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Defence Intelligence Agencies

• New Minister
• Leadership of the Defence Intelligence Agencies
• Ministerial Directions
• Privacy of Australians
• Cross-agency OSA Inquiry – Implementation of Recommendations
• IGIS interactions with the Defence intelligence agencies
• Defence Intelligence Organisation
• Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation
• Defence Signals Directorate

Three of the six intelligence agencies which comprise the Australian Intelligence Community are administered by the Department of Defence. They are the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD).

The Minister for Defence has executive responsibility for each of these agencies.

New Minister

The Hon Joel Fitzgibbon MP resigned as the Minister for Defence on 4 June 2009. Senator the Hon John Faulkner was appointed as Minister for Defence on 9 June 2009.

Leadership of the Defence Intelligence Agencies

The Deputy Secretary of Intelligence and Security within the Department of Defence, Mr Stephen Merchant, has overarching functional responsibility for the three Defence intelligence agencies, while day-to-day management is the responsibility of the respective agency heads.

DIO is an intelligence assessment agency whose activities are subject to direction by the Chief of the Defence Force and the Secretary of the Department of Defence.

DIGO and DSD are both intelligence collection agencies. The activities of both of these agencies are regulated by the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA), ministerial directions, ministerial authorisations (MA) and privacy rules.

The foreign intelligence collection priorities for DIGO, DSD and other intelligence collection agencies of the AIC are established in a planning document that is endorsed and regularly reviewed by the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

Ministerial Directions

Section 8 of the ISA provides that the Minister for Defence must issue written directions to the Director DIGO and Director DSD, which among other things, sets out the circumstances in which the Directors must obtain an MA before engaging in particular activities.

Ministerial Directions are reviewed periodically and were last reissued by the Minister for Defence to DIGO on 25 February 2008 and to DSD 25 June 2008.

Ministerial Directions are classified documents and therefore cannot be made available to the public.

The existing Ministerial Directions have continuing legal effect until such time as they are formally revoked, or overridden, by the issue of a new, properly authorised, direction.

Privacy of Australians

DIO, DIGO and DSD do not have any domestic intelligence functions.

Section 15(1) of the ISA requires that the Minister for Defence must make written rules regulating the communications and retention by both DIGO and DSD of intelligence information concerning Australian persons (the privacy rules).

DIO is an assessment agency rather than an intelligence collection agency and as such there is a more limited prospect of its activities having an impact on the privacy of Australians.

Nonetheless, following an administrative review of the ISA in 2004, DIO implemented privacy guidelines consistent with the rules made under section 15 of the ISA, to govern the use of references to personal information about Australians in external communications – including reports, briefings, emails and advice – emanating from DIO.

Cross-agency OSA Inquiry – Implementation of Recommendations

I advised in my previous annual report that I had conducted an ‘own motion’ inquiry, into the Organisational Suitability Assessment (OSA) policy and procedures which are used by the DIO, DIGO, and DSD when determining the suitability of prospective and current employees to work in their respective agencies.[53]

Overall I found that the management of the OSA policies, procedures and practices within the Defence intelligence agencies was sound but that there was some room for improvement. So as to aid this process I made 18 specific recommendations.

The Defence intelligence agencies accepted each of the recommendations I made.

The Defence intelligence agencies have now fully implemented nine of the recommendations I made and during 2008-09 made varying levels of progress towards implementing the outstanding recommendations.

I will continue to closely monitor the implementation of my OSA-related recommendations in the coming reporting period.

IGIS interactions with the Defence intelligence agencies

Previous practice has been to devote separate chapters of each annual report to each of the three Defence intelligence agencies.

So as to better reflect the fact that the agencies in question all ultimately report through the same higher level chain of command and to the same Minister, I have decided to locate this material in a single chapter.

More detailed information about the role and functions of the three Defence intelligence agencies, and this office’s specific monitoring and review activities with respect to these agencies is therefore provided below.

