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Defence Signals Directorate
What DSD does
DSD is Australia’s national authority for signals intelligence (sigint), and for information security (infosec).
As Australia’s national authority for sigint, DSD collects foreign signals intelligence and produces and disseminates reports based on the intelligence information it collects. These reports are provided to key policymakers and select government agencies with a clear and established need to know.
In performing this function DSD must not intercept communications within the domestic Australian telecommunications network. If the collection of foreign intelligence requires such interception, this can only be conducted by ASIO under warrant authority.
DSD’s various intelligence collection and reporting activities are regulated by ministerial directions, ministerial authorisations (MA) and privacy rules which are made pursuant to the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA).
The foreign intelligence collection priorities for DSD and other members of the AIC are established in a planning document that is endorsed and regularly reviewed by the National Security Committee of Cabinet.
DSD’s intelligence-related activities are highly sensitive and are therefore classified in the interests of national security.
The other significant function DSD performs is to provide infosec products and services to the Australian Government and to the ADF. The underlying purpose of this function is to protect Australian official communications and information systems from unauthorised access and other potential threats.
As Australia’s infosec authority DSD also plays an important role working with industry towards the development of new cryptographic products and the evaluation of other information security products.
General information about the various infosec products and services DSD provides can be accessed via the DSD website.
Further information can be found on the Defence Signals Directorate website.
Significant issues
New Minister
The change of government which occurred following the Federal election of 24 November 2007 saw a suite of new Ministers sworn into office on 3 December 2007. One of the new ministers sworn in on that day was the new Minister for Defence, the Hon Joel Fitzgibbon MP.
In assuming his appointment as the Minister for Defence Mr Fitzgibbon took on executive responsibility for the three Defence intelligence agencies, which includes DSD.
Ministerial Directions
Section 8 of the ISA provides that the responsible Minister in relation to DSD must issue a written direction to the Director DSD, which among other things, sets out the circumstances in which the Director must obtain a ministerial authorisation (MA) before engaging in particular activities.
This requirement was satisfied with the issue of a Ministerial Direction by the then Minister for Defence, immediately before the ISA took effect on 28 October 2001.
Ministerial Directions are reviewed periodically for their currency, and also when there is a change of Minister.
In those instances where there is a change of Minister, pre-existing Ministerial Directions have continuing legal effect until such time as they are formally revoked, or overridden, by the issue of a new, properly authorised, direction.
Mr Fitzgibbon issued several new Ministerial Directions to DSD, in accordance with section 8(1) of the ISA, on 25 June 2008. The directions are similar in nature to those which were in place prior to him becoming the Minister for Defence.
I was consulted about the changes which were proposed to be made with the Ministerial Directions DSD operates under and had no concerns with them.
These new Ministerial Directions, like their predecessors, are classified documents and therefore cannot be made available to the public.
DSD privacy rules
Section 15(1) of the ISA requires that the responsible Minister in relation to DSD must make written rules regulating the communications and retention by DSD of intelligence information concerning Australian persons.
As was the case with the Ministerial Directions (referred to above), Minister Fitzgibbon also inherited the existing DSD privacy rules when he assumed office. Mr Fitzgibbon re-endorsed the DSD privacy rules, without change, on 25 June 2008.
Further commentary on the application of the privacy rules by DSD and the role of this office in monitoring them is provided elsewhere in this chapter.
Compliance oversight of ADF signals intelligence activities
In 2007–08 there was a change in the oversight arrangements in relation to the specialist units of the ADF which are involved in the collection and dissemination of foreign sigint.
DSD now has formal compliance oversight responsibilities for these units through authority afforded to it by a directive issued by the Chief of the Defence Force on 4 September 2007. The contents of this directive are classified.
While I cannot reveal the contents of this directive, I was consulted in the course of its development and am satisfied that the directive establishes the same policy framework for the ADF as is applicable to DSD under the ISA and the DSD privacy rules.
It should be noted that this office does not have direct oversight responsibilities for these specialist ADF units, but does have authority to oversight DSD’s monitoring role with respect to these bodies.
