Print this page
Australian Secret Intelligence Service(ASIS)
Monitoring Activities
63. Foreign Intelligence concerning Australian Persons: As in previous years I have conducted regular examinations of the way in which ASIS met the requirements laid down by the Government for the handling of foreign intelligence in which Australian persons (including companies) were named. The monitoring of ASIS's compliance with the Government's rules has involved me in regular visits to ASIS to examine foreign intelligence documents in which Australian persons were named, and in discussing doubtful cases with ASIS officers. The foreign intelligence reports that name Australian names are compiled by ASIS for examination by the Inspector-General. Each report is assessed by me against the rules and discussed with ASIS. I think it is fair to say that ASIS has a good understanding of the rules and makes very few mistakes indeed. During 199I approximately 24 per cent of all reports where Australian persons or companies were named were, in my view, breaches of the rules, but last year fewer than 10 per cent were in breach of the rules.
64. Many of the mistakes made were in my view understandable, given the need for desk officers to interpret what are fairly complex rules, and some of them are technical in nature. By this I mean that the names quoted are often those of Australians in the public eye or of large Australian companies. Very few breaches relate to ordinary Australians. If, as I believe, the rules exist primarily to protect the privacy of the ordinary Australian citizen, then they do this very well indeed, especially with the improvement that I have noted in ASIS's performance.
65. The Privacy of Australian Citizens and Permanent Residents: Apart from this continuing monitoring program, during the year I have visited ASIS on various occasions to examine their holdings on Australian citizens or permanent residents. I have done this because an ex-officer of the Service told me that ASIS holds thousands of files and cards on Australian citizens; that the files and cards recorded information and gossip of a personal nature and that this was freely available to ASIS officers and was made available on request to foreign intelligence services.
66. The following is an extract from a report that I made to the Foreign Minister conveying my conclusions on this matter.
"ASIS maintains an extensive card index on people, including Australians, with whom it has had contact or in whom it has a valid interest. I have examined a number of cards, chosen by me without forewarning to ASIS, and provided to me on the spot. The majority of people I nominated did not have a card. Eight of those nominated did have a card, but there was a valid reason for this (they may have visited ASIS). None of the cards I saw contained sensitive information of a personal nature.
I am assured that the material in these cards is not made available to other intelligence services …I am also assured that files, as distinct from the card index, are not maintained on private Australian citizens unless the citizens are of operational interest or unless they are staff members of ASIS. I accept these assurances.
"... the System seems to work well. So far as I have seen from my examination of the relevant files, the rights of the Australians concerned are not abused in any way."
67. I have also discussed with ASIS registry officers and ASIS management the way in which ASIS files and cards are stored and am satisfied that access to them is appropriately restricted. However, I propose to continue to monitor the Service's holdings on Australians to ensure that the privacy of Australian citizens and permanent residents is not abused.
68. Own Motion Inquiry: There has been one own motion investigation covering matters other than those of a grievance nature, and it is continuing. It concerns cooperative arrangements with another secret intelligence service.
Staffing Matters
69. If the Inspector-General is to play a constructive role in the grievance process, staff need to have confidence in the Inspector-General and to feel that they will not be ostracised if they approach him. For those conditions to be met, the Inspector-General needs to have ready access to staff and vice versa. It is essential for members of ASIS to know the Inspector-General on a personal, even if limited, basis, so that if the time should come that they need to use the avenue available to them they will be able to do so with confidence.
70. My contacts with ASIS staff in headquarters and elsewhere have been facilitated by the Director-General. As well, I and my staff have kept in close touch with the office-holders of the ASIS Staff and Welfare Association and we find this to be a useful means of checking the pulse of the Service. At the invitation of ASIS Management I speak to each Basic Intelligence Officer course for potential ASIS officers about the role of my Office, the work we perform and the concept of propriety.
Allegations against ASIS and Attacks on the Inspector-General
71. During 1993 a major campaign was waged against both ASIS and the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. It culminated in a television program on 21 February, 1994, in which two complainants to me made various serious allegations against ASIS and my office.
72. The campaign unfolded during the course of 1993. One of the complainants stated to me and the office that ASIS was "rotten to the core", was acting outside the bounds of legality and propriety and required major changes if it was going to be transformed into a useful and decent organisation. He also claimed that ASIS needed legislation or Ministerial guidelines, that it was beyond Parliamentary or effective ministerial scrutiny, that it possessed no effective internal grievance procedures and that officers who complained to the Inspector-General did so at their own risk. He argued that the problems could not be fixed from within, and that an external impetus was needed. Two other people who had earlier complained to me made various allegations against particular ASIS officers, and many of these allegations resurfaced in the television program.
73. When I asked for some substantiation of the allegations and whether I might be permitted to raise them (in the course of a preliminary inquiry into them) with the Director-General of ASIS or the Foreign Minister, I was given some names but was told that "the group" (ie these particular complainants and various others) did not want me to raise them with the Director-General of ASIS although they were agreeable to my discussing the allegations in general terms with the Minister. I subsequently did so.
74. When I met with the Foreign Minister on 18 August, 1993, I told him that the group's claims had not been sufficiently substantiated to warrant my conducting an inquiry into them, and in any case the group had asked me not to do so, but that I did propose to look into two particular matters. (I have since done so and reported separately to the Foreign Minister on them.)
