Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)

In my last annual report I referred to difficulties that I had experienced in obtaining access to the staff of ASIS. I am pleased to be able to report that those difficulties have been overcome and that during the year under review I had a number of meetings with ASIS staff both individually and in groups. I regard my free access to staff and their access to me as of vital importance if I am to carry out my functions properly.

As happened last year, I was given briefings on ASIS activities whenever I or the Director-General felt it to be necessary. I also met from time to time with the President of the ASIS Staff and Welfare Association. I addressed various ASIS training courses about the role of my Office and its place in the general accountability arrangements for the intelligence and security community. Finally, I conducted regular spot-checks on the way in which ASIS was handling any foreign intelligence information received about Australian persons and companies.

From what I have seen, I believe that ASIS is very conscious of the need to act legally and with propriety and is in fact doing so. I believe that the procedures that the Service has in place to ensure that it continues to act in this way are effective and are working well.

ASIS staffing matters

During the year I spent a considerable amount of time exercising a "good offices' role between the management of ASIS and an ASIS officer and his wife. The officer concerned had an extension to his posting foreshortened due to new plans, and there had been complaints about him from members of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He and his wife were subsequently the subject of various allegations by members of the overseas post and the Department. In investigating these individual allegations, ASIS management in effect 'slid" almost imperceptibly into a review of the allegations without the officer being fully aware, and eventually into a full-scale investigation, the terms of which were then explained to the officer. Naturally enough, the officer and his wife were extremely upset about the nature and outcome of the investigation and they sought my help.

I decided to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the matter, and after I had read the various papers and had discussions with ASIS management and the officer concerned, I decided to suggest ways in which the inquiry could be put on a proper footing and expedited. My suggestions were acceptable to the Director-General of ASIS and the officer and were taken as the basis for the finalisation of the ASIS investigation. At the time of writing, the matter has still not been completely finalised and there is a prospect that I may be asked to conduct a full inquiry into it, including into the legality and propriety of ASIS management's actions.

I also received complaints from two ex-members of ASIS who had left the Service after being withdrawn on the closure of an overseas post. One of the ex-members had had serious differences with the Head of Mission. I conducted a preliminary inquiry into the complaint and propose to seek the Foreign Minister's approval to go into full inquiry mode. (I need to obtain the Minister's approval in this case because the events complained of occurred before the commencement of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 and outside Australia, and under my legislation I must obtain Ministerial approval in such cases.)During the Gulf Crisis the Defence Signals Directorate approached me to seek my agreement to some temporary changes the rules relating to signals intelligence and Australian persons and companies. The practical application of these rules can cause some delay in forwarding product to relevant agencies and in view of the increased threats of terrorist acts against Australian nationals and interests during this period any such delays were considered to be unacceptable.

I agreed and the Minister for Defence subsequently confirmed that he also agreed to the changes in these rules for the duration of the crisis subject to a number of strict guidelines. A subsequent inquiry I conducted to determine DSD's compliance with the temporary arrangements found only a small number of technical breaches which were all resolved well within the guidelines endorsed by the Minister.

Apart from this, I visited DSD headquarters in Melbourne on various occasions to receive briefings about the work of the Directorate and to conduct spot-checks designed to ascertain whether the Directorate was carrying out its functions legally and with propriety. I believe that they are doing so and that the procedures and safeguards that they have put in place to ensure that they continue to do so are working well.

DSD

During the Gulf Crisis the Defence Signals Directorate approached me to seek my agreement to some temporary changes the rules relating to signals intelligence and Australian persons and companies. The practical application of these rules can cause some delay in forwarding product to relevant agencies and in view of the increased threats of terrorist acts against Australian nationals and interests during this period any such delays were considered to be unacceptable.

ONA and DIO

There were no requests from Ministers to conduct investigations into ONA and DIO, and there were no references regarding these agencies in relation to human rights. As was the case in the previous year, therefore, my dealings with these agencies were limited to keeping in touch with the Directors and staff of both.

Overseas visit

With your approval I visited the United States and Canada for discussions with my counterparts and with the various intelligence and security agencies in both countries. I also met with other bodies in both places concerned with the accountability of the intelligence and security communities there. In addition I gave a paper on the work of my Office at the annual meeting of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies.

The accountability arrangements in the United States community are extensive.