Defence Intelligence Organisation

DIO is Australia’s strategic level, all-source Defence intelligence assessment agency. It provides intelligence assessments to inform the decision-making of the Department of Defence including the ADF, and the broader Australian government.

DIO’s assessments cover strategic, political, defence, military, economic, scientific and technical issues which have the potential to impact on Australia’s security interests. DIO also plays an important role in assisting with the planning, command and conduct of current and potential operations by the ADF. It assesses the strategic posture, policy and intent and the military capabilities of countries relevant to Australia’s security.

DIO focuses on overseas developments and does not concern itself with domestic concerns or situations within Australia.

DIO also has the responsibility of developing and maintaining a defence intelligence capability for use in time of crisis and conflict in support of ADF deployments around the world.

Further information about the role and functions of DIO can be found at http://www.defence.gov.au/dio.

New Director

On 16 January 2009 Major-General Richard Wilson AO replaced Major-General Maurie McNarn AO as the Director DIO.

Major-General McNarn served as Director DIO for nearly four years before his retirement and subsequent acceptance of the position of Executive Director (Operations) at the University of Queensland.

I had a number of dealings with Major-General McNarn in the period he served as Director DIO and while we did not always agree in the first instance, there is no question that he was firmly committed to maintaining the integrity of DIO’s assessment work.

In the period since he commenced as Director DIO, I have found Major-General Wilson’s approach to this office to be cooperative and constructive and I welcome the opportunity to further develop the relationship between our respective organisations.

Privacy guidelines

The DIO privacy guidelines govern the inclusion of references to personal information about Australians in external communications emanating from DIO.

In recent years I have found that four scheduled inspections per year is sufficient opportunity to inspect DIO’s adherence to the guidelines.

DIO continues to demonstrate a willingness to improve the administrative practices that underpin the guidelines. In the course of the year a number of improvements were made to the decision making and communication processes associated with references to personal information about Australian persons.

In addition to my own inspection activities, DIO has continued to annually audit its own performance with respect to the privacy guidelines.

The internal DIO audit uses a sampling methodology focussing on material produced by a randomly selected section of the organisation. Once DIO has completed the audit, the records associated with that audit are provided to me. Should I have any questions regarding the methodology or findings of the DIO audit I raise those directly with the Director.

I regard the progress that DIO has made in conducting these audits to be positive and indicative of an encouraging maturing of its internal compliance capability.

I intend to continue conducting regular inspections relating to DIO’s application of the privacy guidelines at quarterly intervals in the coming reporting period.

Training

During 2008-09 DIO continued to undertake organisation-wide programs and training to educate analysts on applying the privacy guidelines and reporting on compliance with the guidelines.

DIO’s commitment during the reporting period to ensuring that privacy guidelines training is regularly undertaken by all analysts was evident. I will continue to monitor DIO’s provision of privacy guidelines training over the coming year.

In addition to DIO’s in-house training, I make regular presentations to the AIC common induction and senior officers courses, to which DIO staff are regularly allocated places.

Information about the role and functions of my office is also accessible on DIO’s internal web pages.

Complaints and inquiries

Inquiry into DIO analytic integrity

I commenced an ‘own motion’ inquiry on 29 February 2008 into the propriety of the assessment activities of DIO.[54]

In broad terms the inquiry sought to review the integrity of DIO assessment activities, including the procedures of DIO relating to the integrity of those activities. The inquiry followed as a logical step from the work I have done in relation to ONA over the preceding two years.

Rather than the prompt for this inquiry being a particular concern on my part that there were problems within or relating to the integrity of DIO’s assessments, I initiated this inquiry as part of my continuing interest in questions concerning the independence and integrity (ie. propriety) of the assessment agencies.

I concluded this inquiry in September 2008, with the delivery of my report to the then Minister for Defence, the Hon. Joel Fitzgibbon MP.

My conclusions were generally positive, and included a finding that there was no evidence of any improper pressure on DIO as a part of the Defence White Paper formulation process.

A list of my findings is provided in a box accompanying this text.