During the reporting period I visited some of these specialist units, with a senior member of DSD, and was satisfied with the compliance regimes and reporting processes put in place by DSD.
Support to military operations
DSD devotes significant resources to meeting the needs of the ADF and the wider Defence Organisation.
In the last 10 years the number and variety of ADF deployments has increased significantly. As at 30 June 2008 up to 3 500 ADF personnel were deployed to a variety of locations including but not limited to Iraq, Afghanistan, Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands, Sinai and Sudan.
As this list reflects, the operational environments into which service personnel are deployed can range from the relatively benign to the extremely hostile.
So as to minimise the risks that the ADF deployments face and to facilitate their operational effectiveness, as well as to ensure the operations of these deployments are not compromised, DSD is being increasingly called upon to provide high-quality and timely sigint and infosec products and services to the ADF.
I received several briefings throughout 2007–08 on the support provided to the ADF by DSD, and on a range of cognate issues.
These briefings and discussions have indicated that DSD is properly focussed on delivering to the ADF the best possible service it is able to provide.
Support for counter-terrorism activities
While providing support to military operations is a critical part of DSD’s mission, it is not the only function DSD performs.
A very important focus for DSD in the current global security environment is to identify, collect and share foreign intelligence information connected with terrorism-related targets.
Obtaining and sharing information of this kind directly assists the government to develop policies and plans to reduce the risks posed by these targets to Australian persons and Australian interests, both within Australia and abroad.
NSW coronial inquiry into the late Mr Brian Peters
DSD devoted significant resources during 2007–08 to meeting the requirements of the NSW Coroner in the course of a coronial inquiry into the late Mr Brian Peters.
As has been very widely reported, Mr Peters and four colleagues who have come to be known as the ‘Balibo Five’, all died in the small village of Balibo, East Timor, in October 1975.
A fuller summary of the findings of this coronial inquiry, and DSD’s role in assisting the Coroner, is provided in the ‘Significant Issues’ section of “The Year in Review” chapter of this report.
Inspection activities
During 2007–08 my office undertook the following inspection activities:
- reviewing all MA submissions made by DSD to the Minister for Defence
- monitoring DSD reporting for compliance with the ISA and the DSD privacy rules
- conducting spot checks of a number of DSD databases
- holding monthly meetings with relevant DSD officers to discuss compliance, intelligence policy, and legal issues, and
- visiting various DSD collection sites outside of Canberra.
Ministerial authorisations
The ISA provides a framework within which DSD can deliberately collect the foreign communications of Australians, in limited circumstances.
If DSD wishes to obtain an MA to intercept the foreign communications of an Australian person, the Minister for Defence must be satisfied that the person of interest is, or is likely to be, involved in one or more of a range of activities including:
- activities that present a significant risk to a person’s safety
- acting for, or behalf of a foreign power
- activities that are, or are likely to be a threat to security, or
- committing a serious crime.71
In order to obtain an MA, the Director DSD provides a comprehensive written submission to the Minister for Defence in respect of each individual about whom DSD wishes to produce intelligence.
My office has access to the details of every authorisation which is approved, and I and my staff review documentation for each new or renewed authorisation, usually within four weeks of the authorisation being granted.
The Director DSD brought to my attention one instance where an administrative error had occurred in the production of an MA which was not identified prior to it being submitted to the Minister. The Director took immediate and appropriate corrective action to remedy this oversight and to brief me on what had occurred.
While no error of this kind is desirable, I commend the Director on his responsible approach to this matter.
Spot checking of databases
As proposed in my previous annual report72, a member of my staff conducted a spot check audit of various DSD databases to ensure that collection activities which were enabled by the granting of each MA did not exceed any limits imposed in that approval, and to ensure that such collection only occurred during the period specified in the authorisation.
The spot check took place towards the end of the reporting period. I am pleased to advise that this audit revealed that the requirements of each MA were being strictly complied with.
