AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION
WHAT ASIO DOES
58. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation is Australia's security service. Its functions are set out in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. It is also subject to guidelines issued by the Attorney-General. The Act and guidelines are available on the ASIO Internet site.
59. ASIO's main role is to gather information and produce intelligence that will enable it to warn the government about activities or situations that might endanger Australia's security. It is not a law enforcement agency.
60. The focus of ASIO's work is on terrorists, people who may act violently for political reasons, and people who may clandestinely obtain sensitive government information or otherwise harm Australia's interests in order to further their own causes or the interests of foreign governments.
61. ASIO does not investigate lawful protest activity or engage in surveillance of ordinary members of the community going about their normal business. It has to obtain specific ministerial authority for use of its most intrusive powers, such as telecommunications interception.
62. Other ASIO functions include providing security assessments, protective security advice and collecting foreign intelligence in Australia.
63. Further information about ASIO can be found at http://www.asio.gov.au.
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES
Scope and reporting arrangements
64. The staff of the office and I inspect, or plan to inspect, the following broad categories of ASIO activity: · warrant operations; · authorities to investigate; · provision of information to, and liaison with, law enforcement agencies; · access to, and use of, financial transaction reporting information obtained from the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre; · access to, and use of, information obtained from the Australian Taxation Office; · the official use of alternative documentation to support assumed identities; and · compliance with the Archives Act.
65. The Director-General and I have agreed that if any concerns or matters worthy of comment arise during inspection activities conducted by my office, my staff or I will discuss these matters with an appropriate senior manager or liaison officer, in the first instance.
66. We have also agreed that any concerns that cannot be properly addressed in this manner will be put in writing and addressed to the Director-General for consideration and/or comment.
67. The Director-General and I have also agreed procedures that would operate should I form the view that any matter arising from an inspection needed to be brought to the attention of the Attorney-General or the Prime Minister.
68. No matters arose during the 2000-2001 reporting period that required me to write to the Attorney-General or the Prime Minister.
69. In all instances during the reporting period where my staff or I have identified issues arising during an inspection, I have made it my practice to write a letter outlining the pertinent issues. In each case ASIO has provided a considered response.
Warrant operations - procedures
70. The Attorney-General has the authority to issue warrants to assist ASIO to meet its obligations under the ASIO Act 1979. Such warrants provide authority for the use of special powers such as intercepting telecommunications, using listening devices, entering and searching premises, intercepting mail, using tracking devices and remotely accessing computers.
71. ASIO only seeks such warrants when there are sound operational requirements for their use and the information cannot be obtained by less intrusive means. The Director-General personally signs each request to the Attorney-General for issue of a warrant and the Attorney-General's Department provides separate legal advice to the Attorney-General in relation to each request.
72. We have developed a list of key documents which should accompany each warrant application and which we seek to identify during our inspections of the Organisation's warrant documentation files.
73. My staff and I visit ASIO's Central Office approximately every six to eight weeks, and ASIO's state offices as the opportunity arises, to inspect documentation associated with current or recently concluded warrant operations.
74. We check for documents showing: · the intelligence or security case which has been made in support of the application to use special powers; · that the person of interest to ASIO and the individual named in a warrant are actually identical; · that appropriate internal approvals for the warrant request have been obtained; · the persons who have been given authority to execute the warrant or to communicate information obtained from a warrant; · the Attorney-General's approval, when obtained; · reports of the outcome of executed warrants; and · that the activity concerned did not begin before, or continue after, the period approved by the Attorney-General.
75. The existence of these records provides reassurance that special powers warrants are not sought or obtained without proper justification, thorough planning and appropriate levels of approval.
76. The requirement to produce these records for external scrutiny also serves to remind ASIO staff members at all levels throughout the Organisation, that they are accountable for their actions.
77. We inspect documentation for all warrants issued. In the reporting period we also reviewed a number of warrant operation cases several times, in order to be satisfied that reports of warrant outcomes were actually prepared and provided to the Attorney-General within the requisite time.
