AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

What ASIO Does

109. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation is Australia's security service. Its functions are set out in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. It is also subject to guidelines issued by the Attorney‑General.

110. ASIO's main role is to gather information and produce intelligence that will enable it to warn the government about activities or situations that might endanger Australia's security. It is not a law enforcement agency.

111. The focus of ASIO's work is on terrorism, people who may act violently for political reasons, and people who may clandestinely obtain sensitive government information or otherwise harm Australia's interests in order to further their own causes or the interests of foreign governments.

112. Under its legislation, ASIO must not limit the right of persons to engage in lawful advocacy, protest or dissent and the exercise of that right shall not, by itself, be regarded as prejudicial to security.

113. ASIO does not have the statutory authority or the resources to engage in surveillance of ordinary members of the community going about their normal business.

114. ASIO has to obtain specific ministerial authority for use of its most intrusive powers, such as questioning persons who are believed to possess information which would substantially assist the collection of intelligence in relation to a terrorism offence, telecommunications interception, use of listening devices etc.

115. Other ASIO functions include collecting foreign intelligence in Australia, and providing security assessments and protective security advice.

116. Further information about ASIO, the Attorney-General's guidelines and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, can be found on ASIO's Internet homepage located at, http://www.asio.gov.au.

significant issues

Questioning and detention warrants

117. As mentioned in 'The Year in Review' chapter of this report, the Parliament passed the ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 on 26 June 2003. The Act received Royal Assent on 22 July 2003 but a warrant could not be issued until a Protocol on the procedures to be followed in the exercise of authority to detain persons and conduct questioning, was tabled in Parliament. The Protocol (see Annex 2) was tabled on 12 August 2003. Amendments made by the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 received Royal Assent on 17 December 2003.

118. The legislative provisions that provide ASIO with access to questioning and detention powers are contained in Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act, and run to over 40 pages. The length of this Division reflects the considerable efforts of the legislature to incorporate procedural protections and safeguards into the various sections of this Division.

119. Briefly summarised, the new Division requires that warrants sought under s34D of the ASIO Act can only be authorised by a recognised Issuing Authority such as a Federal Magistrate or Federal Court Judge, on the basis of a request from the Director-General of Security that has been consented to by the Attorney-General.

120. The obligations on the subjects of section 34D warrants include:

• appearing when and where they are directed to in the warrant

• giving any information requested in accordance with the warrant

• not deliberately making false or misleading statements in a material particular, and

• not failing to produce any record or thing in their possession that is requested.

121. Failure to comply leaves the subject at risk of prosecution for a criminal offence for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for five years.

122. Information obtained in the course of questioning the subject of a s34D warrant is not admissible against the person in criminal proceedings, except where the subject is being prosecuted for failure to comply with a request to give information, or to produce a record or thing, that is made in accordance with the warrant.

123. The role of the Prescribed Authority is to oversee the questioning of individuals who are the subject of section 34D warrants and to ensure that they are afforded procedural fairness. The qualifications necessary to be a Prescribed Authority are set down at s34B of the ASIO Act. In most cases they are likely to be judicial officers of long standing who have recently retired.

124. Those safeguards which specifically involve the Inspector-General include the following:

• Section 34C(3A)(a)(i) requires that the IGIS be consulted in the development of a written statement of procedures to be followed in the exercise of authority under section 34D of the ASIO Act.

• Section 34E(1)(e)(i) requires the Prescribed Authority to explain to the subject of a section 34D warrant that they have the right to make a complaint to the IGIS about ASIO, either orally or in writing.

• Section 34F requires that anyone holding a person in custody or detention under Division 3 of the ASIO Act must give the person facilities for contacting the IGIS.

• Section 34HAB of the ASIO Act provides the IGIS and OIGIS staff members with the right to be present at the questioning or taking into custody of such a person should they choose to do so.

• Section 34HA of the ASIO Act provides that where the IGIS has a concern about impropriety or illegality in connection with the exercise of powers under that warrant, they may raise that concern with the Prescribed Authority, who must consider the Inspector-General's concern.

• Section 34Q of the ASIO Act details those materials which ASIO is required to provide to the IGIS is respect of section 34D warrants. These materials include a copy of any draft requests for a warrant given to the Attorney-General, any warrants issued, a copy of any video recordings made of the questioning of subjects, and a statement containing details of any seizure, taking into custody, or detention.

• Section 34QA imposes a reporting requirement on the IGIS where multiple warrants are issued in respect of an individual.

