DEFENCE IMAGERY AND GEOSPATIAL ORGANISATION
358. The Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) is the lead agency responsible for the acquisition and analysis of satellite and other imagery and for the development, acquisition and exploitation of geospatial data, in support of Australia's defence and national interests.
359. This means that DIGO collects and analyses images of foreign and domestic subjects (eg. landforms, waterways, disputed territories etc.), and develops mapping and imagery intelligence products for the Australian Defence Force and a range of other Commonwealth clients.
360. Detailed technical analysis of imagery obtained by DIGO can reveal information that is of value to key decision makers in the development of policies that are in the national interest, and of possible benefit in national and international emergency management.
361. DIGO also has the capacity to combine imagery with other available sources of data to prepare highly accurate topographical maps and other aids that are of value in the preparation of plans relevant to national defence and security.
362. Further information about DIGO can be found at the following address, http://www.defence.gov.au/digo.
363. The foundation Director of DIGO, Mr Chris Stephens AM, retired in July 2003 (noted in the 2002-2003 report), and was succeeded as Director by Mr Ian McKenzie.
364. Mr McKenzie has had a distinguished public service career which has been predominantly spent in the Department of Defence. Mr McKenzie served in DSD as a senior executive immediately prior to his appointment.
General context of DIGO activities
365. DIGO was established on 8 November 2000 through the amalgamation of the Canberra-based Australian Imagery Organisation, the Directorate of Strategic Military Geographic Information, and the Bendigo-based Defence Topographic Agency (now renamed the Geospatial Analysis Centre).
366. DIGO has played an important role in supporting ADF deployments around the globe. It is active in the war against terror in its many manifestations and provides valuable support to the other members of the intelligence community in ways which would not have been possible even just a few years ago.
367. DIGO is in the midst of a very significant period of review and growth. One of the challenges facing the Director is to ensure that the Organisation successfully completes the transition from being several disparate entities into a unified whole which has clear objectives and a common purpose.
368. The Director is also confronted with the need to recruit and train a significant number of specialist staff so that they, and the Organisation, can take advantage of the advanced technologies which are central to DIGO's business.
369. Mr Blick has noted in previous annual reports that DIGO has pursued various initiatives since its creation to formally establish itself as a separate agency, not all of which have yet born fruit.
370. One item requiring action, at least from the perspective of this office, is to formally include DIGO within the Inspector-General's remit.
371. DIGO is not referred to in the IGIS Act, as it was created nearly 14 years after the passage of the Act.
372. Following discussions between this office and the foundation Director of DIGO, it was agreed that the IGIS Act should be amended but until such time as it is, the Inspector-General should oversee the activities of DIGO as if the IGIS Act had already been amended. The government has endorsed this approach.
373. As mentioned in 'The Year in Review' chapter of this report, Mr Philip Flood AO, conducted a significant inquiry into Australia's intelligence agencies in the later part of the 2003-2004 reporting period.
374. Mr Flood made two recommendations which will have a direct impact on the accountability arrangements for DIGO:
"The mandate of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (PJCAAD) should be extended to all of Australia's intelligence agencies - that is, it should cover also, ONA, DIO and DIGO on the same basis it at presently covers ASIO, ASIS and DSD."
"… the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 should be amended to include scrutiny of DIGO on a basis comparable with that which applies to DSD and ASIS."[4]
375. The government has accepted these recommendations. As the PJCAAD is limited to reviewing matters of finance and administration the respective roles of the Committee and the IGIS are complementary.
376. Shortly after I was appointed as Inspector-General, I wrote to the Director DIGO setting out the range of inspection activities I planned to undertake.
377. In that letter I indicated that if any concerns or matters worthy of comment were to arise during an inspection activity, a member of my staff or I would discuss them with an appropriate senior manager or liaison officer in the first instance. I also indicated that following each inspection visit I would write to the Director with a summary of our discussions or findings.
378. Mr Blick and I visited DIGO headquarters approximately every three months during the reporting period. The purpose of these visits has been to identify and review those of DIGO's intelligence collection activities that may have had some impact upon Australians or Australian entities.
379. While DIGO's collection priorities are focussed outside Australia, there are occasions when it collects images of Australian territory, for example in support of defence operations.
380. The scope for collection of imagery which could intrude upon the privacy of Australians is limited and occurs subject to the Rules Governing DIGO's Activities in Respect of Australia and Australians.
381. These rules, which were endorsed by the government in November 2000, embody similar principles to the ASIS and DSD privacy rules.
382. We encouraged DIGO to develop systems whereby our office could examine its' tasking registers electronically (in much the same way that DSD maintains an electronic register for this office). Our purpose in making this request was to enable us to review this material before our regular quarterly meetings, so that our visits could be focussed on discussing pertinent issues arising out of our review, rather than the reading of files.
383. Work to achieve this outcome was on-going at the end of the reporting period. I am conscious that DIGO should not devote substantial resources to this task and if it proves too difficult, will not pursue it. However, I am grateful for the efforts of all involved in seeking a solution for this problem.
384. During the reporting period we raised several procedural issues with the Director DIGO. Each approach received a timely and appropriate response.
385. We were satisfied that all necessary approvals had been obtained in respect of all tasking involving Australian locations and that DIGO's records are being kept in good order.
386. Mr McKenzie has reinforced within DIGO the requirement to have all approvals for tasking requests on Australia and Australian entities approved by Director DIGO or a higher authority as appropriate.
387. In addition to reviewing DIGO's tasking requests register and associated files, Mr Blick and I have taken the opportunity of our quarterly visits to meet with the Director and be briefed on current issues.
388. The office received two complaints about DIGO during the reporting period leading to preliminary inquiries.
Recruitment related issues
389. As indicated above, the 2003-2004 reporting period saw a significant growth in the number of staff employed in DIGO. It is perhaps not surprising that both complaints to this office about DIGO related to recruitment practices.
390. The first complaint concerned an administrative oversight which led to unsuccessful applicants for a position not being notified. DIGO has amended its internal administrative practices in such a way as to minimise the possibility of any reoccurrence.
391. In the second case, the complainant expressed concern that he might have inadvertently provided misleading information during an organisational suitability assessment procedure, and this might have consequences for his future employability.
392. I was able to reassure the complainant that the system was sufficiently robust to withstand minor inaccuracies and isolated misunderstandings, and that although he was unsuccessful on this occasion he would not be precluded from future selection exercises.
[4] Australian Government, Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies, Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies, (Philip Flood AO), Canberra, 2004, p. 180.