78. In each of the cases we reviewed during the reporting period we were satisfied that ASIO had: · reasonable grounds for seeking a warrant for the use of special powers; · provided sufficient information for the Attorney-General to make an informed decision on whether or not to approve the warrant; · put appropriate procedures in place to monitor that the conditions of the warrant were being fulfilled; and · reported the results of warrant operations to the Attorney-General in a balanced and timely manner.
79. We were satisfied that the key accountability documents that ASIO generates as a part of the warrant process, as described above, were being kept on the relevant files.
Warrant operations - result of inspections
80. Warrant operations undertaken by ASIO are generally conducted covertly so as not to alert targets that they are of interest to ASIO, and to maximise the prospects of gathering valuable intelligence.
81. For security reasons it is difficult to report these cases in detail. Several cases that we either reviewed or were briefed about during the reporting period can, however, be commented upon.
82. During the reporting period we noted four instances of inadvertent unauthorised telephone interception.
83. In the first instance a telephone service formerly associated with an individual of interest to ASIO was inadvertently monitored for three hours. The error arose because the regional office supporting this operation referred to previous rather than current warrant documentation and did not realise that the telephone service in question had been determined to be no longer relevant to the target identity.
84. As soon as the error was realised coverage of this telephone service was terminated. Product from the interception was destroyed and no processing of product for this telephone service took place.
85. I was satisfied that the unauthorised interception was inadvertent, that appropriate remedial action was taken immediately, that no harm was done to the interests of the person whose telephone service was intercepted, and that ASIO had been open in revealing the error.
86. The second instance of unauthorised telephone interception occurred when a target identity returned to his country of origin but did not cancel his telephone service. Following the target's departure several calls made by one of the target's professional associates were intercepted. As the warrant documentation supporting the interception activity referred to the target identity by name rather than his replacement, these calls appear to have been intercepted without authority.
87. After reviewing this case I was satisfied that the unauthorised interception was inadvertent and that appropriate procedures have now been put in place to minimise the risk of repetition. ASIO made no use of the intercepted material and destroyed all records of it.
88. The third case we noted arose from an inspection activity we conducted quite unrelated to the warrant process. In the course of that inspection we became aware that due to an apparent mistake by a telecommunications operator a private telephone service, unrelated to the subject of a warrant, was intercepted.
89. This mistake was noticed soon after the issue of the warrant but due to a breakdown in communications was not acted upon for approximately one week. During that week no calls were made on the telephone service. When calls resumed immediate action was taken to cease monitoring.
90. On reviewing this case I was satisfied that the cause of this error lay outside the direct control of ASIO and that all inadvertently collected product had been destroyed. ASIO also took appropriate action to reduce the risk of any recurrence.
91. The final occurrence of unauthorised interception that we noted occurred when, due to a last minute change of plans by the subject of the warrant and reliance on incorrect records, the wrong telephone service was monitored for a very brief period until the error was identified. Immediately the Director-General became aware of this error, he requested his staff to bring this matter to my attention.
92. While I was satisfied with ASIO's explanation of what happened and the response of the Organisation once the error had been identified, I shared the Director-General's concern that a system had not previously been in place to double-check the accuracy of the records which ASIO had relied on.
93. Several minor procedural issues also arose. An example was a case in which ASIO informed us that a single-page warrant revocation notice associated with a sensitive operation could not be located. After reviewing the relevant file we concluded that ASIO had taken all reasonable steps to locate the document, that there was no apparent breach of operational security, and that there was no evidence of any illegality or impropriety associated with the document's disappearance.
94. The most likely explanation for this situation arising was that the document in question had been inadvertently shredded when other associated documents were being destroyed.
Authorities to investigate - procedures
95. The "authority to investigate" (ATI) process involves applications by ASIO staff to more senior officers for authority to conduct investigations in relation to individuals or organisations.
96. My staff and I regularly inspect the records generated as a part of the ATI consideration process and the files on which the investigative activity resulting from the issue of these authorities are kept.
