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Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation
What DIGO does
DIGO was established under a Cabinet Directive on 8 November 2000, by amalgamating the Australian Imagery Organisation, the Directorate of Strategic Military Geographic Information, and the Defence Topographic Agency.
DIGO operated under the authority of this directive until it was inserted into the legal framework of the ISA, with effect from 2 December 2005.
DIGO’s functions are detailed in section 6B of the ISA, and like ASIS and DSD, it is subject to a regime of ministerial directions, ministerial authorisations (MAs) and privacy rules, which are provided for under the ISA.
DIGO is responsible for the acquisition and analysis of satellite and other imagery and for the development, acquisition and exploitation of geospatial data, in support of Australia’s defence and other national interests.
This means that DIGO collects and analyses images of foreign and domestic subjects (eg. landforms, waterways, disputed territories etc.), and develops mapping and imagery intelligence products for the ADF and a range of other Commonwealth clients.
DIGO also has the capacity to combine imagery with other available sources of data to prepare highly accurate topographical maps and other aids that are of value in the preparation of plans relevant to national defence and security.
DIGO operates out of two sites, with its headquarters located in the Russell Defence complex in Canberra, and its other facility located in Bendigo, Victoria.
Further information about DIGO can be found on the Department of Defence website.
Significant issues
New Minister
When the Rudd Government was sworn in on 3 December 2007, the Hon Joel Fitzgibbon MP replaced the Hon Dr Brendan Nelson MP as the Minister for Defence.
As the Minister for Defence Mr Fitzgibbon took on executive responsibility for the three Defence intelligence agencies, of which DIGO is one.
Ministerial Directions and DIGO privacy rules
Section 8(1) of the ISA provides that the responsible Minister in relation to DIGO must issue a written direction to the Director DIGO, which among other things, sets out the circumstances in which the Director must obtain an MA, before engaging in particular activities.
Section 15(1) of the ISA requires that the responsible Minister in relation to DIGO must make written rules regulating the communications and retention by DIGO of intelligence information concerning Australian persons.
Upon becoming the Minister for Defence and assuming executive responsibility for DIGO, Mr Fitzgibbon inherited the section 8(1) Ministerial Directions and section 15(1) DIGO privacy rules which had been established by his predecessors in that role.
These pre-existing directions and rules have continuing legal effect until such time as they are formally revoked, or over-ridden, by the issue of new directions or rules.
Inspection activities
Ministerial and Director DIGO authorisations
Members of my staff and I visit DIGO headquarters approximately every two months to review materials relating to DIGO’s collection activities.
In the course of these visits we review every MA which has been issued by the Minister for Defence in the period since our previous visit, and we also examine any approvals given by the Director DIGO in the same period.
As indicated above, those collection activities which can only be approved by the Minister for Defence are specified in the Ministerial Direction under which DIGO operates. This is a classified document and therefore cannot be released to the public.
The Minister is only required to personally consider/approve a relatively small number of sensitive collection activities undertaken by DIGO. This is entirely reasonable as the Minister would otherwise be overwhelmed by the administrative burden of considering a significant number of non-sensitive requests for items such as maps and other imagery products which are in some cases already commercially available.
As it is not reasonable to expect the Minister to consider every tasking request levied on DIGO, the Director DIGO is empowered to consider requests for imagery products which do not need to be put to the Minister for approval
In my previous annual report I indicated that during 2006–07 I had sought clarification from DIGO in relation to the interpretation of section 9(1A) of the ISA.73
Without going into the detail of the case which prompted my interest, the central issue revolved around the circumstances where the approval of the Attorney-General must be first obtained, before an MA can be sought from the Minister for Defence in relation to particular tasking requests.
Legal advice was obtained during that reporting period which greatly clarified the matters which I had queried.
In the course of the inspections conducted during 2007–08 my office closely monitored whether any tasking requests levied on DIGO raised similar issues or concerns. I am happy to report that none did.
