Role and responsibilities of the Inspector-General

The role and responsibilities of the Inspector-General are mainly set out in the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act. Briefly, I am to help Ministers oversee the activities of Australia's intelligence and security agencies to ensure that the agencies act legally and with propriety, comply with Ministerial guidelines and directives and respect human rights. The thinking behind giving me the power to investigate compliance with human rights is to meet the need for such matters to be examined by an independent authority with unrestricted access to classified information.

My responsibilities vary from agency to agency, broadly in accordance with the degree to which the agency concerned has the potential to intrude into the lives of Australian citizens. Thus I have:

  • Limited responsibilities and powers regarding the Office of National Assessments (ONA) and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). Apart from matters relating to human rights and grievance procedures, which I can investigate of my own motion, I can conduct inquiries only at the request of the responsible Minister, that is, the Prime Minister in the case of ONA and the Minister for Defence in respect of DIO.
  • Substantial responsibilities and powers regarding DSD and ASIS. As well as having the power to investigate human rights and grievance procedures, I can conduct inquiries into the legality and propriety of acts by these bodies. I can do this in response to a complaint, at the request of the responsible Minister (that is, the Defence Minister in respect of DSD and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the case of ASIS), or of my own motion.
  • Greatest responsibilities and powers in respect of ASIO, where I have the same responsibilities as I have for DSD and ASIS but also have the power to protect the rights of a person who has no recourse to the Security Appeals Tribunal and against whom ASIO has furnished an adverse report. I also have the power to review certain directions given to ASIO by the Attorney-General. In respect of the latter, the Attorney-General cannot override the opinion of the Director-General of Security on the question of whether the collection or communication of intelligence about a particular individual is justified on security grounds, except by a direction in writing setting out the Attorney's reasons.

I have the function of inquiring into such directions, and am specifically concerned with the question of whether collection is justified by reason of its relevance to security or whether communication would be for a purpose relevant to security. I can also, of my own motion, investigate ASIO's procedures that are designed to ensure that the Organisation acts legally and with propriety. (I can conduct such investigations into the procedures of the other agencies only if the responsible Minister asks me to do so.)

I also have significant responsibilities for various starring matters in respect of ASIS. I can, for example, inquire into complaints concerning employment-related matters such as promotions, termination of employment, discipline or remuneration, although I can conduct such inquiries only if the complainant has first tried to resolve the problem by using the agency's internal grievance procedures. I have those same powers also in respect of ASIO, but the situation has changed with the appointment in July 199I of an independent chairperson of the ASIO grievance review committee. During the year, the Director-General of Security also appointed independent chairpersons to preside over other employment-related review committees. These independent chairpersons have the power to decide the outcome of the matters referred to them. Section 8(7) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act prevents me from inquiring into a complaint made by an employee of ASIO where the matter can be reviewed by a person external to ASIO.

The arrangements ASIO now has in place have no effect on my informal ombudsman/staff counselling role to members of the intelligence agencies. This source of independent advice reduces the risk of work-related problems being discussed beyond the Organisation or my Office with a consequent risk to national security.

During the course of the year, the Attorney-General issued a set of guidelines to ASIO, on the collection of intelligence. These are the guidelines to which I referred in my last annual report and which require ASIO to take account of privacy in the performance of its statutory functions. They have been tabled in the Parliament.

The following are the main statutes, Ministerial guidelines and agreements which I must take into account in my overseeing role:

Statutes

  • The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986
  • The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979
  • The Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979
  • The Archives Act 1983
  • The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986

Other

  • The Directive to the Director-General of ASIS
  • Rules for the Retention and Communication by ASIS of Foreign Intelligence Information concerning Australian Persons
  • DSD Rules on Foreign Signals Intelligence and Australian Persons
  • ASIO Ministerial Guidelines on:
  • Politically Motivated Violence (tabled in Parliament on 3 June 1988)
  • Sections 85 and 86 of the ASIO Act (issued in September 1989 and amended on 8 November 1990. this set of guidelines covers certain staffing matters, especially relating to the determination of salaries and terms and conditions of employment)
  • Intelligence Relevant to Security (issued 30 November 1992)
  • Draft Agreements Governing the Exchange of Information between ASIO and the State and Northern Territory Police Services

Public complaints against the Intelligence and Security Agencies

During the year my Office received 25 complaints which seemed worthy of serious examination. Of these, 22 were against ASIO, the remainder being against ASIS (one) and DSD (two).

We also received a number of complaints from people who were clearly mentally disturbed. I was taken to task last year by a national newspaper for wasting time on these complaints by checking with ASIO to ascertain whether the complainants had ever been of interest to them. I make no apology for doing this. While it may be immediately obvious to many people that a particular complaint is so far-fetched as to have no substance to it, this is not obvious to the complainant. It takes only a few minutes for me to look up ASIO's indices, and this enables me truthfully to tell the complainant that I have personally checked and can assure them that ASIO has no interest in them. Hopefully, this provides some comfort to them. I have therefore continued to take this approach and shall do so in the future.

During the year we disposed of 20 substantive complaints. This compares with a disposal rate of 33 substantive complaints the previous year and 14 during 1990-91,

The disparity in the figures demonstrates again the difficulty of achieving an accurate picture of the efficiency or otherwise of my Office by relying on the figures. They are lower this year than last because four particular cases, which proved to be extremely complex and demanding, took up a disproportionate amount of the Office's time. One of the cases took up approximately one-third of the total resources of my Office during the year.

As I noted last year, I recognise that the length of time it takes to complete some inquiries can be very trying for complainants. I am aware of the stress caused especially for those people whose futures may depend on the outcome of my investigations. However, in spite of my best efforts, slender resources coupled with the complexity and seriousness of some of the issues complained of sometimes result in long delay before an inquiry can be completed.

At the end of the year 19 cases remained outstanding.