125. There is no legislative requirement for the Inspector-General to attend the questioning of the subjects of s34D warrants. However, my predecessor as Inspector-General, Mr Blick, gave an undertaking to the PJCAAD that he intended to attend the first few occasions where the new powers were used and then review his position after that (pp 14-15, PJCAAD Committee Hansard, 30 April 2002 refers).

126. It is not possible, for security reasons, to provide specific details of when, where, and against whom ASIO used its new special powers during the reporting period.

127. However, I am able to say that with the exception of only one day either Mr Blick, myself, or one of my staff, have been present on all days when the subject of a section 34D warrant has been questioned, for the full duration of the questioning. The exception was a relatively brief period of questioning on one day, which was video-taped and for which a full written transcript was also provided to my office.

128. Mr Blick and I have corresponded with the Director-General of Security and the Attorney-General, detailing our views on how the new powers worked in practice. We observed that in all instances where a section 34D warrant was executed, in accordance with Section 34Q, our office received:

• advance notice from ASIO that it intended to approach the Attorney-General seeking consent to request such a warrant from an Issuing Authority

• a copy of warrants issued under section 34D, and

• a copy of video recordings made of the questioning of subjects.

129. Mr Blick and I have raised several procedural and practical issues based on our experience in observing the execution of section 34D warrants. These include:

• whether lawyers representing the subjects of such warrants should be given scope to address the Prescribed Authority concerning the continuation of questioning

• the provision of legal aid to the subject of warrants

• whether relevant terrorism offences were identified with sufficient specificity in the warrant documentation

• the recording of elapsed time during questioning, and

• the degree of privacy which is afforded to the subject of such warrants to meet their religious obligations, consult their legal representatives or lodge complaints.

130. These matters have been the subject of on-going discussions with ASIO and the Attorney-General's Department.

131. Mr Blick and I came to the same general conclusions on the use to date of section 34D warrants, as follows:

• the questioning of the subjects of s34D warrants has been conducted in a professional and appropriate manner

• the subjects of questioning have been accorded dignity and respect

• the facilities used for each questioning session have been appropriate

• due consideration has been given in each case to the subject's physical comfort and religious needs, and

• the existing commitments of subjects have been properly taken into account in determining the timing of questioning.

Search warrants

132. At the completion of the 2002-03 reporting period, 10 preliminary inquiries remained open. The majority of these inquiries related to complaints about the manner in which ASIO had executed entry and search warrants. Each of these inquiries was concluded by Mr Blick during the 2003-04 reporting period.

133. For the most part Mr Blick found that the complaints could not be substantiated. However, in two cases there were issues of concern. These are discussed at paragraphs 197-202. Mr Blick also identified some procedural issues which he believed required consideration. This is discussed further at paragraphs 203 - 207.

Inspection activities

Scope and reporting arrangements

134. ASIO is the AIC agency most likely to come into contact with members of the Australian public. It is therefore appropriate that ASIO's intelligence collection activities should be subjected to more intensive and more frequent review by the Inspector‑General than any of the other members of the intelligence community.

135. Shortly after being appointed Inspector-General I wrote to the Director-General of Security setting out the range of inspection activities I planned to undertake. In that letter I indicated that if any concerns or matters worthy of comment were to arise during an inspection activity, a member of my staff or I would discuss them with an appropriate senior manager or liaison officer in the first instance. I also indicated that following each inspection visit I would write to the Director‑General with a summary of our findings.

136. During the reporting period, this office regularly inspected records associated with the following ASIO activities:

• warrant operations

• authorities to investigate

• access to, and use of, information obtained from the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre and the Australian Taxation Office

• provision of information to, and liaison with, law enforcement agencies

• the official use of alternative documentation to support assumed identities, and

• compliance with the Archives Act.

Warrant operations - procedures

137. ASIO has access to a range of special powers to assist it to perform the functions mandated for it by the Parliament. These special powers can only be used in limited circumstances following the issue of a properly authorised warrant.

138. The use of special powers is provided for under Divisions 2 and 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, and various sections of the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979.

139. The Attorney‑General is the issuing authority for all special powers warrants, with the exception of s34D warrants (ie. questioning and detention warrants). The issuing authority for s34D warrants will ordinarily be a Federal Magistrate or a Judge. A s34D warrant cannot be sought from an Issuing Authority unless the Attorney-General has consented to this action.

140. In addition to s34D warrants there are seven broad special powers warrant categories, as follows:

• telecommunications interception (including named person warrants)

• entry and search

• computer access

• listening device

• tracking device relating to persons or objects

• inspection of postal and delivery service articles, and

• foreign intelligence collection.

