Annual Report 2002 - 2003

DEFENCE IMAGERY AND GEOSPATIAL ORGANISATION

WHAT DIGO DOES

275. The Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) has prime responsibility for the acquisition and analysis of satellite and other imagery and for the development, acquisition and exploitation of geospatial data.

276. This means that DIGO collects and analyses images of foreign and domestic subjects (eg. landforms, waterways, disputed territories etc.), and develops mapping and imagery intelligence products for a range of Commonwealth agencies and the Australian Defence Force.

277. Detailed technical analysis of imagery obtained by DIGO can reveal information that is of value to key decision makers in the development of policies that are in the national interest, and of possible benefit in national and international emergency management.

278. DIGO also has the capacity to combine imagery with other available sources of data to prepare highly accurate topographical maps and other aids that are of value in the preparation of plans relevant to national defence and security.

SENIOR APPOINTMENTS

279. Mr Chris Stephens AM was foundation Director of DIGO from 1999 until his retirement on 4 July 2003.

280. In establishing DIGO as a separate entity within the Australian intelligence community, Mr Stephens was concerned to ensure ethical conduct, transparency and accountability within the agency.

281. I would like to thank Mr Stephens for supporting the work of our office, and wish him well in his retirement.

ACCOUNTABILITY ARRANGEMENTS

282. During the reporting period DIGO continued to pursue initiatives to formally establish itself as a separate agency.

283. As was noted in last year’s annual report, one piece of legislation that needs to be amended is the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, which currently makes no reference to DIGO.

284. Meanwhile, the Director DIGO and I have agreed that I should oversee the activities of DIGO as if the IGIS Act had already been amended. The Minister for Defence has endorsed this approach.

INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

285. We visited DIGO headquarters approximately every three months during the reporting period to identify and review DIGO intelligence collection activities that may have had some impact upon Australians or Australian entities.

286. While DIGO’s collection priorities are focussed outside Australia, there are occasions when it collects images of Australian territory, for example in support of defence operations.

287. The scope for collection of imagery which could intrude upon the privacy of Australians is limited and occurs subject to the Rules Governing DIGO’s Activities in Respect of Australia and Australians.

288. These rules, which were endorsed by the Minister for Defence in November 2000, embody similar principles to the ASIS and DSD privacy rules.

289. My staff and I have received comprehensive briefings on DIGO’s capabilities from the Director and his staff. These briefings have been helpful in better appreciating DIGO’s capabilities and planning our inspection activities.

290. During the reporting period we raised several procedural issues with the Director DIGO. Each approach received a timely and appropriate response.

291. In overall terms, we were satisfied that all necessary approvals had been obtained in respect of all tasking involving Australian locations and that DIGO’s records are being kept in good order.

292. At the invitation of the Director I visited DIGO’s facility in Bendigo, Victoria in July 2002, to meet staff, to learn of the work they undertake, and to discuss the role and functions of the Inspector-General.

COMPLAINTS AND INQUIRIES

293. No complaints during the reporting period specifically referred to DIGO.

294. One complainant had concerns about employment within the Australian intelligence community, which required checking with each member of the AIC including DIGO.

Bali terrorist attack

295. As mentioned in the unclassified introduction and summary at Annex 2 to this annual report, we concluded at an early point in our investigations that it was most unlikely that DIGO could have obtained relevant intelligence.


previous

content

next