KEY POINTS
- The inspection activity of the office kept pace with growth in the activities of the six intelligence and security agencies and expansion of their powers.
- To promote better awareness of the role of the office as well as the importance of acting legally and with propriety, an increased number of presentations have been made at agency seminars and training courses. In the 2004–05 year, the office presented to approximately 700 staff in the six agencies.
- The greatest number of complaints in 2004–05 concerned the timeliness of ASIO’s security clearances for visa processing purposes. The government announced additional funding in the 2005 Budget and revised arrangements on 17 June 2005 to improve timeliness. The level of other complaints remained relatively stable (see Annex 1).
- Legislation has been introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament to implement the various recommendations of the July 2004 report by Mr Philip Flood AO into the Australian intelligence agencies. One new function for this office (assuming passage of the legislation) will be to periodically review ONA’s statutory independence.
- ASIO acted professionally and appropriately when seeking and executing questioning warrants under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD is currently reviewing the operation, effectiveness and implications of such warrants. I provided written and oral submissions to the Committee. These included a number of suggestions for refinement of the legislative provisions (see Annex 2).
- Inspection work showed that DSD & ASIS compliance with the Intelligence Services Act 2001 and the associated privacy rules has been sound.
- Inspections of ASIS operational records were focussed on those activities with greater potential to be controversial. Inspections, including of activities concerning illegal immigration, did not raise any concerns which might warrant a formal inquiry.
- A significant inquiry finalised during the reporting period concerned whether access to a particular intelligence database had been deliberately cut off for ADF intelligence officers attached to the INTERFET force in Dili in December 1999. The Minister for Defence released into the public domain a 2004 letter and an abridged version of the inquiry report (see Annexes 3 and 4).