141. Since becoming Inspector-General I have increased the frequency of our warrant inspection visits to ASIO's central office from bi-monthly to monthly.

142. To ensure that ASIO does not seek warrants without proper justification, thorough planning and appropriate consideration at various levels of approval, we check ASIO's files for documents showing:

• the intelligence or security case that ASIO has made in support of the application

• that the people named in warrants are in fact those of interest to ASIO

• that appropriate internal approvals for the request have been obtained

• the persons to whom the Director‑General has given authority to execute the warrant or to communicate information obtained from a warrant

• the Attorney-General's approval, when obtained

• that reports to the Attorney‑General of the outcome of executed warrants are factual and have been provided in a timely manner, and

• that the activity concerned did not begin before, or continue after, the period approved by the Attorney‑General.

143. In the course of our rolling visits programme we aim to inspect documentation for all warrants issued.

144. During the reporting period we reviewed many warrant documentation files several times, to ensure that they were being properly managed throughout the period of the warrant. In each case we were satisfied that ASIO had:

• reasonable grounds for seeking a warrant

• provided sufficient information for the Attorney-General (or the Issuing Authority in the case of s34D warrants) to make an informed decision

• appropriate procedures in place to check that the conditions of the warrant were being fulfilled

• reported the results of warrant operations to the Attorney-General in an accurate manner, and

• maintained the key accountability documents on the relevant files.

145. As an additional safeguard, my staff and I also periodically review a sample of operational management files alongside the warrant documentation files, so that we might gain a better insight into operational planning and management issues, and the practical effects of the execution of some warrants. No issues of concern arose from this further scrutiny.

Unauthorised telephone interception

146. We noted three instances of unauthorised telephone interception during the 2003-04 reporting period. This is the same number of instances as was recorded during the previous reporting period. Details are as follows:

• In the first instance the expiry date of a telecommunications interception warrant was incorrectly programmed into the automated interception system used by ASIO (the 18^th of the month was inserted instead of the correct expiry date of the 8^th). This error was noted several days after the correct expiry date had passed. None of the product collected in the period between the expiry of the warrant and when the error was noted was processed. Mr Blick was satisfied that the error in this case was inadvertent and that appropriate remedial measures were taken.

• In the second instance ASIO provided correct details of a telephone service to be intercepted under warrant authority to a telecommunications carrier, but the carrier mistakenly connected the wrong service to the ASIO recording system. This error, which was wholly beyond the control of ASIO, was promptly noticed and all associated data was immediately destroyed.

• In the final instance, a telephone service which had been the subject of a previous valid warrant was left off the list of numbers to be intercepted when the warrant in question was renewed. Due to inexact/partial validation checking at the time the warrant was renewed this service continued to be intercepted and product from it continued to be delivered, as though its collection had been properly authorised. A large number of calls were received by this service but they were not monitored because the service in question was not on the list of services authorised by the warrant renewal. While this breach occurred due to the cascading effect of several human errors and the remedial steps taken in this case were appropriate, I am concerned that an error of this kind did occur. I am exploring what new or additional checking procedures my office might undertake so I can be assured that there is no repetition.

147. My office also noted an instance where intercept from several authorised ASIO warrant operations was misdirected to a law enforcement agency for a very brief period. This error, while concerning, was again beyond the control of ASIO. The misdirected material has been retrieved and appropriate remedial actions taken to limit the risk of any reoccurrence.

Other warrant related issues

148. We had cause on several occasions to query the timeliness of the reports provided by ASIO to the Attorney-General on the outcome of the use of special powers warrants.

149. Section 17 of the Telecommunication (Interceptions) Act 1979, requires the Director-General of Security to furnish reports of TI related warrants within three months of the expiry or revocation of such warrants. By contrast, Section 34 of the ASIO Act 1979 simply requires the Director-General to furnish a report to the Attorney-General in respect of each warrant issued under the ASIO Act, ie. it does not specify a period within which reports must be provided.

150. Although Mr Blick and I did not identify any instances where the reporting requirements of the T(I) Act were not met, we have separately identified delays in reporting the outcome of non-TI warrant operations. Mr Blick expressed the view to the Director-General of Security that unless there are unanticipated problems in processing information obtained under such warrants, reports should be provided to the Attorney-General in a similar timeframe to TI warrants. If a report is delayed for any length of time, the reasons for the delay should be stated in the report.

151. I do not wish to convey the impression that this is a major problem, but it is a matter to which I will be attuned in the coming year.

