Australian Secret Intelligence Service

 

 

 

 

What ASIS does

ASIS was established by executive order on 13 May 1952 and operated under government directive until the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA) came into effect on 29 October 2001.

ASIS collects foreign intelligence, generally relying on human sources to obtain information. It produces and disseminates intelligence reports to key government decision-makers. It also undertakes counter-intelligence activities, liaises with overseas agencies, and undertakes other activities formally directed by the minister.

The intelligence collection, reporting and other activities of ASIS are regulated by ministerial directions, ministerial authorisations and privacy rules, which have been made pursuant to the ISA.

Intelligence priorities for ASIS and other members of the AIC are established in a planning document that is endorsed and regularly reviewed by the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

Further information about ASIS is available at http://www.asis.gov.au.

Significant issues

Growth and expansion

The global and regional security environment has necessitated that each AIC agency seriously examine their priorities, and the means by which they go about their business.

ASIS therefore engaged a distinguished retired senior public servant to conduct a comprehensive review of its functions and resources, and identify any gaps which could cause it not to achieve its mission.

The results of the review were considered by various senior level committees and naturally, were also fed into the budget process.

The result was that in the 2006–2007 Commonwealth budget, the government announced a funding increase for ASIS of $125.1 million over four years (including $39.4 million in additional capital funding) for the purpose of enabling ASIS to meet increased operational demands and to improve its analytical and assessment capabilities.27

In the period since the budget decision I have been briefed on the likely effects of this significant increase in resources on the organisational structure of ASIS, recruitment, training, accommodation and facilities.

While the expansion of ASIS provides it with new opportunities, it is properly mindful of the risks associated with growing rapidly. Certainly I will be mindful of this in our various inspection and review activities in the near to medium term.

Authorisations for training in, or use of, weapons/self-defence techniques

In my first annual report as Inspector-General I wrote of amendments to the ISA to enable ASIS persons to be trained in the use of weapons and/or self-defence techniques, and in very strictly controlled circumstances, to be authorised to use weapons and/or self defence techniques for protection purposes while deployed overseas.28

The bringing into effect of these amendments was contingent upon the development of appropriate guidelines29. There was also an expectation on the part of the relevant Parliamentary oversight committee (the then PJCAAD) that the use of these new powers would be used sparingly and be subject to very strict supervision and monitoring.30

The guidelines in question were developed in close consultation with my office and were finalised in 2004–05, and in the period since the guidelines were finalised I have taken a close interest in their implementation.

Subclause 1(5) of Schedule 2 of the ISA requires the Director-General of ASIS to provide the IGIS with copies of all approvals issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in respect of training in the use of a weapon or in self-defence techniques, or the provision of a weapon.

As was the case in 2004–05, I had visibility of all such approvals granted during 2005-06. This visibility was achieved through our regular examination of all submissions made by the Director-General of ASIS to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and through the copying to me of each approval which specifically dealt with weapons and/or self-defence training and/or use.

Towards the end of 2005–06 I conducted a reconciliation between ASIS’s ministerial submissions files and the copies of each ministerial authorisation I had received relating to training in/use of weapons. I also met with various ASIS officers who had received weapons training and/or were authorised to use a weapon should circumstances require it.

I am confident that through the combination of these activities I have had access to all ministerial authorisations which were issued. I am also confident that I have obtained a good insight into the training which is provided.

It is not possible in a public report to provide details of these approvals, but I can report that the number of persons who were the subject of weapons related authorisations during the reporting period was consistent with the general expectations of the PJCAAD.

Clause 3 of Schedule 2 of the ISA also requires the Director-General of ASIS to provide me with a written report should a weapon allocated to an authorised person be discharged in specified circumstances (i.e. other than during training).

As the amendments to the ISA relating to weapons have now been in effect for a reasonable period, ASIS has been able to acquire a good appreciation of how the guidelines work in practice, particularly in hostile environments. This has led to some very minor technical modification of the guidelines for the purpose of enhancing personal safety. I have no concerns with these changes.

I am satisfied that number of authorisations being sought is relatively small, the training being provided is both necessary and appropriate, and the powers afforded to ASIS under Schedule 2 of the ISA are not being misused.

I will nonetheless continue to very closely monitor this subject in the coming reporting period.

Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2005

Compared to most of the other AIC agencies, the legislative framework within which ASIS operates was little touched during 2005–06.

Of the changes contained in the ISLA Act which impact upon ASIS, the two of significance are probably:

Details of these are contained in the chapter ‘Legislative Review’.