Apart from their accountability to various of the President's Oversight Board, the two Congressional committees, the Attorney-General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary for Defense, the courts and bodies such as the Department of Justice, many agencies have their own Inspectors-General, although the latter do not perform the same range of functions as does my Office, being rather more in the nature of internal auditors who report to the heads of their own agency. The only one who comes anywhere near to approximating my own Office is the newly appointed independent Inspector-General of the CIA. However, even here there is an important difference, because the Director of the CIA can prevent him on national security grounds from undertaking an investigation; should this occur, the Congressional committees must be told and the Inspector-General can tell them his side of the story.

I was interested to compare staffing arrangements in the FBI with those in ASIO. Neither body is staffed by "regular" public servants (ie under the Public Service Act), and neither is unionised, although the FBI staff are well-enough organised to have hired attorneys to represent them from time to time in their disputes with management. The FBI has an Ombudsman and an EEO Office, but despite this there have recently been occasions when group action has been taken by FBI officials, including two occasions when the action has been organised on the basis of race. FBI officials enjoy permanency and similar conditions to those of the public service. By comparison, ASIO officials are employed under individual contracts with the Director-General of Security and their terms and conditions of service are to be in accord with the Government's public sector employment principles.In Canada, approximately 36 people are engaged in overseeing the work of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. There is an Inspector-General with a staff of about 15. As well, there is an external review body, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which consists of five Privy Councillors and, like the Inspector-General, has a staff of about 15.

There is no similar independent review of the work of the CSE (the Canadian Communication Security Establishment, the equivalent of our DSD).

Finally, it is worth noting that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service pays the salary of the president and one member of the Staff Association to work full time on Association matters. In addition, the Service employs a Director of Staff Relations as a sort of internal ombudsman. Both of these seem especially desirable for a closed agency such as a security intelligence body, whose members cannot join a union or have access to the various review bodies that public servants are able to use.

Work program and outlook for 1991-92

This has been a very busy year but next year is unlikely to be any less busy.

I propose to continue my program of visits, spot-checks, discussions and investigations. In addition I expect there will be some more significant activity for my Office once the Privacy Guidelines have been issued.

On-going cases that will require priority treatment are:

the case involving allegations of discrimination by ASIO against an ex-ASIO officer on grounds of race, gender and her submissions to Mr Justice Hope;
the complaints that ASIO has not met its obligations under the Archives Act; and
the various complaints that have been made to me by ASIO staff against ASIO management.

Staffing and administration

Administrative matters continue to make disproportionate demands on us. With only four members of staff, the Office is faced with the constant need to interpret and adapt guidelines and legislation designed for much larger organisations. This situation can be frustrating especially when staff might otherwise have been available to concentrate more fully on inquiries in order to finalise them sooner.

Staffing Changes

There was one change to the permanent staff of the office with Ms Kerrie Dwyer taking up duty as my personal assistant.

The temporary transfer of two officers, one from ASIS and the other from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, helped significantly with several large inquiries in progress during the year. With the increasing number of investigations involving complex and sensitive issues, I sought an extra position in the staffing establishment of the Office and an upgrading of two existing positions.

Accommodation

The Office is collocated with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet at 3-5 National Circuit, Barton. This is an ideal arrangement for the proper functioning of my Office because, apart from providing secure premises, it enables easy access to our portfolio department for the purposes of liaison and administrative support.

Industrial Democracy

The Office's Industrial Democracy Plan states the need to create and maintain an awareness of Industrial Democracy and its application, consultation on issues of industrial significance and the involvement of staff in decisions concerning the workplace. These objectives have been met during the year.

Equal Employment Opportunity

By arrangement with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Department's Equal Employment Opportunity Program also covers the staff of my office.

Composition of Office

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
Mr Roger Holdich
Principal Executive Officer
Mr Philip Moss
Personal Assistant to the Inspector-General
Ms Ros Tassaker (until 27 July 1990)
Ms Kerrie Dwyer (from 31 July 1990)
Clerical Assistant
Ms Lyn Holt

Staffing structure (As at 30 June 1991)

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
(Statutory Office-holder, Secretary equivalent)
Principal Executive officer
(Senior Executive Band 1)
Personal Assistant to the Inspector-General
(Administrative Service Officer Class 4)
Clerical Assistant
(Administrative Service Officer Class 2)

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