97. During the 2000-2001 reporting period, my office examined files relating to every ATI that was issued in ASIO's central office, and a sample of those issued in ASIO's other offices during our periodic visits interstate.
98. Based on these inspection activities, I believe the arrangements are working well and strike an appropriate balance between the need to protect the privacy of individuals and the operational needs of ASIO.
Authorities to investigate - results of inspections
99. As with warrant operations, detailed public discussion of specific ATI cases is not possible. Despite this restriction several cases that were reviewed during the reporting period can be commented upon in general terms.
100. One case involved ASIO obtaining assistance from a Commonwealth agency with wide statutory powers of search, to conduct a covert examination using those powers, of the effects of a person of interest to ASIO.
101. I obtained legal advice from the Australian Government Solicitor about whether either agency had acted without proper legal authority. The advice cast some doubt upon the legal situation. Although the other agency has wide search powers they must be used for the purpose of the empowering legislation.
102. I drew this advice to the Director-General's attention and he promptly directed that there be no further requests for such assistance without legal advice from ASIO's legal adviser. He further directed that there be discussions with the agency concerned about the assistance the agency might properly be able to provide to ASIO in future. Preliminary discussions have since taken place.
103. In a different case, I noted that another intelligence agency had sought ASIO's assistance to obtain the details of the subscriber of a telephone service. As it appeared on the ASIO file the request was quite bald and did not contain any reasons justifying it.
104. As the Inspector-General has oversight responsibilities for the requesting agency, I was able to inspect that agency's records. These showed that the ASIO officer concerned had been sufficiently briefed orally in order to make an informed decision and that the requesting agency had recorded the reasons for the request.
105. Although in the case in question there was sufficient reason for not including more details on the ASIO file, I wrote to the Director-General of Security and the head of the requesting agency suggesting that information of this kind should be recorded on file unless there was a very good reason not to. This principle was accepted.
106. Following one ATI inspection we queried the duration of several ATIs where the subject was expected to be in Australia for a very short period but the ATI approval was for 12 months. ASIO has accepted that the length of ATI approvals should be flexible to meet the needs of particular cases rather than being automatically valid for one year.
107. In another case we queried the use of a justification related to the Olympic Games as the basis for approving an ATI even though this event had concluded many months beforehand. ASIO accepted that there had been an error and cited a more appropriate authority as justification for their investigation to proceed.
108. In a separate case, we noted that ASIO had borrowed the use of a linguist from a cooperating foreign service to assist with a particular translation task.
109. As this was not the first time issues about the use of foreign linguists had arisen, I sought clarification from the Director-General of the circumstances of this case.
110. The Director-General provided me with a comprehensive response that detailed ASIO's efforts to obtain an Australian linguist with the requisite language skills, the terms of the agreement that underpinned the temporary secondment, and several associated legal issues. Importantly, the agreement provided satisfactory arrangements for limiting access to Australians' communications.
111. On the basis of our inspections during the previous 12 months, the explanations by ASIO staff to the various questions we posed and the responsiveness of senior management to our comments, I am satisfied that the ATI regime is operating as it should.
ASYLUM SEEKERS - SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
112. Several complaints to this office have alleged delay in processing security assessments, resulting in asylum seekers spending longer in detention than they believed necessary.
113. In response to the issues arising out of one such complaint the Director-General assured me that ASIO is focussed on ensuring that the decision making process does not involve people being kept in detention any longer than necessary. Since September 1999, at the Director-General's instigation, ASIO has provided me with reports on the status and age of DIMA detention cases awaiting assessment by ASIO. In February 2001 I met with ASIO officials to discuss changes to the security assessment process over the previous 12 months.
114. An influx of asylum seekers in the last two months of 1999 triggered changes to the arrangements, designed to speed things up. ASIO and the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs conducted a joint review of the processes and implemented recommendations flowing out of this review.
115. The changes included: · Establishment of an ASIO task force to clear the backlog of cases; · Creation of a specialist new directorate within ASIO, resulting in greater continuity, consistency of approach and greater efficiencies; and · Involving ASIO at the 'front end' of the process, so that ASIO is able in most cases to complete security assessments before the department finishes its processing.