During the 2007–08 inspections my staff and I either noted, or had brought to our attention, a small number of instances where tasking requests which ordinarily require authorisation by the Director DIGO, were undertaken prior to that approval having been obtained.
In the cases in question I was satisfied that this occurred because the individuals involved did not fully appreciate that the activities they were involved in required authorisation rather than anything of a more sinister character, and that if such an authorisation had been sought beforehand it would undoubtedly have been granted.
The Director DIGO took immediate corrective action including requiring relevant officers undergo appropriate privacy rules refresher training, and also issuing an appropriate level authorisation for the activities in question.
While no error is desirable I was satisfied that this was no more than an administrative breach of internal policy. Indeed, the above instance has served as a useful training tool.
In the course of the inspection visits, my staff and I queried the specific grounds upon which the Director DIGO had justified several collection activities.
By way of background, each Director DIGO authorisation must be justified by reference to one of DIGO’s functions.74 There is a degree of overlap between DIGO’s five functions so it is not surprising that there will occasionally be debate as to which is the most appropriate reference.
In each of the instances identified the Director was able to fully and properly justify his selections.
On the basis of our discussions about such matters, I am satisfied that the Director DIGO is fully committed to ensuring that DIGO staff are properly conversant with their obligations.
DIGO privacy rules
During our bi-monthly visits to DIGO headquarters my staff and I also closely examine all tasking requests that DIGO actions, for compliance with the DIGO privacy rules.
DIGO faces some unique challenges in applying its privacy rules in that those rules are predicated on the assumption that the privacy of “Australian persons” will be protected, unless appropriate justification is put forward to enable the reporting of intelligence information to recipients with an established need to know.
The term “Australian persons” has a broader meaning than living human beings, and is also applicable to bodies corporate which are registered in Australia and controlled by Australians. By extension this can be applied to premises or property controlled by Australian companies.
Although the application of the privacy rules has its complexities for every agency, it can be more difficult for DIGO than the other AIC agencies which are bound by similar rules because its reporting is primarily image-based and focussed on property or premises, which may or may not be an “Australian person” for the purposes of the privacy rules.
While this does create some interpretative issues from time to time, for the most part it has a limited impact upon DIGO’s business operations because the vast majority of DIGO’s reporting has an off-shore focus, in which case the privacy rules have a much more limited application.
On the basis of our periodic inspections I am satisfied that DIGO is genuinely committed to strictly applying the privacy rules.
Meetings with senior DIGO staff
As with each of the other collection agencies, I think there is distinct benefit in meeting regularly with senior agency staff to candidly discuss matters of mutual interest or concern.
During the reporting period we conducted six such meetings, each of which coincided with our inspection / visits.
On each occasion I met with the Director DIGO or the Acting Director and a representative from DIGO’s policy and compliance area.
I am grateful to all DIGO staff who have been involved in these exchanges for giving freely of their time to participate in these meetings.
Training
My office did not make any specific presentations to DIGO staff during the reporting period but we did make a number of presentations to AIC-wide induction and senior officer courses which included a number of DIGO personnel.
Visits
During 2007–08 a member of my staff visited DIGO’s Geospatial Analysis Centre, which is located in Bendigo, Victoria.
Complaints and inquiries
Wider review of OSA policy and procedures
I decided towards the end of the last reporting period to initiate an own motion inquiry into OSA policy, procedures and practices across the three Defence intelligence agencies of which DIGO is one.
This inquiry was finalised during the reporting period and my findings are briefly summarised in “The Year in Review” chapter of this report.
The visit which was undertaken by one of my staff to DIGO’s Bendigo facility was associated with this inquiry.
Matters handled administratively
In addition to the OSA inquiry referred to above, I also received two complaints about DIGO relating to concerns about OSA processes and practices from persons applying for positions with DIGO.
The issues raised by these complainants were handled administratively, and helped to inform the direction taken by our OSA inquiry.
Footnotes
73. IGIS Annual Report 2006–07, p. 65–66.