At the conclusion of my inquiry I made two recommendations, as follows:

I am pleased to advise that DIO has accepted both of these recommendations in full and commenced their implementation.

As DIO was in the process of re-developing its training and development framework when I undertook my inquiry I made no specific recommendation in relation to training at that time.

I subsequently received a briefing on the re-developed training and development framework and was satisfied that it constituted a significant improvement on the old framework.

The executive summary of the above inquiry is available on the office website and is also provided at Annex 4 of this report.

Inquiry into alleged denial of access to an intelligence database

In my 2004-05 annual report I referred to an inquiry I had conducted into the loss on 20 December 1999 of access to a particular database experienced by several ADF intelligence officers attached to the INTERFET force in Dili, East Timor.[55]

Prior to my conducting that inquiry, The Bulletin magazine published two articles which made a number of comments about the then Director DIO, Mr Frank Lewincamp PSM, including that he had deliberately cut the intelligence officers’ access to the database and that this action may have endangered Australian lives.

Mr Lewincamp initiated legal action against Australian Consolidated Press Magazines Limited claiming that he was defamed by the two articles published by The Bulletin.

I note for the record that on 23 July 2008, the ACT Supreme Court issued a judgement that Mr Lewincamp was entitled to damages from Australian Consolidated Press Magazines Limited.

Current complaints about DIO

I received no complaints about DIO during 2008-09 which required me to conduct an inquiry. One matter was handled administratively.

Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation

DIGO is principally a foreign intelligence collection agency and in this capacity it is responsible for the acquisition and analysis of satellite and other imagery and for the development, acquisition and exploitation of geospatial data, in support of Australia’s defence and other national interests.

DIGO collects and analyses images of foreign and domestic subjects (e.g. landforms, waterways, disputed territories etc.), and develops mapping and imagery intelligence products for the ADF and a range of Commonwealth agencies.

DIGO also has the capacity to combine imagery with other available sources of data to prepare highly accurate topographical maps and other aids that are of value in the preparation of plans relevant to national defence and security, and which can be of assistance to Commonwealth and State authorities in times of natural emergency or crisis.

Further information about DIGO can be found on its website which is located at http://www.defence.gov.au/digo.

Significant issues

Bushfire support

DIGO provided significant support to the ADF and Victorian State authorities in the immediate aftermath of the bushfire crisis which struck Victoria in February 2009.

The provision of relevant imagery and mapping products significantly assisted the ADF to coordinate/plan response and recovery activities.

The provision of this assistance was appropriately authorised by the Director DIGO.

Inspection activities

Ministerial and Director DIGO authorisations

Members of my staff and I visit DIGO headquarters regularly to review materials relating to DIGO’s collection activities.

In the course of these visits we review every MA which has been issued by the Minister for Defence in the period since the previous visit, and we also examine any approvals given by the Director DIGO in the same period.

The Minister authorises sensitive collection activities undertaken by DIGO. The number of authorisations
is small.

A ministerial direction provides the Director DIGO with the capacity to authorise a range of less sensitive collection activities.

During 2008-09 DIGO made a number of significant improvements to its compliance framework that increased the rigour of the decision making process for Director’s authorisation and resulted in greater alignment with the compliance framework of other ISA agencies. These changes were initiated by DIGO and I commend the organisation for its commitment to improving its internal governance processes.

In the reporting period there were no instances identified where DIGO undertook collection without a valid authorisation.

During one inspection period DIGO referred inspection staff to one instance where a Director DIGO’s approval had not been sought to cover the ongoing analysis of data previously obtained under the previous Nationality Rules. Under the ISA this activity would require a Director’s approval but was overlooked as no new collection had been tasked. The anomaly was noticed when data was being compiled for inclusion in an intelligence report.

In the case in question I was satisfied that if a renewal of the authorisation had been sought it would undoubtedly have been granted. While no error is desirable I was satisfied that this was an inadvertent administrative breach of internal policy and the nature of the information collected did not impact on the privacy of any individual.

