Key points

• The office (OIGIS) celebrated its 20th anniversary on 1 February 2007—having conducted 433 formal inquiries as well as extensive inspection activity over those 20 years. The 2004 Flood review had noted that the office performs an important function in the system of accountability of the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) agencies.
• Proactive inspections of agency records and activities continued to be the major part of the office’s workload in 2006–07. The continuing growth of the AIC agencies increased demands in this regard, but I am pleased to say the office met the challenge and extended the program in suitable ways.
• No deficiencies were identified in the course of inspecting agency approaches to significant (and for some controversial) new powers and capabilities which have been introduced in recent years. These included Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) questioning warrants and B-party telecommunication interception warrants, and Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) carriage of weapons for self-defence.
• Presentations at agency seminars and training courses and at common AIC courses saw OIGIS address at least 1,100 staff in the six agencies in 2006–07. Key themes included the importance of the rule of law and having the trust and confidence of the community, the role of this office and the accountability framework generally, and key requirements in relevant legislation. Targeted community outreach was also undertaken and a brochure on how to make a complaint to the office was translated into another 12 languages (making a total of 16 in all).
• The number of formal inquiries triggered by complaints to the office in 2006–07 was 10. This compares to 18 in 2005–06.
• However, there was an increase in the number of complaints concerning delays by ASIO in producing security assessments for immigration purposes. ASIO has some initiatives underway and others planned, and it is important that these be successful in dealing with the challenge which an increasing workload has posed.
• The office completed its first inspection work in relation to the independence and propriety of the assessment work of Office of National Assessments (ONA). Generally analysts did not believe there were attempts to improperly direct or influence assessments, and some processes have been introduced to enhance the integrity of the assessment work. The possibility of “self-censorship” on certain topics was explored—in some instances examination showed that this was not the case, while in others it was inconclusive. With the benefit of this exploration and conscious that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) specifically refers to formal inquiries being conducted periodically, a formal inquiry was commenced in 2007.
• One inquiry completed in 2006–07 concerned allegations that an ASIO security assessment which resulted in the denial of a visa to Mr Rhuhel Ahmed (one of the UK “Tipton Three” and a subject of the film “The Road to Guantanamo”) was politically or otherwise improperly influenced. Upon investigation I found no evidence or indication to support the allegation and concluded that ASIO had acted legally and properly.
• The office increased from a total of seven to 10 people over 2006–07, and we moved to new accommodation which provides necessary additional space and better facilities. I was re‑appointed as IGIS for a further four years.
• In summary, none of OIGIS activities in 2006–07 revealed enduring systemic deficiencies that would lead to breaches of the law, propriety, or human rights. I was satisfied that the agencies were committed to acting legally and with propriety and respect for human rights, and that apart from a very small number of genuine errors, had complied with their obligations.