The Year in Review

3. The 1995-96 year saw the Office returning to a more normal workload after two heavy years associated with the Commission of Inquiry into ASIS. The backlog of cases which built up during recent years has now been fully cleared and the Office was able to devote most of its attention to dealing with current complaints and inquiries and in achieving a more satisfactory turn around time.

4. In a very small office, there is always the possibility that what may appear to be a relatively small increase in cases can have a disproportionate impact in the time taken to resolve complaints or complete inquiries, particularly if one or two inquiries prove to be complex in character. However, the number of new complaints lodged and requests received to conduct inquiries was at a fairly typical level and, overall, the Office was able to resolve most within a reasonable time frame. At the end of the financial year there were only seven complaints outstanding, most of which were of quite recent origin. Further comments on the performance of the Office in handling complaints/inquiries appear later in this Report.

5. With the change of Government in March, a new group of Ministers assumed responsibility for the various intelligence and security agencies. Following their appointment, I provided written briefs on the role of my Office in supporting Ministers in their oversight responsibilities. I subsequently met with the Ministers and brought them up to date with outstanding cases and current issues associated with their particular agency(ies). In so doing I was able to commence developing a personal relationship with the Ministers and their staffs, which is an important part of my role, given that my statute requires me to consult with Ministers in certain circumstances as well as giving me direct access to the Ministers and to the Prime Minister, should I consider this to be necessary.

6. One of the issues facing the incoming Government is the attitude it is to adopt to the recommendations of the Samuels Commission of Inquiry into ASIS which reported in early 1995. During the year I contributed to, and participated in, inter-departmental discussions aimed at assisting the previous Government to address the outcome of the Commission of Inquiry. This included consideration of the nature and form of possible complementary amendments to my Act, if the Government accepts the recommendation of the Samuels Inquiry to place ASIS on a legislative basis. These changes if enacted, while not altering the substantial elements of my Act, would help to streamline and simplify certain aspects of the procedural framework contained in the legislation.

7. As complaints/inquiry work have permitted, I have been endeavouring to expand the monitoring activities of my Office within the intelligence collection agencies, (ASIO, ASIS and DSD). Since its inception, it has been envisaged that the Inspector-General would devote a reasonable proportion of time to visiting the agencies and observing aspects of their activities, so as to be able to give assurance to Ministers that the agencies are acting appropriately.

8. The Commission of Inquiry into ASIS found that the Office had become too complaints oriented to the detriment of its self initiated monitoring activity. I have been endeavouring to develop an expanded program of monitoring of key activities of the agencies, and the major development this financial year was the commencement of retrospective operational audits within ASIS.

9. I have discerned a growing level of openness in my relations with all agencies. This is a positive development and gives me greater confidence to be able to report on the activities of the bodies, believing that the knowledge of my Office of the internal working arrangements of the agencies is as good as it could be. It also reflects a stronger sense of awareness, by the agencies, of the importance of working within an accountability framework which includes some external checks and balances.

10. ASIO, ASIS and DSD invited my Office to attend or contribute to a number of training sessions and staff induction courses. These opportunities are welcomed as they enable my Office to emphasise to a range of staff of the agencies, the importance of the accountability arrangements in place within the intelligence and security community. They also provide me with valuable feedback on the tensions and pressures which can arise in the challenging operational environments which the agencies work within.

11. Most Western countries with intelligence and security services, have external monitoring or oversight bodies with similar powers to my own. During the year I followed overseas developments with interest. In New Zealand, for example, legislation establishing an office of Inspector-General was passed in 1996, drawing on the Australian experience. There was a visit to my Office by a Canadian academic who has developed considerable experience in oversight mechanisms in the intelligence and security field. I also led a useful session with the United Kingdom Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee during their visit in June 1996. I met with the United Kingdom Intelligence Coordinator when he was in Australia in late 1995.

12. During the year I saw cause to have a letter published in the press in response to a 'letter to the Editor' which reflected adversely on ASIO and the Government. While normally I do not consider it appropriate to be engaging in public debate about matters dealt with by my Office, I considered it important in this case to present certain information to the public in the interests of presenting a more balanced picture.

13. In previous annual reports, reference has been made to the need for the Commonwealth and the States and Territories to finalise contemporary agreements on cooperation between ASIO and the respective Police Services. As part of my monitoring program, I regularly check ASIO's adherence to the terms of the agreements and liaise with the State authorities, where they exist, which monitor the police side.

14. South Australia is the only State yet to conclude an agreement with the Commonwealth. A draft has been under consideration in that State for some time. I used the opportunity of a visit to Adelaide to call on the local Police Commissioner, encouraging him to pursue with his State authorities the conclusion of an agreement. While long standing informal arrangements for cooperation between ASIO and the Police exist in that State, it is desirable that they all be placed on a more formal footing.

15. My Office contributed to a current review by the Australian Law Reform Commission of arrangements within the Australian Federal Police and the National Crime Authority for the handling of complaints about the police, their internal disciplinary system and investigation of police related corruption. At an earlier occasion, there had been some support for my Office being given a broader role to enable it to take on these responsibilities. I expressed the view to the Commission that transgressions covering internal management, customer service complaints of a less serious kind, and misconduct by police not warranting dismissal, ought to be under the direct control of the head of the organisation to emphasise the direct accountability of that person for establishing and maintaining proper standards of behaviour and control of subordinate personnel. In the more serious area of behaviour involving suspected corruption and serious criminality, I favoured investigation by a competent external body with appropriate powers. I do not favour these responsibilities being combined with those of my Office as I believe there are important differences between the law enforcement area and the security and intelligence field.

16. I supported a proposal contained in a scheme being examined by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, that the security and intelligence agencies, and my Office, should be exempted from a general 'Notice to Produce' scheme. The purpose of the scheme is to authorise government agencies, in certain circumstances, to disclose otherwise confidential information to law enforcement agencies. The scheme, if introduced, would eliminate the need to use a search warrant by one government agency against another. In the security and intelligence area there are already in place satisfactory arrangements governing the passage of relevant information to law enforcement agencies.

17. The Assistant Inspector-General completed a short secondment with the Office of the Inspector-General of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). In the course of the attachment, he also familiarized himself with the work of the Security Intelligence Review Committee which also reviews the activities of CSIS. These Canadian agencies have considerable experience in developing and conducting monitoring programs, from which my Office can learn.