Media interest

ASIS is, by its very nature, a secret and secretive organisation. If it were not, it would not be able to properly perform the various functions assigned to it by the government.

While the closed nature of ASIS has very obvious operational advantages, it does leave the Service open to accusations that it is somehow less accountable because it is not subject to the same public scrutiny as other areas of government activity.

The closed nature of ASIS also tends to make it a subject of some fascination to the media and the wider community, who are naturally curious about the activities of the Service.

During 2005–06 there appeared to be an increase in the level of media interest in ASIS. Given the global security environment, the increased engagement of Australia in regional affairs, and the significant funding boost that ASIS has received, this is understandable.

There were also several highly speculative media stories, with an apparently small number of anonymous sources31, about ASIS’s internal management, staff relations, and collection activities.

The handling of these stories and commentary pieces is particularly problematic given that ASIS is a secret organisation and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as a matter of policy, does not comment publicly on intelligence related matters.

In consequence of this approach sometimes outlandish claims remain on the public record unchallenged when they have no basis in fact32, but where it is judged that to publicly correct them would do more harm than good.

In light of this limitation, I monitor media stories and other commentary about ASIS, so that I can make my own judgements about their veracity or otherwise. In making these judgements I pay particular regard to the provenance of the story, the background of the source (if identified), and the currency of knowledge identifiable sources may have of the Service.

In some cases the purported sources are acting on very dated information, or put forward a mish-mash of conjecture and speculation as fact.

In those instances where I am satisfied that legitimate issues have been raised I will either seek a specific briefing from ASIS, or pursue any matters of concern directly with the Director-General.

It is not my role to publicly defend ASIS against some of the more ill-informed commentary to which it is subjected. However, I am satisfied that it is properly responsive to legitimate criticisms which are made of it, and that it also keeps the Minister for Foreign Affairs properly informed of such matters.

Inspection activities

Range and scope

Since commencing as Inspector-General I have sought to increase the depth and duration of the various inspection activities the office undertakes in respect of ASIS. During 2005-06 these activities included:

Engagement of consultant

Given the sensitive nature of the materials we access during ASIS reviews, I have largely restricted the conduct of these activities to myself and to a senior member of my staff.

Given the various other demands on my time I found through the early part of 2005–06 that I could not devote myself as fully to these important tasks as I would have liked. As a consequence, I have engaged my predecessor as Inspector-General, Mr Bill Blick AM, as a consultant, to assist particularly with our regular review of current operational files.

Mr Blick commenced this arrangement in May 2006 and it is my intention to engage him for two days per month until the end of 2006, following which the position will be reviewed.

Privacy rules

Section 15(1) of the ISA required the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make written rules regulating the communication and retention by ASIS of intelligence information concerning Australian persons.

This requirement was achieved immediately prior to the ISA coming into effect in October 2001, when the Minister for Foreign Affairs endorsed the ASIS privacy rules.

The ASIS privacy rules are effectively identical to the DSD and DIGO privacy rules (the only significant difference being the minister who endorsed them). The rules are identical so as to ensure that consistent standards are applied across the AIC.

The ASIS privacy rules are unclassified and were published in the IGIS Annual Report 2001–2002. The ASIS privacy rules can also be accessed on the ASIS website at http://www.asis.gov.au/rules_to_privacy.html.

In discharging its functions ASIS generates and receives a significant amount of secret intelligence information. Information reaching this threshold is put into reports (which are generally in a standard format), and then circulated to properly cleared addressees with a need to know this information.

My office regularly reviews this reporting to ensure that, so far as we are able to ascertain, it was collected in accordance with the requirements of the ISA, and then reported/disseminated in accordance with the requirements of the ASIS privacy rules.

The number of reports of this kind which are circulated run into many thousands each year, but the instances when it is felt necessary or appropriate to refer to Australian persons in this reporting is very low.

So as to ensure that we have full visibility of every instance where intelligence on or about an Australian is included in an ASIS report, relevant ASIS staff are required to complete a privacy cover sheet, highlighting the reference, citing justification under the privacy rules for the inclusion of this information, and giving an explanation of how the relevant provision is applicable.

All of these reports and their accompanying privacy coversheets are provided to my office approximately every two weeks for consideration and comment.

My office also has other means of accessing ASIS reporting, so as to independently verify that all reporting which refers to Australian persons is being passed to our office, and that no formal reporting is being hidden from us.

Following our review of the reporting which is specifically brought to our attention, we provide written comments to the head of the relevant section within ASIS which coordinates the publication and distribution of this reporting.