DIGO privacy rules

During my regular visits to DIGO headquarters my staff and I also closely examine all tasking requests that are levied on DIGO to ensure that they comply with its privacy rules.

DIGO faces some unique challenges in applying its privacy rules in that those rules are predicated on the assumption that the privacy of “Australian persons” will be protected, unless appropriate justification is put forward to enable the reporting of intelligence information to recipients with an established need
to know.

Although the application of the privacy rules has its complexities for each of the ISA agencies, it can be more difficult for DIGO because its reporting is primarily image-based and focussed on property or premises, which may or may not be an “Australian person” for the purposes of the privacy rules.

The term “Australian person” has a broader meaning than living human being, and is also applicable to bodies corporate which are registered in Australia and controlled by Australians. By extension this can be applied to premises or property controlled by Australian companies.

While this does create some interpretative issues from time to time, for the most part it has a limited impact upon DIGO’s business operations because the vast majority of DIGO’s reporting has an off-shore focus, in which case the privacy rules have a much more limited application.

On the basis of our periodic inspections I am satisfied that DIGO is genuinely committed to strictly applying the privacy rules.

Meetings with senior DIGO staff

As with each of the other collection agencies, I think there is distinct benefit in meeting regularly with senior agency staff to candidly discuss matters of mutual interest or concern.

During the reporting period I met regularly with the Director DIGO, often coinciding with the office’s scheduled inspection visits.

At the conclusion of each inspection my staff and/or I also meet with representatives from DIGO’s policy and compliance area and on occasions with DIGO’s Legal Counsel, to discuss issues of mutual interest and any concerns arising from the inspection activities.

I am appreciative that all DIGO staff who have been involved in these exchanges have done so very positively.

Training

A member of my office participated in a DIGO training course during the reporting period. While my office did not give any specific presentations to DIGO staff, a number of presentations to AIC-wide induction and senior officer courses included DIGO personnel.

Briefings and demonstrations

I and a member of my staff had the opportunity to observe a live training exercise during one of our visits to DIGO. I found the briefing and demonstration we received to be of a high quality and provided me with appropriate insight into DIGO’s specialist capabilities.

Complaints and inquiries

During the 2008-09 reporting period there were no complaints received by my office relating to DIGO, nor was there any trigger which warranted inquiry action on my part.

Defence Signals Directorate

DSD is Australia’s national authority for signals intelligence (sigint), and for information
security (infosec).

DSD collects foreign sigint and produces and disseminates reports based on the intelligence information it collects. These reports are provided to key policymakers and select government agencies with a clear and established need to know.

In performing this function DSD must not intercept communications within the domestic Australian telecommunications network. If the collection of foreign intelligence requires such interception, this can only be conducted by ASIO under warrant authority.

The other significant function DSD performs is to provide infosec products and services to the Australian Government and to the ADF. The underlying purpose of this function is to protect Australian official communications and information systems from unauthorised access and other potential threats.

As Australia’s infosec authority DSD also plays an important role working with industry towards the development of new cryptographic products and in the evaluation and testing of other information security products.

During the reporting period DSD also assumed responsibility from International Policy Division in the Department of Defence for management of policy in relation to joint defence facilities located in Australia.

Further information about DSD can be found at http://www.dsd.gov.au.

Significant issues

Compliance oversight of the Australian Defence Organisation – ADF signals intelligence and capability development activities

DSD has formal compliance oversight responsibilities in relation to the specialist units of the ADF which are involved in the collection and dissemination of foreign sigint and where applicable, the activities of Defence Science and Technology Organisation’s (DSTO) personnel in developing specialist capabilities.

Formal oversight responsibility in relation to the specialist units of the ADF was assigned to DSD in a directive issued by the Chief of the Defence Force on 4 September 2007.

The above directive establishes the same compliance framework for the ADF that is applicable to DSD under the ISA and the DSD privacy rules, excepting that the activities of these specialist ADF units do not fall directly within my remit. However, I am legally empowered to monitor and review DSD’s interactions with these units and this is what I do.

