Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

Monitoring Activities

47. During the year I visited most of the state collection offices of ASIO. In the period since my appointment I have visited all of the Organisation's regional offices and have had an opportunity to meet with many of the regional staff so as to become better acquainted with their activities.

48. In the course of these visits I carried out inspections of the records covering warrant operations, and the registers and files which contain Authorities to Investigate. In the course of my monitoring activities I did not detect any discrepancies or omissions which gave me any cause for concern. Generally the staff I met and spoke with were well versed in the legal requirements governing the Organisation's use of its special powers, and the detail of the relevant internal operating procedures.

49. Some variations in interpretation of the circumstances in which an Authority to Investigate should be raised were apparent. These related solely to the initial stage of certain investigations when only limited intrusive powers were being exercised. ASIO is currently undertaking a review of its procedures in this area and I have made some suggestions.

50. I examined the records of the Organisation covering exchanges of information with the State and Territory Police Services. During my visits interstate, I also called on the Police organisation, meeting in most cases with the Commissioners. These visits helped me to gain an impression of the relationships between ASIO and the Police from a Police perspective. In all cases, I was assured that the relationship was considered to be valuable and working satisfactorily.

51. Despite the apparent good working relations, I was also satisfied that ASIO is sensitive to the need to limit its passage of information to the Police to that which is directly relevant to the commission, or potential commission of serious crimes.

Complaints about ASIO

52. Virtually all of the complaints received in my Office during the year related to ASIO. This follows the patterns of previous years. As I have noted elsewhere in this Annual Report, the fact that ASIO is the subject of a much greater volume of complaints than the other intelligence and security agencies, reflects the much closer working relationships it has with a wide range of Australian citizens in the normal conduct of its work. The two other intelligence collection agencies, ASIS and DSD, are concerned with foreign intelligence collection and therefore their activities are much less exposed to members of the Australian public.

53. ASIO historically, has also had a higher public profile than the other agencies and this is a contributing factor in the larger number of complaints received about its activities.

54. The majority of complaints, upon investigation, are revealed to be unfounded. Nevertheless, some expose deficiencies in the manner in which the Organisation has dealt with particular matters and ASIO appears keen to learn from its experience and to take corrective action, where this appears warranted.

55. It was pleasing to note, that after several years of negotiation, the Commonwealth was able to achieve a settlement of a long outstanding complaint to my Office, by implementing the recommendation of my predecessor that compensation be payable to a former ASIO officer in respect of her superannuation entitlements.

56. Future cases involving compensation will be capable of much more expeditious treatment if the Government accepts a recommendation of the Samuels Commission of Inquiry that the Inspector-General have a determinative power rather than the present recommendatory power.

57. Some of the cases involving ASIO dealt with during the reporting period, are summarised below.

Did ASIO act legally and with propriety in collecting information on a businessman, his family and his business affairs?

58. In October 1991, the owner of a publishing company wrote to my predecessor claiming that ASIO held false and defamatory information on himself, his family and his business affairs. The complainant claimed to have been frustrated in his efforts to have his name 'cleared', and in gaining assurances that no false material relating to him and his family remained on ASIO's files.

59. The complainant's concerns arose when he became aware that several years previously an individual had passed information about him to ASIO. The complainant believed that the same individual had also stolen material from his business at the instigation of ASIO. The complainant described the source of this information as "a discredited police informer".

60. My inquiry revealed that ASIO had received information from a source alleging that the complainant intended to publish a book which would reveal the identities of ASIO staff. To have done so would have constituted an offence under section 92 of the ASIO Act 1979.

61. In my view ASIO had a clear responsibility to ascertain the veracity of the allegations and it proceeded to investigate the matter. Subsequently, the Organisation concluded that the informant was not a reliable source, that the allegations were unfounded, and it ceased its inquiries.

62. I recommended that ASIO place a warning notice on all of its relevant files to the effect that the material provided by the informant should be regarded as being from an unreliable source and its truth or accuracy should not be relied upon.

63. ASIO accepted this recommendation. I advised the complainant accordingly.

Did ASIO collude with Federal and State Government agencies to defraud an individual of a large sum of money?

64. I conducted preliminary inquiries into a complaint that ASIO had acted in concert with several government instrumentalities to divert business away from a named individual. The complainant was imprecise about the nature of his business but was able to provide a precise dollar value for the business he claimed had been foregone.

65. My investigations revealed that there was no substance to these claims and no basis for a full inquiry.

Did ASIO or any other intelligence agency keep a named individual under surveillance?

66. I received a request from a complainant to ascertain whether he and his family were being kept under surveillance. While the complainant did not offer any reason for his suspicions, I pursued the matter with the Director-General of Security and was satisfied that further investigation into the complaint was not needed.

Did ASIO behave improperly in relation to a security assessment process carried out for a Commonwealth Agency?

67. In September 1995, I received a complaint from an individual regarding a security assessment process which was initiated in 1987 upon his probationary appointment to the Australian Public Service (APS). The complainant alleged that ASIO was indiscreet in conveying aspects of his background to public servants in several departments; that ASIO tried to block his security clearance; and that ASIO's actions led indirectly to his subsequent forced retirement from the APS.

68. In examining the complaint, I had access to relevant files held by ASIO and the department which appointed the complainant. I found that the security assessment process did not take an inordinate amount of time; that there was no evidence to suggest that ASIO officers passed information to officers of other departments in an improper or unlawful way; and that there was no basis to claims that ASIO was in any way involved in the complainant's departure from the APS.

Was ASIO involved in providing advice to a State Government concerning the construction of a juvenile detention centre?