75. During the second half of 1993 the group - or some members of it - began to attack my Office. One member told my Office that I would become the scapegoat once the alleged mismanagement within ASIS became public. Another member told me that I had been placed in the position of Inspector-General "to keep the lid on ASIS". This person, who became abusive in his telephone conversations with me and my staff, and who constantly set deadlines for me to contact him or to complete my inquiry into his case, told me on 18 September, 1993, that he would force me to resign or the Government to remove me.
76. Subsequently the Government set up in March 1994 the Commission of Inquiry into ASIS and these matters are amongst those being examined by that Commission.
Complaints Against ASIS
77. As already noted, there have been very few complaints against ASIS by members of the public. This is not surprising. As I said in my 1991-92 Annual Report to the Parliament:
"It is unusual to receive complaints from members of the public against ASIS. This is as it should be because ASIS - like the other agencies – should be acting legally and with propriety, and in any case the main thrust of ASIS's activities is overseas. "
None of the complaints that my Office has received from members of the public has proved to be well-founded. Many of them seem to have come from people who appear to be suffering some form of delusion.
78. Until recently at least ASIS was not widely known about by the general public. It remains to be seen whether the recent publicity about ASIS provokes complaints from members of the public. This is the pattern that we have noted in respect of publicity about ASIO.
Did ASIS act legally and with propriety in its dealings with an officer who was being investigated by the Australian Federal Police?
79. I discussed this case in my last annual report.
80. After I concluded my inquiry into this case, the officer concerned asked me to act as an impartial observer during a security interview that he participated in with ASIS. I did so after warning the officer that I might thereby be obliged to debar myself from handling any complaint that he might subsequently wish to make against ASIS. Shortly afterwards he complained that the Service proposed to terminate his appointment, and asked if I would act as a mediator between himself and the Service. I said I would do so only with the agreement of the Director-General of ASIS and the Foreign Minister (mediation lying outside of my statutory role). When the former told me that he believed no useful purpose could be secured by mediation, I considered whether to inquire into the complaint. I decided against doing so, on the following grounds:
- the Director-General would not extend the period of notice of termination of the complainant's appointment to enable us to inquire fully into the complaint;
- and the complainant indicated that he would take legal action as soon as the termination came into effect. (Thus, he indicated his intention to pursue another avenue for the resolution of his complaint and there was no scope for me, under section 11(3) of my Act, to inquire further into the matter.)
I also had in mind the effect of my attendance as an observer during the security interview that had been conducted earlier.
81. This case is now being reviewed by the Commission of Inquiry into ASIS.
Did ASIS act legally and with propriety in dealing with an officer and his assistant who were withdrawn from an overseas post?
82. These cases concern a former ASIS officer and his operational assistant who were recalled (for different reasons) from an overseas post.
83. I concluded my inquiry into the ex-officer's complaint.
84. I found that ASIS acted legally and with propriety in their handling of this matter.
85. The case centred on the breakdown of relations between the Head of Mission and the ASIS officer and the subsequent actions of ASIS. The breakdown occurred suddenly, and quickly became irrevocable. I concluded that ASIS took appropriate action by sending a joint Foreign Af'fairs/ASIS team to the post to investigate, in the meantime urging their officer to act with prudence and moderation, and discussing the events with senior Foreign Affairs officials. The team concluded that relations between the ASIS station chief and the Ambassador had reached such a low state that there was little option but to withdraw one of them. Because of the possibility that the station chief’s cover might already have been damaged, it was sensible to withdraw the station chief rather than the Ambassador.
86. In my view there was nothing else that the Service could do to settle matters at the overseas post. and once the officer had returned to Australia and had indicated that he no longer had faith in ASIS management, the latter had little option but to terminate his appointment.
87. My inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the termination of the operational assistant's posting and her return to Australia is continuing.
88. Both cases are under review by the Commission of Inquiry into ASIS.
Did a long-serving member of ASIS receive appropriate departure entitlements on his retirement?
89. My inquiry into this complaint, which concerns the departure entitlements of a long-serving ex-ASIS member, continues.
Other complaints against ASIS
90. Towards the end of the year I received four more complaints against ASIS and have begun inquiring into them.
Case 1: concerns the appropriate level for the translation of an ASIS officer from one category of employment to another when the former category was abolished.
Case 2: concerns allegations of impropriety against ASIS officers by an ex-operational assistant, who claims that her private mail was opened by a colleague, that she was prevented by her head of station from lodging complaints with headquarters; and that various of her colleagues treated her unfairly and inappropriately.
Case 3: concerns allegations by an Australian journalist that ASIS holds records on him that describe him in scurrilous and ludicrous terms and that these records have been seen by various ASIS officers.
Case 4: the complainant refers to articles published in two magazines, New Idea (26 March, 1994) and The Australian Women's Weekly (November, 1993) in which Ms Wendi Holland is said to have made various claims about her links with MI6 and the CIA, and her alleged connections with and activities on behalf of ASIS.
91. The complainant alleges that, if there is any truth in Ms Holland's claims, ASIS has been acting improperly.
92. I am at present conducting a preliminary inquiry into this complaint under section 14 of my Act. If I decide to inquire further I shall need to obtain the Foreign Minister's approval because the activities alleged are said in part to have occurred overseas and in part at least to have predated the commencement of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act.