116. By the end of the reporting period over 99% of security assessments were being completed within six months of referral with 80% of clearances being issued within a few weeks after referral.
DEALINGS WITH AUSTRAC AND THE AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE
117. Amendments to the Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 and the Taxation Administration Act 1953 in December 1999, provided a legal basis for ASIO to obtain information from the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), in strictly prescribed circumstances.
118. The procedures involved in ASIO accessing financial transaction reports (FTR) and taxation information are set out in Memoranda of Understanding between the respective parties. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and the Director of AUSTRAC have also entered into a Memorandum of Understanding covering oversight issues. These agreements were signed, in the presence of the Attorney-General, on 7 September 2000.
119. The MOU between AUSTRAC and IGIS requires the Inspector-General to review all ASIO requests for FTR information. A similar arrangement exists between this office and the ATO, in respect of ASIO's access to taxation information.
120. To assist us to conduct this monitoring activity, every member of my office visited AUSTRAC's Sydney offices and received a thorough briefing on its activities.
121. We have now put in place procedures to review all ASIO requests for FTR information. On the basis of our review activities so far, it is apparent that ASIO is complying with the requirements of the MOU between itself and AUSTRAC.
122. These include a requirement that ASIO officers attend AUSTRAC premises to interrogate the computer databases, which imposes significant practical limitations on the utility of the system. Other agencies, however, have on-line access in their own premises. In view of the detailed monitoring and inspection regime applying to ASIO and the security surrounding its operations it would seem reasonable that it, too, be able to have online access.
123. ASIO has less frequent need to access taxation information. We will, however, review each case in a similar manner to ASIO's access to FTR information.
DEALINGS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
124. Members of the office and I attempt to visit each of ASIO's interstate offices at least once each year. During these periodic visits we examine ASIO's records of exchanges of information with local law enforcement agencies.
125. During the reporting period we found these records to be properly maintained and sufficiently detailed for us to conclude that the exchange of information that occurs is necessary for the performance of the functions of the organisations concerned.
126. In previous reporting periods I have met with senior police in different jurisdictions to discuss their experiences when dealing with ASIO. On each occasion I have been informed that a good level of cooperation existed with ASIO, and that ASIO had a proper understanding of the distinction between its role and that of the police forces.
127. I did not conduct any such visits during the reporting period but will again in the future, if particular circumstances demand it or as the opportunity presents itself.
ARCHIVE ISSUES
128. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO conducted a public inquiry into the nature, scope and appropriateness of ASIO's public reporting activities, including looking at archives issues. I appeared before the committee on 17 July 2000.
129. A copy of the committee's report may be found on the parliamentary web site at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcasio/PubRep-Report.htm.
130. I subsequently met with the Director-General of the National Archives of Australia (NAA) and several of his senior staff to discuss record management and access issues pertinent to both the NAA and ASIO.
131. In addition to these activities, the Director-General of Security provides our office with quarterly progress reports on ASIO's performance in meeting its obligations under the Archives Act 1983. I also meet occasionally with relevant ASIO staff to discuss their handling of significant archive issues.
132. We sometimes also receive complaints about the handling of archives access requests. A description of one of these complaints is at paragraphs 170 to 172. Applicants who are dissatisfied with decisions under the Archives Act also have the right to have decisions reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
133. Based on the complaints we have investigated, our occasional inspection activities, and the progress report we receive, I am satisfied that ASIO is committed to processing access requests as expeditiously and efficiently as it can, and to otherwise meeting its obligations under the Archives Act.
CONTACT WITH STAFF
134. I regularly participate in training sessions for ASIO officers and inductees, addressing them on accountability issues and the work of this office. 135. ASIO officers also occasionally brief me on matters which touch upon the work of the office, or to seek an independent opinion.
136. In contrast to the situation that I understand pertained early in this office's history, the Director?General places no barriers to contact between ASIO staff and members of this office. Indeed he encourages such contact and does not seek to monitor or control it in any way. For our part, we seek to use this freedom of access positively and responsibly so as to minimise any adverse impact on the work of the agency.
