Monitoring Activity

138. DSD's business is to collect foreign signals intelligence. It does this by various, sophisticated technical means. It is not the role or purpose of DSD to eavesdrop on foreign communications involving Australians. It is sometimes the case, however, that such communications are collected inadvertently.

139. In 1988, the then Federal Government endorsed a set of rules covering foreign signals intelligence and Australian persons. These rules were amended in 1994.

140. In December 1996, my predecessor met with the Director DSD, to discuss a proposal that the rules should be reviewed again. The Director DSD agreed that a joint review should be pursued.

141. In March 1997, Mr McLeod provided a report on the operation of the rules to the Minister for Defence in which he identified those areas he believed could be improved.

142. In the current reporting period, my office contributed to the process of rewriting the rules, to make them easier to understand and interpret, and to reinforce accountability arrangements. I am pleased to note that these revised rules were endorsed by the Government, with effect from June 1998.

143. In addition to the above, Mr McLeod and I devoted some time to monitoring DSD's compliance with the rules which applied for most of the reporting period. In overall terms I found the incidence of breaches to be very low and that where breaches occurred appropriate action was immediately instituted.

144. DSD has a significant research and development capacity. In the course of the reporting period my office was involved in witnessing several tests and trials of new equipment. The purpose of our presence was to ensure that proper protocols were followed and that the privacy interests of Australians were being protected.

145. I am pleased to report that each of the tests witnessed by my staff was conducted with appropriate regard to legality and propriety.

146. In the year ahead, I plan to put my monitoring activities on a more regular footing, and to visit various DSD facilities to speak to management and staff on issues of concern to each.

Complaints about DSD

147. DSD traditionally attracts the least number of complaints of the three collection agencies which my office oversees. This is because DSD deploys technical means rather than human sources to gather intelligence and because it targets foreign nationals rather than Australians.

148. During 1997-98 my office received one complaint about DSD, brief details of which are provided below.

Did DSD improperly promote the merits of one secure telecommunications system over another?

149. In August 1997, my predecessor received a complaint from a member of the public who had been previously employed by a Commonwealth agency.

150. One of the complainant's duties had been to examine options for putting in place a secure telecommunications link between the central office of his then employer and several outlying offices, and making a recommendation of the best system to perform this function.

151. The complainant recommended the purchase of a pre-existing foreign telecommunications encryption system, in preference to a system which was then being developed by DSD and an Australian company. The agency involved chose the foreign system as an interim solution before ultimately choosing the later system for its longer term needs.

152. The complainant alleged that DSD used its position as the Commonwealth's national communications security adviser to improperly influence the selection decision, in favour of the system it was involved in developing.

153. Mr McLeod conducted a thorough investigation into the complaint, receiving the full co-operation of both DSD and the complainant's former employer, even though that agency is outside of the jurisdiction of this office.

154. Mr McLeod concluded that there was no evidence of impropriety by any of the parties to this matter.