152. In respect of a specific warrant operation, Mr Blick suggested that the documentation provided to the Attorney-General seeking his authorisation could have provided fuller details on the safeguards which were to be put in place to limit intrusions into the privacy of persons who were not connected to the subject of interest.

153. In the case in question, the Attorney-General had already received a briefing note on what was proposed months in advance of the operation. Mr Blick suggested that the proposed safeguards should have been incorporated into the request documentation so that the Attorney-General could formally indicate approval of the safeguards and also be reassured that ASIO is committed to minimising intrusions into the privacy of members of the public.

154. Mr Blick and I also raised several technical/legal issues during the reporting period such as the circumstances when a listening device warrant might be used in preference to a computer access warrant, the effect of name/service changes on the validity of warrants, and the legal effect of minor discrepancies between warrant request documentation and the warrants themselves.

155. We also raised several minor points designed to enhance the clarity of warrant documentation, thereby removing possible ambiguities.

156. Several minor procedural issues also came to notice during inspections, mainly relating to the absence of some accountability documents. In each case the missing documents were quickly located and presented for review.

157. Given the increasing number of warrants that have been sought in recent years, the complex nature of the operations being planned and the speed with which most warrant documentation is turned around, the incidence of error is very low.

158. I would like to commend the staff of ASIO's warrant documentation section for their industry, willingness to raise with my office issues of possible concern, and responsiveness to our requirements.

Authorities to investigate - procedures

159. The authority to investigate (ATI) process involves applications by ASIO staff to more senior officers for authority to conduct investigations in relation to people or organisations of national security interest. We regularly inspect the records of the ATI consideration process and the files recording the resulting investigative activity.

160. During the reporting period we examined files relating to every ATI issued in ASIO's central office and a selection of those issued in ASIO's other offices.

161. Given the increasing number of ATIs that have been raised in recent times and that this number is likely to grow rather than diminish, I have increased the frequency of visits by this office to ASIO's larger state collection offices and will continue to review the resourcing of this important function.

Authorities to investigate - results of inspections

162. As with warrant operations, detailed public discussion of specific cases is not possible but comment follows in general terms upon several cases reviewed during the reporting period.

163. In one case Mr Blick noted that a particular ATI was formally approved two months after investigative activity had commenced. The explanation provided was that oral approval had been obtained from a properly qualified authorising officer but the paperwork had not been completed, "… due to the urgency associated with this particular operation."

164. While Mr Blick accepted that oral approval from an appropriately senior officer is an appropriate basis to initiate action in truly exceptional cases, he made the point that these cases will be rare and the associated paperwork should be completed as soon as possible once the urgency has passed.

165. In another case, we noted an instance where a requesting officer and the approving officer were the same person. The officer concerned was counselled by ASIO that this was contrary to ATI policy and amendments were made to the ATI template to ensure that any future such requests would be automatically rejected.

166. During the reporting period we noted several ATIs had been raised in respect of a minor. While these ATIs were properly endorsed and the supporting arguments for investigative action were quite reasonable in the circumstances, a member of staff suggested to us that the authorising officer in such cases should be no lower than at the SES Band One level (or equivalent). I endorsed this suggestion, and the relevant internal ASIO policy has now been amended along these lines.

167. During these inspections we identified several instances where ATIs contained incorrect information. For the most part these were transcription errors which were promptly corrected.

168. My predecessor and I expressed concern at various times that the 'limits on investigation' field on some ATI submissions were lacking in detail. My office has been pursuing this issue with ASIO's senior operational advisers.

169. Although the nature of inspection work is such that we tend to look for and therefore find fault, the general quality of the ATIs I have examined is of a high standard.

ASIO and law enforcement agencies

170. The increased focus on terrorism during the reporting period necessarily involved close cooperation between ASIO and law enforcement agencies.

171. As has been described elsewhere in this report, ASIO required the assistance of various federal and state law enforcement bodies in the course of executing a number of entry and search warrants. I believe that cooperation in this area is good but can be improved, and will work towards clarification on the roles of each in such operations, over the next 12 months.

172. More generally, during our periodic visits to ASIO state offices we examine ASIO's records concerning exchanges of information with local law enforcement agencies. We found these records to be properly maintained and sufficiently detailed for us to conclude that the exchange of information that occurs does not exceed what is necessary for the performance of the functions of the organisations concerned.

173. In examining these records we probed the internal controls around the passage of, storage, and access to, information on persons of intelligence interest to law enforcement agencies. We will continue to do so in the coming reporting period.