During 2008-09 I visited some of these specialist units, with a senior member of DSD, and was satisfied with the compliance regimes and reporting processes put in place by DSD. I received regular updates from DSD in relation to DSD’s oversight regime and compliance training during the reporting period.

The responsibility in relation to particular DSTO personnel was formalised in an agreement between the Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security and the Chief Defence Scientist on 2 June 2009.

Support to military operations

DSD devotes significant resources to meeting the needs of the ADF and the wider Defence Organisation.

In the last 10 years the number and variety of ADF deployments has increased significantly. At the end of the reporting period, some 3 300 ADF personnel were deployed to a variety of locations including but not limited to Afghanistan, Middle East, Iraq, East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Sinai and Sudan.

As this list reflects, the operational environments into which service personnel are deployed can range from the relatively benign to the extremely hostile.

So as to minimise the risks that the ADF deployments face and to facilitate their operational effectiveness, as well as to ensure the operations of these deployments are not compromised, DSD is increasingly called upon to provide high-quality and timely sigint and infosec products and services to the ADF.

In the course of conducting these activities, incidental information not directly relating to the deployment may be obtained that requires further investigation or referral to the appropriate authorities. These situations arise rarely. DSD informs me in a timely manner in relation to these small number of cases and I am satisfied that DSD has handled these matters appropriately.

During 2008-09 I asked DSD to reconsider the information provided to deployed ADF personnel, to ensure that there is an appropriate awareness of DSD monitoring activities and that incidental information not necessarily relating to operational security may be referred to the appropriate authorities for consideration, should the need to do so arise.

I received several briefings throughout 2008-09 on the support provided to the ADF by DSD, and on a range of related issues.

These briefings and discussions have indicated that DSD is properly focussed on delivering to the ADF the best possible service it is able to provide.

Support for counter-terrorism activities

While providing support to military operations is a critical part of DSD’s mission, it is not the only function DSD performs.

A very important focus for DSD in the current global security environment is to collect and communicate foreign intelligence information connected with terrorism-related targets.

Collecting and communicating information of this kind directly assists the government in reducing the risks posed by these targets to Australian persons and Australian interests, both in Australia and abroad.

Inspection activities

During 2008-09 my office undertook the following inspection activities:

• reviewing MA submissions made by DSD to the Minister for Defence relating to Australian persons
• monitoring DSD reporting for compliance with the ISA and the DSD privacy rules
• quarterly reviews of assessments made by DSD of Commonwealth agency networks, and
• holding monthly meetings with relevant DSD officers to discuss compliance, intelligence policy, and legal issues.

The ISA provides a framework within which DSD can deliberately collect the foreign communications of Australians, in limited circumstances.

If DSD wishes to obtain an MA to intercept the foreign communications of an Australian person, the Minister for Defence must be satisfied that the person of interest is, or is likely to be, involved in one or more of a range of activities including:

• activities that present a significant risk to a person’s safety
• acting for, or behalf of a foreign power
• activities that are, or are likely to be a threat to security, or
• committing a serious crime.[56]

In order to obtain an MA, the Director DSD provides a comprehensive written submission to the Minister for Defence in respect of each individual about whom DSD wishes to produce intelligence.

My office has access to the details of every authorisation which is approved, and I and my staff review documentation for each new or renewed authorisation, usually within a few weeks of the authorisation being granted.

In the course of the reporting period my office did not identify any substantive concerns about the authorisations provided by the Minister for Defence. In one instance I asked a question that was procedural in nature. I am satisfied that in this particular circumstance, as with each authorisation reviewed by my office, the authorisation was sufficient.

DSD’s internal compliance measures

DSD places significant emphasis on ensuring that its activities are compliant with all applicable laws and policies across the full range of its activities.