69. I received complaints from two legal rights/public interest lobby groups expressing concern about the contents of a newspaper article in which it was claimed that ASIO had been involved in providing advice on the construction of a juvenile detention centre.

70. My inquiries indicated that while ASIO provided advice on protective security measures in response to a legitimate request for guidance, it was unable to demonstrate to me that it had complied with proper procedures as required under its Act. It appears that ASIO assumed that the then Attorney-General had given it a standing approval to provide protective security advice to bodies such as State Governments, whereas no such authority could be located.

71. ASIO has acknowledged that proper procedures under its Act were not followed in this case and is taking action to ensure that a similar error does not occur in the future.

Did ASIO place an electronic interception device on the telephone of a named individual?

72. Over the course of several months I received correspondence from an individual who claimed that his telephone was being tapped by an Australian intelligence organisation. Following my preliminary inquiries into this matter I am satisfied that this was not the case.


Did ASIO collude in the alleged transfer of restricted technology to a foreign country?

73. An individual wrote to me seeking to revisit aspects of a complaint which was dealt with by my predecessor. The complainant alleged that ASIO had colluded (with persons unknown) in permitting the transfer of restricted technology to a foreign country.

74. Following a review of past papers on this case and in the absence of any new substantive information, I was satisfied that ASIO was not involved in any activity which was illegal or improper. I advised the complainant of this and my intention not to engage in further correspondence on this matter.

Did an unspecified Government agency (possibly ASIO) engage in the harassment of a named individual so as to jeopardise his employment prospects?

75. In November 1995, I received a complaint from an individual alleging that an Australian intelligence body or some other Commonwealth agency was acting in such a way as to cause him emotional and financial detriment and in consequence he had difficulty in finding acceptable employment.

76. After conducting preliminary inquiries I was able to assure the complainant that I was satisfied that his fears in relation to being harassed by one of Australia's security and intelligence agencies were groundless.

Did ASIO intervene to stop an investigation into the business affairs of a former intelligence officer?

77. An individual wrote to me advising that he had been duped out of a large sum of money by two confidence tricksters, one of whom he alleged was a former intelligence officer. The complainant indicated that he had twice referred the matter to a government regulatory body for investigation and on each occasion the matter was dropped. The complainant alleged that ASIO was responsible for obstructing these investigations. I found there to be no substance to these claims.

Did ASIO become improperly involved in the personal/family affairs of a named individual?

78. The complainant in this matter first wrote to my predecessor in June 1992, and followed this with several further letters. Upon assuming office as Inspector-General, I reviewed all of the material which had been gathered in relation to this complaint and concluded the inquiry, after some additional material had been gathered and analysed.

79. The complainant, a former intelligence officer, alleged that an ASIO officer had intervened in a marital dispute in a manner which went beyond the statutory functions and powers of ASIO.

80. In my report on this case, I concluded that there was no evidence to substantiate the complainant's allegations about the actions and motivations of the officer concerned. Notwithstanding this, I recommended that in future, as a matter of policy, ASIO should not involve itself in family law matters affecting its current and former officers and agents.

81. I further recommended that where involvement is unavoidable because of significant security concerns, it should be limited to passive monitoring, with legally represented intervention used only as a last resort, if it becomes necessary to seek protection of information on national security grounds.

82. The Director-General of Security accepted these recommendations.

Did ASIO act in concert with a State Police Service in the search of a house and the seizure of explosives? If so, did ASIO exceed its charter?

83. In November 1995, a member of the House of Representatives wrote to me with some generalised concerns raised with him by one of his constituents. In January 1996, that constituent wrote to me directly, complaining about the actions of a particular State Police Service which had searched his house and the houses of several other individuals, in the course of which some explosives were seized.

84. The complainant, who implied that ASIO was also involved, wanted to know who conducted the raid on his house, the purpose of the raid, and how he could get his seized property back.

85. On the basis of the above, I decided to conduct a preliminary inquiry. My investigations subsequently revealed that no ASIO officer was directly involved in the search of any premises or with the laying of charges for explosives offences. This being so, I determined that, having regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry into ASIO's actions was not warranted.

Was the selection process used by ASIO to screen an external applicant for appointment fair and reasonable?

86. An unsuccessful applicant for appointment to ASIO wrote to me in February 1996 complaining that the selection process he underwent was 'discriminatory' and 'fraudulently misrepresentative'.

87. I subsequently conducted a preliminary inquiry which satisfied me that the relative claims of the complainant were objectively considered by ASIO. I therefore determined that as there was no evidence that ASIO had acted illegally or improperly, a full inquiry was not warranted in this case.

88. While conducting my preliminary inquiry, I had the opportunity to look at ASIO's selection processes more generally. I expressed the view to relevant staff that although ASIO fell outside the scrutiny of bodies such as the Public Service and Merit Protection Commission, its selection processes should at the very least be of a standard commensurate with government agencies which were subject to external scrutiny.

89. It is my intention to keep ASIO's selection practices under notice and to encourage best practice in this field.

Did ASIO arrange a 'sham' marriage between a person whom it resettled in Australia on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, and an unwitting Australian citizen?

90. In April 1996, a complainant wrote to the Attorney-General alleging, amongst other things, that ASIO had set her up in a sham marriage and otherwise improperly involved itself in her personal affairs. The Attorney-General subsequently asked me to conduct a full inquiry into this matter. The complainant appeared on a national television program at the end of April to air her concerns.

91. By early June 1996, I had concluded my inquiries and prepared a draft report setting out my findings. As required by section 21(1) of the IGIS Act 1986, I referred a copy of this draft report to the Director-General of Security, as a precursor to reporting to the Attorney-General. This complaint remained open at the end of the reporting period.