Monthly meetings
I place great store on meeting regularly with senior level managers and desk officers, in each of the collection agencies so that we can candidly discuss issues of common interest or concern.
The meetings I hold with DSD usually involve a senior DSD manager, as well as drawing staff from the compliance and oversight area of the Directorate, staff involved in intelligence policy issues, and DSD’s legal adviser.
These meetings typically involve broad-ranging discussion on privacy rules casework, collection priorities, MAs, legislative and parliamentary reviews, and current legal and operational issues, as well as any topical issues.
Any briefings I might seek on specific aspects of DSD’s work are also usually scheduled to coincide with these meetings.
I also meet with the Director DSD, either prior to, or following each monthly meeting, or in his absence, with one of the Deputy Directors.
I have been pleased with the candour and quality of discussion in these meetings, and find them very helpful in maintaining a sound understanding of the important work which DSD undertakes.
Privacy rules – monitoring and compliance
Earlier in this chapter I indicated that the Minister for Defence had re-endorsed the DSD privacy rules on 25 June 2008.
Simply put, the DSD privacy rules enable DSD to include references to Australian persons in its reporting, in limited circumstances, and so long as these references are properly justified in accordance with the privacy rules.
A fully staffed section within DSD monitors that the requirements of the privacy rules are being met. My office fulfils a similar function independently of DSD.
My staff and I engage in regular dialogue with DSD’s compliance staff on a range of issues. It is not possible to provide details of these issues in a public report, but I can say that the incidence of Australian persons being identified in DSD reporting is extremely low relative to the number of reports DSD disseminates.
It has been my experience as the Inspector-General that DSD has a strong compliance culture, and that staff across the spectrum of its activities are usually very well schooled in their legal obligations.
The leadership shown by various Directors and senior managers combined with the efforts of DSD’s compliance staff, policy advisers, legal counsel and trainers satisfy me that notwithstanding that DSD’s work is necessarily intrusive, privacy issues are taken very seriously.
New collection activities
In order to remain effective DSD must continually enhance its collection activities and counter threats to its capabilities.
DSD regularly informs this office of its capability development projects and we discuss any aspects of these projects that could give rise to concerns about legality and propriety.
I was pleased that DSD briefed me on several such projects during the reporting period and seriously addressed the various questions which I asked.
Site visits
DSD maintains a number of facilities around Australia which are integral to its collection activities.
During the reporting period I visited one such facility, as well as two ADF units whose work is very closely aligned with DSD’s mission.
Training
DSD continues to devote significant resources to delivering technical and professional training opportunities to its staff on a wide range of subject matters, including compliance with the ISA.
In this reporting period I, or a senior member of my staff delivered 11 presentations to DSD staff on the role of my office and the principles underpinning the ISA.
Complaints and inquiries
The level of complaint about DSD is generally low because its intelligence function is to collect foreign sigint by technical means. Given this focus DSD’s activities are unlikely to come to the notice of or impact directly on members of the Australian public.
Wider review of OSA policy and procedures
I decided towards the end of the last reporting period to initiate an own motion inquiry into OSA policy, procedures and practices across the three Defence intelligence agencies of which DSD is one.
This inquiry was finalised during the reporting period and my findings are summarised in “The Year in Review” chapter and Annex 5 of this report.
Matters handled administratively
In addition to this formal inquiry, I dealt with three complaints about DSD relating to recruitment and other personnel matters.
One of these complaints concerned claims that an applicant for a particular position had been disadvantaged by the length of time involved in the security assessment process which was a necessary precondition for employment. In this case DSD assisted the complainant by locating an appropriate and acceptable position with another agency.
Another complainant raised concerns about the appropriateness or otherwise of some internal personnel management procedures. My office assisted the complainant by referring them to a relevant senior level manager.
The other complaint received by my office related to OSA processes. The complainant’s views were considered as part of the wider review of OSA policy and procedures which was in train at the time of the complaint.
Footnotes
71. Section 9(1A) of the Intelligence Services Act 2001.
72. IGIS Annual Report 2006–07, p. 61.