DSD has developed its internal compliance and oversight capability over many years, including funding a fully staffed section that is focused solely on ensuring DSD’s compliance with relevant legislation and fostering awareness of compliance requirements throughout DSD. Through this capability DSD clearly demonstrates the depth of its commitment to complying with its legislative framework.

DSD’s compliance and oversight team is responsible for developing and maintaining policies, procedures and other forms of guidance for DSD staff, providing training to DSD staff and monitoring DSD’s compliance performance.

It has been my experience as the Inspector-General that DSD has a strong compliance culture, and that staff across the organisation are generally very well schooled in their legal obligations.

While the number of errors that DSD makes are very small proportionally speaking, where the compliance and oversight team identifies that an error has been made, it responds in the first instance and consults with my office at the first available opportunity.

I have found over a number of years that DSD’s compliance staff thoroughly considers each issue that arises and where appropriate develops sound remediation.

My staff and I engage in regular dialogue with DSD’s compliance staff on a range of issues. This relationship is a constructive one that contributes significantly to my overall confidence in the Directorate.

Privacy rules – monitoring and compliance

The DSD privacy rules enable DSD to include references to Australian persons in its reporting, in limited circumstances, and so long as these references are properly justified in accordance with the privacy rules.

The incidence of Australian persons being identified in DSD reporting is extremely low relative to the number of reports DSD disseminates.

The privacy rules require that if DSD identifies that it has communicated intelligence concerning an Australian person either contrary to the requirements of the privacy rules or because the basis for presuming that a particular person is not an “Australian person” is subsequently found to be incorrect, then it is to consult with me with a view to determining the appropriate course of action to protect that person’s privacy.

During 2008-09 there were a very small number of occasions where DSD communicated intelligence concerning an Australian person contrary to the requirements of the privacy rules.

The most common cause for this occurrence is when a person is living abroad and comes to attention through being actively involved in the affairs of that country, and it is only subsequently learnt that the person concerned also maintains Australian citizenship or is a permanent resident.

Once it is ascertained that the individual meets the legal definition of being an Australian person, DSD gives consideration to seeking an MA from the Minister for Defence.

DSD also considers the most appropriate approach to retention or destruction of any intelligence information collected that pertains to that person. DSD consults with me and I give consideration to whether its proposed approach is appropriate.

Monthly meetings

I meet each month with the Director of DSD, or in his absence, with one of the Deputy Directors, staff from the compliance and oversight team, staff from DSD’s intelligence policy team, and DSD’s Special Counsel.

These meetings typically involve broad-ranging discussion on privacy rules casework, collection priorities, MAs, legislative and parliamentary reviews, and current legal and operational issues, as well as topical issues of mutual interest.

I find these meeting useful in monitoring topical issues and maintaining a sound understanding of DSD activities.

Projects

During 2008-09 my office completed the first stage of a project on assessments made by DSD of Commonwealth agency computer networks. These assessments are typically undertaken by DSD to identify and help counter vulnerabilities in Australian government information technology networks. Such assessments are only undertaken at the request of a Commonwealth agency and under the strict terms and conditions of an MOU with that agency. These activities form part of DSD’s infosec role.

The focus of my project was to review the legal and policy framework under which these activities are conducted, the procedures and controls put in place, the MOU between DSD and agencies requesting the assessment, data handling and retention, privacy considerations, reporting and general record keeping.

This project included access to all of the relevant documentation, a briefing, and consultation with DSD Special Counsel. My staff and I also received a demonstration of ‘live’ assessment activities conducted on a range of government systems.

The nature of the activity means that DSD needs to tailor its approach to best fit the agency systems being assessed. The authorisation and MOU process ensures that DSD’s consideration of the privacy of individuals, the handling of personal data and the control of access to systems is appropriately rigorous.

I found that overarching procedures and policies needed to be better documented to support these activities.

DSD has been very responsive to the report and development of this supporting framework was well underway at the end of the reporting period.

The second stage of the project will address those matters, if any, arising from the inquiries I have already made and DSD’s progress in relation to formalising the supporting policies and procedures framework discussed above.