AUSTRAC and the Australian Taxation Office

174. The Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 and the Taxation Administration Act 1953 provide for ASIO to obtain information from the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) and the Australian Taxation Office, in strictly prescribed circumstances.

175. The procedures involved in ASIO accessing financial transaction reports and taxation information are set out in memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between the respective parties.

176. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and the Director of AUSTRAC have also entered into a MOU covering oversight issues and the Inspector‑General provides an annual report to the Attorney‑General on ASIO's compliance with its obligations.

177. We regularly review ASIO's access to financial transaction reports and it is apparent from this that ASIO is complying with the requirements of the MOU between itself and AUSTRAC. Until recently, approved ASIO staff could only obtain access to financial transaction records at AUSTRAC premises. ASIO now has direct on-line access to this information.

178. ASIO has formal internal procedures for approving access to AUSTRAC information similar to those applying to ATIs. These procedures require ASIO investigators who need information about the financial transactions of persons of interest to obtain approval from senior officers. Interrogation of the databases is not undertaken by the investigator who requires the information but by an officer specially authorised and trained for the task. Under the MOU between ASIO and AUSTRAC the maximum number of authorised officers at any one time is twelve.

179. The procedures require that, before access is approved, the entity under investigation also be the subject of an ATI or identified in an Intelligence Requirement document which has been endorsed at a senior level within ASIO.

180. This office receives regular online statistical usage reports of who in ASIO is accessing AUSTRAC data and an audit record of each search conducted. These records are generated by AUSTRAC.

181. Neither Mr Blick nor I have identified any significant problems with ASIO's access to and use of AUSTRAC data.

182. We also review all instances where ASIO seeks and/or obtains access to taxation records. It is apparent that, as with access to AUSTRAC records, ASIO is complying with the requirements of the MOU between itself and the Australian Taxation Office and is careful not to abuse the access which has been agreed.

Use of assumed identities

183. Amendments to the Crimes Act 1914 during 2001‑2002 required Commonwealth agencies that issue or use alternate identity documentation, to maintain appropriate records.

184. The amendments require ASIO, as soon as practicable after 30 June each year, to give the Inspector‑General a report for the year. The Director-General of Security furnished me with such a report for the 2003-04 reporting period on 26 July 2004.

185. The report showed that ASIO issued a moderate number of authorisations under the legislation for use of assumed identities by intelligence officers and that no particular problems had been identified in the issuing, variation, use and cancellation of this material.

186. Prior to receiving this report, Mr Blick and I quite independently reviewed the approvals process and related documentation associated with supporting assumed identities. The conclusions we reached were identical to those contained in the Director-General's report.

Archives issues

187. The Director-General of Security provides our office with quarterly progress reports on ASIO's performance in meeting its obligations under the Archives Act 1983. Like my predecessor, I also meet periodically with relevant ASIO staff to discuss their handling of significant archive issues.

188. We sometimes receive complaints about the handling of archives access requests but the incidence of such complaints has declined in recent times. We received only one such complaint during the 2003-04 reporting period.

189. Individuals who are dissatisfied with decisions on archives applications have the right to have them reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

190. On the basis of the reports I have received from the Director-General and speaking to members of his staff, I am satisfied that ASIO's performance in meeting its obligations has been satisfactory, especially considering the competing priorities which are being placed on ASIO's resources.

Contact with staff

191. Mr Blick regularly participated in training sessions for ASIO officers and inductees, addressing them on accountability issues and the work of this office. I believe this is an important function of the office and as a consequence readily accept every invitation I receive to speak to ASIO staff that I am able to attend. Where I am unable to attend, my staff will do so in my place.

192. ASIO officers also brief me from time to time on matters that touch upon the work of the office, or to seek an independent opinion.

193. The Director‑General places no barriers to contact between ASIO staff and members of this office. Indeed he encourages such contact and does not seek to monitor or control it in any way. For our part, we seek to use this freedom of access positively and responsibly so as to minimise any adverse impact on the work of the agency.

Complaints and inquiries

194. During the reporting period 35 complaints about ASIO were concluded without proceeding to a full or preliminary inquiry^[3] (compared with 32 such cases in 2002-2003).

195. Nine outstanding complaints about ASIO were carried over from the previous reporting period. The office conducted preliminary inquiries into 10 new complaints about ASIO, and initiated full inquiries into two new complaints.

196. Some of the complaints dealt with during the reporting period are summarised below.

Compensation arising out of previous search warrant complaints

197. Mr Blick highlighted two cases in his last annual report where he had recommended that ASIO pay compensation arising out of the use of search warrants (see paragraphs 136-145 of the 2002-2003 IGIS Annual Report).

