report) as well as the Bali inquiry by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee and media attention generally.

429. Of the many recommendations made by Mr Flood, three bear directly on ONA's accountability to the Parliament and this office.

430. The first of these recommendations is that the mandate of the PJCAAD should be extended to also include DIO, DIGO and ONA.

431. The second recommendation of relevance in this context is that the mandate of the IGIS should be extended to permit 'own motion' inquiries in respect of ONA and DIO, without ministerial referral.

432. The third recommendation, and the one which is likely to have the greatest impact on relations between this office and ONA, is that the IGIS should conduct a periodic review of ONA's statutory independence.

433. Mr Flood's rationale for this recommendation is as follows:

"A vital element of the product quality control question is independence … Given the nature of the assessment business, where individuals' judgements are a key factor in the final product, and ONA's direct line of responsibility to the Prime Minister, with the consequent potential for charges of political influence, there is a need for some external process to ensure independence is preserved, and is seen to be so."

"The Inquiry finds that it would be appropriate for the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security to review ONA's statutory independence on a periodic basis. As part of such a review, the Inspector-General might:

• read a selection of ONA product on key contemporary international issues to obtain a sense of the independence of the judgements
• interview a range of senior members of the relevant policy departments to gather their perceptions of the independence of ONA's assessments
• interview, under conditions of strict confidentiality, a cross-section of ONA analytical staff up to and including the Director-General
• seek an account from the offices of the Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers of how they interact with ONA and what kinds of advice and feedback they have provided to ONA."^[6]

434. The government has accepted all of these recommendations. Subject to legislative amendments and resourcing adjustments, this office stands ready and willing to action these recommendations.

Complaints and inquiries

435. No complaints or inquiries during the reporting period specifically referred to ONA.

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