The Intelligence and Security Community 1987-1996: A Decade of Change

34. In Western democracies there has been a gradual expansion of the role of the State in regulating community affairs as society has become more diverse and exposed to an increasingly complex array of pressures. Legislation and regulatory controls of one kind or another are necessary to create a society which maximises the benefits for all.

35. Sometimes the exercise of official power or authority is at the expense of individual freedoms. In particular, while the right of citizens to personal privacy is an extremely important ingredient of any democratic society, at times there will be occasions when the privacy of individuals will need to be overridden in the wider interests of, for example, national security, national defence, or the law enforcement obligations governments have to society as a whole.

36. The power of search, seizure and entry without consent, the right to undertake covert surveillance of the activities of citizens and the capacity to secretly collect and record conversations and communications between people, are essential 'tools of trade' of governments in carrying out their national security, national defence and law enforcement responsibilities.

37. Governments have generally considered that the greater good is served by the State being empowered to exercise these invasive powers at the expense of some diminution of the individual privacy rights of the citizens affected.

38. However, these powers should not be exercised lightly and it is important that they not be abused by the officials entrusted with them. Most democratic countries have developed independent monitoring or oversight mechanisms to provide protections against potential abuses of power, to strengthen the accountability framework within which the powers are exercised and to provide society with a greater sense of assurance that the invasion of personal privacy is limited, carefully supervised and justified by the importance of the national interests involved.

39. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security was established as a 'watchdog' organisation over Australia's intelligence and security community ten years ago. During that period the community itself has undergone significant change. The organisations have all been extensively reorganised and restructured as a consequence of changing strategic priorities and in response to budgetary constraints. The aftermath of the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the end of the ideological divide between East and West has dramatically changed the priorities of the intelligence and security bodies over the last decade.

40.While the threat of global nuclear war has abated, regional wars and tension, international terrorism and racial, religious and ethnic conflicts continue to pose a challenge. The collection of foreign intelligence remains of considerable significance to Australia, assisting as it does with the pursuit of the Government's policies and interests in maintaining the security of our nation.

41. While a cloak of secrecy must surround much of the work of the intelligence and security agencies, the last decade has seen some significant changes in the direction of greater openness. In 1988 the then Government, with the endorsement of the Opposition, made a major statement on the role and importance of the intelligence collection activities undertaken at the Joint Defence Facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar.

42. ASIO, as the security body which historically has raised the greatest concerns in the minds of some sections of the community, has progressively adopted a more open policy in dealing with citizens and in publicly explaining its role. Its annual reports to the Parliament have become more comprehensive and now give a better insight into its activities than was previously the case. In 1996, for example, ASIO won an award for producing one of the best annual reports in the government sector.

43. The transfer of the headquarters of ASIO (1986/87), and DSD (1992) following the move of ASIS in 1984, saw for the first time the location of the headquarters of all the security and intelligence bodies in Canberra. This has greatly facilitated the coordination of the activities of all of the organisations and has significantly improved the quality of their relationships with other parts of the bureaucracy and with the Government and its Ministers.

44. The manner in which the organisations worked together in providing substantial support to the Government during the Gulf War in 1990-91 and more recently during the constitutional crisis in Papua New Guinea, have confirmed the value of the concentration of the headquarters personnel close to the seat of government in Canberra. The intelligence and security bodies have all been exposed to enhanced management accountability and to the discipline of budgetary restraint.

45. They have become more embedded in the budgetary and management arrangements associated with the public sector at large and have participated in the administrative reforms of the last decade aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector organisations generally and their responsiveness and accountability. They have reviewed, adjusted and improved their working practices to conform with the increased demands now being placed upon them by Government.

46. In particular there has been a noticeable improvement in the staff management policies and processes in the organisations over the last 10 years. ASIO and ASIS, both being organisations whose staff are employed outside the framework of the Public Service Act, experienced a range of difficulties with the handling of staff grievances in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of which were the source of complaints to my Office. As a consequence both bodies introduced improved grievance handling machinery and processes that are working well and have contributed to an improvement in morale. My Office has not been involved in inquiring into any staff related grievances for several years.

