Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation

What DIGO does

DIGO was established under a Cabinet Directive on 8 November 2000, by amalgamating the Australian Imagery Organisation, the Directorate of Strategic Military Geographic Information, and the Defence Topographic Agency.

DIGO operated under the authority of this directive until it was inserted into the legal framework of the ISA, with effect from 2 December 2005.

DIGO’s functions are detailed in section 6B of the ISA, and like ASIS and DSD, it is subject to a regime of ministerial directions, MAs and privacy rules, which are provided for under the ISA.

DIGO is responsible for the acquisition and analysis of satellite and other imagery and for the development, acquisition and exploitation of geospatial data, in support of Australia’s defence and other national interests.

This means that DIGO collects and analyses images of foreign and domestic subjects (eg. landforms, waterways, disputed territories etc.), and develops mapping and imagery intelligence products for the ADF and a range of other Commonwealth clients.

DIGO also has the capacity to combine imagery with other available sources of data to prepare highly accurate topographical maps and other aids that are of value in the preparation of plans relevant to national defence and security.

DIGO operates out of two sites, with its Headquarters located in the Russell Defence complex in Canberra, and its other facility located in Bendigo, Victoria.

Further information about DIGO can be found on the Department of Defence website.

Significant issues

New Director DIGO

As discussed elsewhere in this report, the Director of DIGO for most of this reporting period was Mr Ian McKenzie. Towards the end of the period he was appointed Director DSD and was succeeded at DIGO by Mr Clive Lines.

Growth and expansion

When DIGO commenced on the path of becoming an AIC agency in its own right in the late 1990s, its managers were confronted with a series of challenges arising out of the fusion of sometimes disparate elements.

These issues have now been largely resolved, through the combined effects of a committed workforce, strong but sensitive management, and by the infusion of a large number of recruits who do not know DIGO as being anything other than the agency which it is today.

While these issues were important and required significant management attention, DIGO has also rightly focussed on establishing and then consolidating its role as Australia’s leading imagery/geospatial agency.

Having to my mind achieved this objective, DIGO is now able to fully direct its focus towards:

  • further developing and exploiting its collection and analytical capabilities
  • forging close links with similarly focussed international agencies
  • forging closer links with its domestic customers, and
  • contributing to a ‘whole of government’ approach to various issues through the provision of unique products and services.

While the creation of a new agency from many parts is no easy task, and DIGO has experienced some growing pains, DIGO’s future is bright, and it is now well placed to make a significant and growing contribution.

Inspection activities

DIGO privacy rules

Section 15(1) of the ISA requires the Minister for Defence to make written rules regulating the communication and retention by DIGO of intelligence information concerning Australian persons.

On 2 November 2005, the then Minister for Defence endorsed a document entitled the Rules Governing DIGO’s Activities in Respect of Australia and Australians. I included a copy of these rules as an annex in my previous annual report.56

My staff and I visit DIGO headquarters every two months to review materials relating to DIGO’s collection activities. In the course of these visits we closely examine all tasking requests DIGO receives which might impact upon Australian persons or interests, for compliance with the DIGO privacy rules.

For all practical purposes DIGO’s privacy rules are essentially the same as the privacy rules under which the other ISA agencies (i.e. ASIS and DSD) operate.

While there is much to commend in having a uniform approach to the handling of privacy related matters across our foreign intelligence collection agencies, it does pose certain issues for DIGO.

The foremost challenge DIGO faces in applying their privacy rules is that they are predicated on the assumption that the privacy of “Australian persons” will be protected, unless there is appropriate justification provided to enable the reporting of intelligence information to clients with an established need to know.

The term “Australian persons” has a broader meaning than living human beings, and is applicable to bodies corporate which are registered in Australia and controlled by Australians. By extension this can be applied to premises or property controlled by Australian companies.

Although the application of the privacy rules has its complexities for every agency, it can be more difficult for DIGO than it is for ASIS and DSD. This is because ASIS and DSD reporting is largely text based and references to Australian persons are normally to living persons, whereas DIGO’s reporting is primarily image-based and not focussed on persons per se but on property or premises which may fall within the definition of being an “Australian person”.

In making the above observations, I should state that the vast majority of DIGO’s reporting has an off-shore focus, and that the privacy rules come into play relatively infrequently.

DIGO is committed to applying the privacy rules, and if anything inclined to take a cautious and conservative approach rather than to disregard the requirements of the rules.

Ministerial authorisations

Whenever my staff and I conduct a privacy rules inspection, we also review every MA which has been issued by the Minister for Defence in the period since our previous visit, and also examine any approvals given by the Director DIGO in the same period.

In the course of one of these reviews, early in 2007, I queried whether every legal requirement for the granting of a particular MA had been met.

In the case in question a customer agency had requested DIGO as a matter of urgency to obtain some imagery relevant to an ongoing inquiry. As the request appeared to relate to activities which might be construed as posing a threat to security, I queried whether the approval of the Attorney-General had been obtained, as required by section 9(1A)(b) of the ISA.

In the circumstances of the case DIGO did not believe that such an approval was necessary, and prior to seeking the authorisation had obtained advice supporting this view.

Following my questioning of the basis for the authorisation in question, DIGO placed an immediate internal ‘stop’ on their collection activity, pending the resolution of the legal questions raised by my query.

There followed several intra-agency meetings involving discussion of what is required to trigger the operation of section 9(1A)(b) of the ISA, and ultimately the production of what is accepted by all interested parties as a definitive legal opinion by the Australian Government Solicitor on the subject.

As that opinion is classified, I am not able to directly discuss its contents but I am glad that there is now a clear understanding by all parties of the requirements of this provision.

Meetings with senior DIGO staff

As with each of the other collection agencies, I think there is distinct benefit in meeting regularly with senior agency staff to candidly discuss matters of mutual interest or concern.

During the reporting period we conducted six such meetings, each of which coincided with our review our privacy rules/ministerial authorisation inspections.

On each occasion I met with the Director DIGO or Acting Director, DIGO’s legal adviser, and a representative from the policy and compliance area of the Organisation. I am grateful to all for giving freely of their time to participate in these meetings

Training

I did not make any specific presentations to DIGO staff during the reporting period but did incidentally speak to those DIGO staff who attended the cross-AIC induction and senior officer courses at which I spoke.

Complaints and inquiries

The office received one complaint about DIGO during the reporting period, which was handled administratively.

The above complaint was from an unsuccessful candidate for a position with DIGO, who also raised queries about Organisational Suitability Assessment (OSA) processes. I suggested to the complainant that they should seek feedback or redress from within the Department of Defence.

Wider review of OSA policy and procedures

As noted in the DSD chapter, I decided towards the end of this reporting period to initiate an ‘own motion’ inquiry into OSA policy, procedures and practices across the three AIC agencies which operate within the Department of Defence. The above inquiry naturally includes DIGO.

The purpose of this inquiry is to examine existing policies, procedures and practices in each of the DIG intelligence agencies, to identify and consider any inconsistencies which might exist, and to comment on practice across the Group against considerations of fairness and “propriety” generally. This inquiry was on-going at the completion of the reporting period.

Footnotes
56 IGIS Annual Report 2005-2006, Canberra, October 2006, Annex 5, pp.103-104

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