COMPLAINTS AND INQUIRIES
137. During the reporting period 19 complaints about ASIO were concluded without proceeding to a preliminary inquiry (compared with 15 such cases in 1999-2000).
138. Two outstanding matters were carried over from the previous reporting period. The office conducted preliminary inquiries into 10 new matters and a full inquiry into one complaint (see Annex, Table 2).
139. In conducting inquiries I sought briefings on a range of subjects, as well as access to files and to individuals. The Director-General of Security met all such requests.
140. Some of the complaints dealt with during the reporting period are summarised below.
Did ASIO break a promise of assistance and place a human source in danger?
141. An Australian citizen who became aware of possible activity by an intelligence service of another country contacted ASIO to inform it of the matter.
142. ASIO enlisted this person's assistance to obtain further information about the intelligence service's intentions. When it appeared that these were likely to extend to doing physical harm to certain people ASIO obtained further help from its informant in an operation designed to frustrate the intended activity.
143. ASIO paid its informant for helping, but the informant also wanted assistance with an immigration matter involving a relative.
144. At the conclusion of the operation ASIO sought to terminate the relationship with a final payment. The informant refused the payment and approached the Inspector-General alleging that ASIO had failed to keep promises it made about immigration matters. Furthermore, the informant alleged that involvement in the operation had entailed serious physical risk that was likely to continue because the informant would now be the target of a violent individual bearing a grudge.
145. Following a long interview between the complainant and a member of the office I initiated an inquiry under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act.
146. For the purposes of the inquiry we first obtained ASIO's records of the operation and received oral briefing from senior ASIO officers on the operation and its context.
147. Following this, to ensure that the complainant had every opportunity to provide information to support the allegations, I prepared a detailed list of issues and questions for discussion with the complainant. At a further meeting I invited the complainant to provide details such as the names of the ASIO officers involved, the precise terms of agreements and promises made and the reasons for the belief that there was a continuing physical danger to the complainant.
148. Having taken these matters into consideration and concluded examination of ASIO's records, I prepared a draft letter to the complainant and, as required by the IGIS Act, sought clearance of the draft from the Director-General on security grounds.
149. The Director-General responded that, while he did not have any difficulty with the conclusions in the draft, he had concerns, inter alia, that if the complainant chose to reveal such a letter in certain quarters there could be operational risks.
150. From our observation of the complainant's behaviour it seemed quite possible that there might be such disclosure. I therefore agreed with the Director-General that there should be an arrangement whereby the complainant read the letter under the supervision of a member of staff of the office of the Inspector?General, but without being able to retain it. Also, because the complainant was believed to have attended other meetings with a concealed tape recorder, the staff member was not empowered to discuss the contents of the letter, the complainant being invited instead to comment in writing.
151. The letter told the complainant that our examination of ASIO's records showed that they contained contemporary reports of each discussion between the complainant and ASIO officers. These confirmed that the complainant sought immigration assistance but also clearly recorded that ASIO told the complainant it could not involve itself in the decision making process of Australia's immigration authorities.
152. In relation to the complainant's claim of exposure to unreasonable risk, it was clear that the assistance the complainant provided to ASIO was not without risk at the time. This was particularly true of the complainant's initial approach to ASIO which, if it had become known to the foreign service, might have attracted reprisal. Neither the complainant, however, nor the ASIO records, gave reason to believe that ASIO subsequently acted without regard to the complainant's welfare or that there was any basis for the complainant's fear of ongoing physical danger.
153. All this we explained in the letter to the complainant, who was understandably disappointed but was unable to produce any information to suggest that the conclusions were wrong.
Protection visas
154. There were three complaints from representatives of persons in immigration detention who were seeking protection visas. Of the two that were dealt with before the end of the reporting period, one concerned alleged delay by ASIO in conducting a security assessment. After inquiry it was apparent that, although the period of detention was some 12 months, this was due to factors outside ASIO's control.