47. The intelligence and security area has also been subject to a number of reviews and studies over the course of the decade. These have included:

  • a review conducted in the first half of 1992 of the overall impact of the changed international circumstances on the roles and priorities of 	the agencies,
  • a review of plans and arrangements to counter terrorism conducted late in 1992,
  • an inquiry into various aspects of security commissioned in 1993 flowing from Government concern about the implications of the 	removal, without authority, of certain material from ASIO, and
  • a Commission of Inquiry into the operations and management of ASIS, which reported in March 1995.

48. In addition to these ad hoc reviews and inquiries, the Office of National Assessments has continued to report annually to the Government on the activities of the organisations concerned with foreign intelligence collection and analysis including an evaluation of their performance, identifying areas which might command further development.

49. These regular and occasional reviews of the security and intelligence community supplement the direction and guidance given to the organisations on an ongoing basis by a Secretaries' Committee chaired by the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

50. Finally, my own Office has played its part in helping the agencies to identify weaknesses in their procedures and processes. A range of suggestions and recommendations have been made in the course of the conduct of inquiries into matters involving the agencies. Some have led to changes in operational practices while others have led to improved personnel policies and processes.

51. While the agencies, like any large organisation, have made mistakes from time to time, the quality of their performance in terms of respect for the rights of citizens and their sensitivity to prevailing societal attitudes has progressively improved over the last decade and currently is at a very high level, in my judgement.

52. The Inspector-General's insight into the intelligence and security community is gained through the investigation of complaints and the conduct of specific inquiries, and through the Office's monitoring program.

53. The complaints handling responsibility, while important, was not seen initially as the major activity of the Office, but with a build-up of cases in the early 1990s, it became the main preoccupation of the Inspector-General and his staff. Consequently, the monitoring responsibilities took on a lesser role. The Commission of Inquiry into ASIS commented on the manner in which the Office had become too complaints driven, and recommended certain measures aimed at clearing the backlog of cases and in enabling the Inspector-General to devote more resources to monitoring the ongoing activities of the agencies.

54. In the last couple of years the complaints load has settled down, the backlog has been cleared and the monitoring program of the Office has been stepped up. As a result, the Inspector-General's assessment of the agencies is now based on a more substantial inspection program and a better understanding of the work of the agencies and manner in which they go about their general business.

55. In general terms, the original legislation establishing the office of Inspector-General has proven to be soundly based. It has provided the necessary powers to enable the Inspector-General to obtain access to the necessary facts, it has provided appropriate protections to people giving evidence to inquiries and it has not given rise to arguments relating to interpretation or meaning.

56. Some limited changes in the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 have been endorsed by the Government. These are largely of a procedural nature and are designed to simplify some of the technical processes under the Act. Of greater significance are amendments to extend determinative powers to the Inspector-General in relation to, firstly, appeals by staff members of agencies against dismissal, and secondly, the award of compensation to persons who have been adversely affected by the actions of agencies. In each of these situations the present legislation provides the Inspector-General with the capacity to make recommendations only.

57. The introduction of these amendments is linked with other legislative initiatives arising from recommendations of the Samuels Commission of Inquiry into ASIS. The timing of introduction of these amendments has yet to be settled and is dependent upon the overall priorities within the Government's legislation program.

58. An area of future possible extension of the role of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security is in the handling of complaints lodged in relation to the National Crime Authority (NCA). In 1992 the then Government introduced legislation into the Parliament to this effect, however it lapsed when a disagreement between the Government and the Opposition emerged in the Senate on other aspects contained in the Bill.

59. The Australian Law Reform Commission in 1996 recommended that a new authority be established to deal with NCA complaints and certain matters related to the Australian Federal Police. The Government has yet to determine its attitude to this recommendation. If the Government were to favour giving this task to an existing body rather than to establish a new one, the earlier proposal that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security be given this role, could be revived. I put this point of view to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the NCA, when I appeared before it in June 1997.

60. This summary briefly paints a picture of an important area of government which over recent years has been progressively reviewed and improved, and which continues to be subject to close oversight and direction by other agencies and by the Government itself.

61. Community fears about the agencies and their capacity to unreasonably interfere with citizen rights should be allayed by the understanding that the activities of the agencies are under close supervision, their objectives and priorities are set by collective processes within government, and the effectiveness of their performance is regularly reappraised.