My office also began initial scoping work on another set of activities conducted by DSD. Due to the sensitivity of these activities I am unable to provide any further details within this report.

New collection activities

In order to remain effective DSD must continually enhance its collection activities and counter threats to its capabilities.

DSD regularly informs me of its capability development projects and we discuss any aspects of these projects that could give rise to concerns about legality and propriety.

I was pleased that DSD briefed me on several such projects during the reporting period and seriously addressed the various questions which I asked.

Training

DSD continues to devote significant resources to delivering technical and professional training opportunities to its staff on a wide range of subject matters, including compliance with the ISA.

In this reporting period senior members of my staff delivered 12 presentations to DSD staff on the role of my office and the principles underpinning the ISA.

Complaints and inquiries

The level of complaint about DSD is generally low because its intelligence function is to collect foreign sigint. Given this focus DSD’s activities are unlikely to come to the notice of or impact directly on members of the Australian public.

Four complaints were received during 2008-09 all of which were employment related. Three of these complaints were the subject of preliminary inquiry and one was handled administratively. I also conducted one significant ‘own motion’ inquiry during the same period.

There were no complaints carried over from 2007-08 and only one complaint which has been carried forward to 2009-10.

Alleged spying on the Minister for Defence by DSD

On 26 March 2009 allegations appeared in various media outlets that an individual or individuals employed by DSD may have improperly accessed information technology used by the then Minister for Defence, the Hon. Joel Fitzgibbon MP, as part of a covert investigation into the Minister’s activities and associations by persons working within the Defence Department.

Immediately after the allegations were published, the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Mr Nick Warner PSM, directed the Head of the Defence Security Authority (DSA) to undertake an investigation to determine whether there was any basis to the allegations of Department of Defence involvement.

On 27 March 2009 I initiated an ‘own motion’ inquiry in accordance with section 8 of the IGIS Act.

Due to the fact that the IGIS Act limits my jurisdiction to the activities of the six AIC agencies, it was agreed between Mr Warner, the Head of DSA, and myself, that the primary focus of my inquiry would relate to the allegations pertaining to the alleged involvement of a DSD employee or employees, and that the DSA inquiry would exclude DSD from its remit.

The DSA report was finalised on 14 May 2009, and is available on the Department of Defence website.[57] The principal finding of the DSA inquiry was that it had found no evidence within Defence to support the allegations.

I finalised my inquiry on 1 June 2009. At the conclusion of my inquiry I had reached a firm view that the media allegations in respect of DSD personnel were incorrect, and as a consequence of this there was no basis for me to make any recommendations.

A copy of my inquiry report is provided at Annex 3 of this annual report and can also be found on the IGIS website.[58]

The formal findings of my report are as follows:

Preliminary inquiries

There were three preliminary inquiries undertaken into complaints made about DSD during the reporting period (a fourth was initiated just before the end of the reporting period).

One of the complainants sought clarification of his security accreditation status to determine whether he was precluded from conducting consultancy work for DSD. My office conducted a preliminary inquiry into this matter and established that DSD had made an error. DSD apologised for the error and formally clarified the complainant’s security status.

Another complainant raised concerns related to DSD’s ability to locate information relating to an employee’s organisational suitability assessment. The assessment process necessarily involves the collection and retention of personally sensitive information about an individual. DSD is in the process of conducting a comprehensive census of these records and will report its findings to me early in the next reporting period.

My office was also contacted by a contractor in relation to the appropriateness of actions taken by DSD relating to personnel management issues. At the same time an independent investigation was separately undertaken by the complainant’s employer in relation to the same matter.

The inquiries made by my office identified procedural concerns relating to the management of the matter and DSD took appropriate action within Australian Public Service guidelines.

Matters handled administratively

One complaint received by my office related to an unsuccessful application for employment within DSD on the basis of an organisational suitability assessment. My office assisted to resolve this matter by arranging the opportunity for the complainant to receive general feedback from the psychologist involved in the process.

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