Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)

For various reasons, my contacts with ASIS (and DSD) were not as extensive as with ASIO. I was given full briefings on the work of the Service soon after I took up my appointment last September. I had a meeting with the president of the Staff and Welfare Association and a briefing by him in company with a senior officer about the structure of the Service. In company with senior officials from various Government Departments, I attended a two day seminar about the Service. I conducted spot-checks on the way in which ASIS was handling any foreign intelligence information received about Australian persons and companies.

My attempts to develop closer links with ASIS staff were not, at first, welcomed by management. This was a matter of deep concern to me. ASIS (as well as ASIO) staff have to be confident of their access to me if my independence and the important role that is provided for the Inspector-General in the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act in respect of various staffing matters are to be maintained. While not seeking to drum up business, it is essential for staff members of the intelligence agencies to know the Inspector-General on a personal, even if limited, basis so that if the time should come that they need to use the avenue available to them they will be able to do so with confidence. Having prior contact with the Inspector-General and his office plays an important part in developing that confidence. Accordingly, I met with the Director-General, who then made arrangements for me to speak to two large meetings of ASIS staff, to explain the role of the Inspector-General and to ensure that they understood that if they had difficulties that they felt unable to resolve they would be able to come to me for help. I hope in future to be able to go around to meet each one of them individually, as I have done in other agencies.

ASIS and Propriety

ASIS took the unusual, but welcome, step of seeking my views on the propriety of their undertaking a particular course of action before deciding whether to embark on it.

I gave my views and the matter was subsequently taken up with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. However, it has now been decided not to proceed with the proposal.

ASIS's procedures for ensuring that the Service acts legally and with propriety

Various guidelines exist to ensure that ASIS acts legally and with propriety.

Other safeguards are built into the ASIS Directive.

ASIS Staffing Matters

There are established grievance procedures covering the Service and advice has been circulated to Service members about my Office and my functions.

No grievances or complaints were put to me by any member of ASIS. 1 hope that this truly reflects a well-run Service with good morale.

DSD

During the period under review I visited the DSD headquarters in Melbourne on various occasions to be briefed about different aspects of the work of the Directorate and to conduct spot-checks on whether the Directorate was acting in accordance with the Rules on Foreign Signals Intelligence and Australian persons. I also visited a number of DSD stations.

I do not have the same range of responsibilities for staffing matters in respect of DSD as I have for ASIO and ASIS, and there was not the same need to develop a close relationship with DSD staff. At the invitation of the Director, DSD, I spoke to all senior staff about the functions and responsibilities of my Office.

DSD and the Rules on Foreign Signals Intelligence and Australian Persons

Considerable effort has gone into ensuring that these rules are not breached and I think it fair to say that the program for this is working very effectively.

DSD's Procedures for ensuring that the Directorate acts Legally and with Propriety

The procedures and safeguards which have been put in place by DSD to ensure that the Directorate meets the rules governing foreign signals intelligence and Australian persons are satisfactory and are working well, but there is a continuing need to ensure that DSD's cooperating colleagues overseas understand our rules and the need to observe them.

ONA and JIO

As there were no requests from Ministers to conduct investigations into ONA and JIO, and as there were no references regarding these agencies in relation to human rights, my dealings with these agencies were limited to keeping in touch with the Directors and staff of both. I counselled one staff member of the ONA about a personnel problem that he was experiencing.

Work Program and Outlook for 1990-91

This has been a busy year but next year looks like being even busier.

Apart from continuing activities such as investigating complaints, conducting spot-checks on the activities of agencies and the regular program of visits to the agencies and meetings with their management, staff associations and individual staff members, my office is likely also to be involved in:

  • monitoring the flow, both ways, of information passed between ASIO and the various police forces under the inter-governmental agreements on the subject;
  • what may be a difficult and time-consuming case involving allegations of discrimination by ASIO against an ASIO officer on grounds of race, gender and her submissions to Mr Justice Hope;
  • examining the way in which ASIO handles requests made of it under the Archives Act ;
  • examining ASIO's program for disposing of records in accordance with disposal schedules approved by the Director-General of Archives to ensure that ASIO does not maintain files on people about whom there is no longer a security interest;
  • following developments in the dispute between some staff and ASIO management regarding new employment contracts, and possibly conducting an inquiry into this matter; and
  • ensuring ASIO's adherence to Privacy Guidelines (assuming these are issued during the year).

Staffing and Administration

The functioning and management of my office presents some unique aspects. With a staff of four, the office is nevertheless deemed to be a separate Department in the Australian Public Service: section 32(2) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act. As a consequence the members of my staff perform a variety of duties which broadens their work experience and enhances multi-skilling. On the other hand there is not much inherent flexibility to deal with unforeseen events without calling on extra resources. If in future more than one major inquiry were to be conducted at any given time my office's capacity would be swamped. This prospect faces me in the forthcoming year. Control of the office's resources tends to be an exercise in micro-management, with the constant need to interpret and adapt guidelines and statutory provisions designed for much larger organisations. Consequently, administrative matters make disproportionate demands on staff resources. One means of coping has been to rely for administrative support on the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Staffing Matters

Mr Neil McInnes AM, ceased full-time duty as the first Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, when he retired on 5 September, 1989. He was re-appointed on a part-time basis, pending the appointment of his successor, until 27 September, 1989.

I took up my appointment as Inspector-General on 28 September, 1989. Previously I had been Deputy Public Service Commissioner.

No other staffing changes occurred during the year.

Location

In August 1989, the office moved from Macarthur House, Lyneham to 3-5 National Circuit, Barton, the building occupied by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Many benefits and efficiencies have resulted.

Equal Employment Opportunity Program

By arrangement with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Department's EEO Program also covers the staff of my office. In addition, my officers are actively encouraged to participate in staff development and training courses offered within the Public Service and beyond.

Industrial Democracy

Because of its size, sharing information and consulting and involving the staff in my office in decisions affecting their working lives does not pose a difficulty. All possible steps have been taken to maintain an awareness of industrial democracy and its application.

Staffing

  • Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
    Mr Neil McInnes (until 27/9/89)
    Mr Roger Holdich (from 28/9/89)
  • Principal Executive Officer
    Mr Philip Moss
  • Personal Assistant to the Inspector-General
    Ms Ros Tassaker (acting)
  • Clerical Assistant
    Ms Lyn Holt

Organisation chart (as at 30 June 1990)

  • Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
    (Statutory Office-holder, Secretary equivalent)
  • Principal Executive Officer
    (Senior Executive Band 1)
  • Personal Assistant to the Inspector-General
    (Administrative Service Officer Class 4)
  • Clerical Assistant
    (Administrative Service Officer Class 2)