155. In the second case, the complainant's concern was the nature of the information ASIO may have furnished to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs that led the department to advise the applicant that it had confidential information relevant to the assessment of his character, which it was unable to divulge.
156. I wrote to ASIO asking what involvement, if any, it had in the processing of the application for refugee status. After examining ASIO's actions, while unable to be forthcoming on the nature or extent of information that ASIO held, I was able to inform the complainant that ASIO had done nothing improper, illegal or contrary to human rights.
Sydney Olympic Games community interviews
157. In the lead-up to the Olympic Games ASIO engaged in a programme of community interviews to help assess the extent of possible risks of politically motivated violence.
158. Considering the magnitude of the programme, the fact that there were only two complaints arising from it suggests that it was conducted sensitively and sensibly.
159. The first complaint was from a man whom ASIO sought to locate at his residence in a religious centre. The ASIO officer was accompanied by a member of the state police, who assisted ASIO with the interview programme where necessary. The complainant said that his reputation in his community had been damaged by the public way in which the interviewers had set about locating him. He also complained about the manner in which the interview was subsequently conducted at the local police station.
160. I examined the relevant documentation in which ASIO detailed its contact with him and received briefing on the circumstances of his case.
161. For reasons which cannot be disclosed here, ASIO had a legitimate need to speak to the complainant at the earliest possible opportunity. As he lived at a religious centre it was not possible to be sure of making contact with him except by attending the premises and by asking people where he might be found. While this was unfortunate, it is clear that there was no intention to damage his reputation and in the circumstances I concluded that ASIO had sufficient justification for the approach.
162. ASIO made it clear to the complainant in the course of conducting its inquiries that its interest in him was as part of a security investigation and not a criminal one. While it is understandable that police involvement and the use of police facilities for interviewing purposes may cause embarrassment or heightened anxiety in some people, ASIO had legitimate reasons for this approach in this case. ASIO seeks cooperation from people on a voluntary basis and the complainant was free to decide whether or not to assist.
163. The complainant was in the process of applying for residency within Australia and was concerned that he might be sent back to his homeland. I reassured him that applications for residency are covered by strict guidelines and his application would be processed within these guidelines. I also explained that there are avenues of appeal open to all applicants should their application prove unsuccessful.
164. The second complaint arising from the interview programme was from a man who believed that ASIO and the police were harassing him. He also claimed that ASIO had provided his address to a community newspaper that published it within an article. This, he said, was proof that ASIO had turned 'his community' against him.
165. On examining ASIO's conduct it was apparent that there was no basis for the allegation of harassment. ASIO explained to the complainant why they were interested in talking to him. The information sought was for legitimate purposes related to national security and there were good reasons for seeking assistance from the state police.
166. The complainant provided the office with a copy of the offending newspaper article, marked with an arrow labelled 'my address'. This article was translated in its entirety and contained no mention of an address or the vicinity in which the complainant lives.
167. The complainant contacted the office again in April and May 2001 alleging that as a result of ASIO turning his community against him he and his family had been threatened and assaulted. He told the office that he had reported these events to the police and that he was not satisfied with the manner in which they were handled. He stated that he no longer felt safe and wanted to leave Australia with his family. He demanded ASIO pay for these plane tickets.
168. I informed him that ASIO was not behind the activities he described, that the matters he raised were outside my jurisdiction and that he should contact the state police if he believed that he or his family's lives were in danger. I also informed him of steps he could take if he wished to make a complaint about the police.
Did ASIO withhold information requested under the Archives Act?
169. Under the provisions of the Archives Act people can apply for access to ASIO material that is more than 30 years old, in the same way as for records created by other Commonwealth agencies.
170. A retired public servant complained that ASIO was not providing full access to the records relating to a security clearance undertaken many years ago when he applied for a public service promotion. The contents of the file holdings released to him were not what he expected and fuelled his belief that ASIO must hold other records that pertained to him at this time and later in his career.
171. After discussing the case with researchers from both ASIO and the National Archives of Australia and examining what ASIO had done, I was confident that ASIO had made exhaustive efforts to find records of the kind requested, but does not hold (and may well never have held) any other records on the complainant.