198. In the first of these cases, the complainant alleged that a computer that had been seized in the course of an ASIO search had been returned in a damaged state.

199. Mr Blick concluded, on the basis of an independent technical analysis of the computer and his other investigations, that while it was unlikely that the alleged damage had occurred while the computer was in ASIO's possession, it had nonetheless not been returned in the same condition as when it was seized.

200. Mr Blick suggested to ASIO that it offer the complainant compensation. ASIO agreed and paid the complainant compensation in July 2003.

201. In the other case, Mr Blick received a complaint alleging that a search had taken place at premises other than those specified in the warrant. After an investigation Mr Blick concluded that this had indeed happened.

202. Notwithstanding that the error was unintentional, Mr Blick recommended that ASIO negotiate with the complainants to reach a mutually agreeable settlement. Negotiations were continuing at the end of the reporting period.

Search warrant related complaints actioned in 2003-2004

203. The IGIS annual report for 2002-2003 referred to a number of complaints the office had received from, or on behalf of, individuals whose residences had been the subject of ASIO entry and search warrants. Each of these complaints was finalised during the 2003-2004 reporting period.

204. The principal allegation made in the majority of these complaints was that those present when the warrants were executed had been, in effect, detained and prevented from going about their normal business. Search warrants do not authorise detention of people and if people whose premises are being searched wish to leave they are at liberty to do so.

205. Investigations into the complaints found no evidence to suggest that ASIO tried to prevent, or actually prevented, persons leaving the premises in question. In fact there were instances of residents and visitors entering and leaving the premises during the search process.

206. During an overt search of the kind conducted by ASIO in these cases, residents are free to go about their business so long as they do not threaten the integrity of the search. Video and audio records made during the execution of these searches incidentally recorded routine household activities being undertaken by residents.

207. My predecessor identified some procedural issues in relation to the conduct of the searches and recommended that ASIO and concerned law enforcement agencies work towards a common understanding of each party's role and responsibilities. Discussions are continuing between my office, ASIO, the Australian Federal Police and the Commonwealth Ombudsman to develop suitable agreements.

Seizure of passports

208. This office received several complaints during the reporting period from individuals whose passports were either seized by ASIO, or cancelled by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on advice from ASIO.

209. While the circumstances of each case are different, citizens whose Australian passports are cancelled have various legal options available to them to challenge such a decision, including recourse to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

Archival practices

210. The office received a complaint in the second half of the reporting period from an individual who had applied through the National Archives of Australia (NAA) for access to ASIO's file holdings on him which fell into the open period (ie. records that are more than 30 year old).

211. The NAA released a number of documents to the complainant, excluding material which was exempt from disclosure.

212. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal has the power to review decisions to withhold information from public access after 30 years and to make its own decisions about what may be released and what should be exempt. On occasions this may result in more information being released to the applicant. However, the AAT cannot make rulings on the content of the record, nor on how or why the information was gathered.

213. Through negotiations with the NAA in the first instance, or this office, complainants who disagree with aspects of the ASIO records relating to themselves are able to prepare, where appropriate, a correcting statement for placement on their file. This statement is then available for public access.

214. In this case the complainant was concerned about the content of the records which were released to him and negotiated with ASIO and NAA to add 'corrections' to these files. The complainant then asked this office to conduct an inquiry into ASIO's management of his case in the period covered by the open period documents which had been released to him.

215. The records released to the complainant all predated the creation of this office. Section 8(8)(a) of the IGIS Act precludes the Inspector-General from inquiring into matters relating to an agency that occurred before the commencement of the Act, without the approval of the responsible Minister.

216. After reviewing the records relating to the complainant, I decided that there was no basis upon which to approach the Attorney-General for such approval.

Alleged monitoring of single-issue interest group

217. In early 2004, Mr Blick received a letter from an individual who was concerned at newspaper reports which suggested that 'intelligence officers' had been closely monitoring the activities of a named domestic single-issue interest group and had provided briefing to a government minister.

218. Mr Blick commenced an inquiry into these claims and I finalised the matter. The inquiry included independently reviewing ASIO's various electronic databases and conducting an extensive file search.

219. The conclusion reached was that there was no evidence that ASIO had acted illegally or improperly. There was no reason to believe that ASIO had provided any information on the group to a government minister, nor was there any indication that ASIO had been asked to obtain information on the group by a government minister.

---

previous

content

next