172. The complainant, however, was sure that there must be other records, held on seemingly unrelated files. He believed that he might have come to notice in the 1950s in the context of the Petrov espionage case. Since the Petrov papers have previously been made public the complainant undertook to research this material himself. He also proposed to look at records of his former employer held in the Archives. We agreed that if he uncovered a significant lead to other ASIO records in this way then we would follow it up to the extent possible.
Employment application - interview with psychologist
173. An applicant for a position with ASIO complained about the tone and conduct of a psychological assessment interview he underwent.
174. At my request ASIO provided a copy of the complainant's psychological assessment report and commented on the issues that he raised. The report and comments confirmed that this was not an interview in which he and the interviewer achieved a great deal of rapport. It was understandable, therefore, that he came away feeling concerned about the outcome, but there was no evidence that this was due to inappropriate conduct by the interviewer.
175. The purpose of such interviews is to establish, so far as possible, whether candidates for positions will be capable of meeting ASIO's general suitability requirements. The complainant had compared his interview with the Defence Security Branch (DSB) security clearance process. The purpose of the DSB interview is different and it is not surprising, therefore, that the methodology is also.
176. ASIO employs experienced psychologists who use standard, tested, though not inflexible, methodologies. If, as the complainant speculated, there were systemic problems with this approach, one would expect there to be numerous dissatisfied interviewees, but there are not. While his was a difficult interview it was not possible to conclude that it resulted in injustice to him. On this basis I did not see any scope for revisiting the assessment process.
177. Through this office, ASIO offered a face-to-face discussion with the complainant of its recruitment process that was to include an explanation of the purpose of the psychological assessment and the differences between it and the DSB process. The complainant did not take up this offer.
Employee grievances
178. A lawyer acting on behalf of an ASIO employee sought to complain about ASIO's alleged refusal to negotiate a settlement of his client's claims arising from his employment.
179. I explained to the employee's legal representative that the Inspector-General does not have jurisdiction to inquire into complaints by or on behalf of ASIO employees where the complaint relates to their conditions of employment.
180. This is because subsection 8(7) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act operates to preclude inquiry by the Inspector-General into a complaint by an ASIO employee if the employee is able to have the subject matter of the complaint reviewed by a body constituted by, or including, persons other than the Director-General or employees of ASIO.
181. There is such a body, namely a formal grievance review committee established by determination, chaired by a person who is not the Director-General or an ASIO employee. This body has determinative powers and could, in my opinion, review the matters the employee wished to complain about. So long as such a mechanism exists there is no scope for action by the Inspector?General in response to employment-related complaints by ASIO staff.
Imaginary concerns
182. Previous annual reports have discussed the fact that we regularly receive complaints from people who are of no interest to ASIO but believe they are under surveillance or being harassed. The following case is illustrative of these.
183. The complainant sought access to information relating to himself that he believed might be held by ASIO. He had written earlier to ASIO seeking this information and was dissatisfied with the response he had received.
184. He expressed particular interest about the use of 'hidden cameras' by ASIO, ASIS, ONA and the Australian Federal Police.
185. I wrote explaining to him that, of the agencies listed, the only organisation under my jurisdiction that has the authority to place people under surveillance in Australia is ASIO. Even so, surveillance of any kind can only take place for good reasons that relate to national security. ASIO does not have the right to install networks of hidden cameras covering public places on the off chance that a matter relevant to national security may come to its notice. I also told him that if he remained concerned and would like me to take his complaint further, he would need to give me reason to believe that he may be of interest to ASIO.
186. The complainant wrote twice more, in his final letter asking for my help in determining whether the harassment he was experiencing was real or perceived.
187. He provided an extensive list of the ways in which he believed ASIO was harassing him and the reasons he believed ASIO might use to justify such harassment. I wrote to him saying that none of the matters listed in his letter could justify ASIO activity in relation to him. ASIO has neither the legal authority, the motivation nor the capacity to engage in the activities that the complainant described.