Approximately every two months we meet with the intelligence coordinators and legal and policy staff to discuss issues which we have identified in the course of our inspections. These meetings also enable ASIS staff to put forward any issues or concerns they might have about the application of the privacy rules.

My experience is that the internal resources and training made available to ASIS staff on privacy issues is good, and that the obligations imposed by the privacy rules are taken very seriously.

I am pleased to say that I have seen no abuses in the material we have access to, rather there is a deepening understanding of the principles upon which the privacy rules are based and a continuing commitment by ASIS staff to do the right thing.

Ministerial authorisations

One of the most important changes brought about by the enactment of the ISA in 2001 was the creation of a formal process whereby the Minister for Foreign Affairs, rather than the Director-General of ASIS, is empowered to authorise certain of ASIS’s activities (eg. entering into formal relationships with foreign liaisons, opening or closing ASIS stations, approving any activities carried out for the purpose of collecting intelligence on Australian persons etc).

My office reviews all ministerial authorisations so that I might be satisfied that ASIS only seeks approval to collect intelligence information on Australian persons where there is a sound basis for doing so, and that the submissions referred to the minister contain sufficient detail for well-informed decisions to be made.

On the basis of my review activities during 2005-06, I was so satisfied.

Ministerial submissions

In addition to regularly reviewing all ministerial authorisations provided to ASIS, I also have access to, and review, all other submissions which the Director-General puts to the minister.

As a consequence of reviewing ASIS’s ministerial submissions, I sometimes seek briefings from the Director-General. During the reporting period these briefings included but were not limited to subjects including the planning for and conduct of particular operational activities, claims or allegations made in the media, relationships with other agencies etc.

Review of operations

As discussed above, I have engaged my predecessor as Inspector-General, Mr Blick, to assist in our ongoing review of ASIS operational files.

For the purposes of this activity a combination of myself, Mr Blick and a member of my staff, devote four person days per month to visiting ASIS headquarters and reviewing current operational files.

The purpose of this review activity is to monitor whether ASIS’s operations are being conducted with legality and with propriety.

This review activity naturally has a retrospective focus as I believe it is not the proper place of the IGIS to second-guess operational decisions as they occur, or attempt to manage operational matters at one remove.

During the reporting period we continued the thematic approach of the previous year and reviewed activities which are the subject of a ministerial direction under section 6 (1) (e) of the ISA.

As these operational files detail some of the most sensitive work that ASIS undertakes it is not possible to provide further information in this report.

I can state that I am satisfied that the vast majority of operations undertaken by ASIS are well planned and run, are managed tightly by staff in ASIS headquarters, and are properly directed towards achieving outcomes which promote the national interest.

Following each review I provide a detailed letter to the Director-General of ASIS setting any issues of concern arising out of our inspections. The Director-General has provided written replies in all instances where we have required a response, or offered briefings by key staff.

I have been satisfied with these responses and briefings. On those occasions where I have still had some concern I have appreciated the willingness of the Director-General to engage in further discussions.

Use of assumed identities

Section 15XUA of the Crimes Act 1914 requires ASIS to, as soon as practicable after 30 June each year, provide the IGIS with a report for the preceding 12 months on:

ASIS has satisfied this requirement by providing me with six-monthly reports on the above matters.

Although the advice provided to this office by ASIS confirmed that no evidence of fraud or any other unlawful activity had been detected by these audits, I did seek clarification on several issues. These clarifications were provided to my satisfaction.

Visits and contact with staff

I met with a significant number of ASIS officers prior to their overseas postings. The purpose of these meetings is to remind ASIS representatives of the role and functions of this office and the expectations of their behaviour.

These meetings are an important means of reinforcing with ASIS personnel that their actions are subject to on-going external scrutiny no matter where they are posted, and that they are obliged to conduct themselves in an appropriate manner at all times.

So that I might obtain an even better understanding of the above, I conducted a short familiarisation visit to an overseas ASIS station during 2005–06.

I also met with heads of mission who are being sent to posts where ASIS staff are present to discuss any issues they might have prior to their departure.

Training

In addition to these pre-departure meetings members of my staff and I regularly address training sessions for ASIS officers whenever we are invited to do so. These training sessions ordinarily focus on accountability issues and the work of the office.

Complaints and inquiries

I received five complaints about ASIS in 2005–06 which led me to initiate preliminary inquiries, compared to one such instance in 2004–05. In addition to these matters three people contacted OIGIS with queries or concerns about ASIS which were handled administratively (ie without need for formal inquiry action), compared to three such matters in the previous year.

A brief summary of some of the inquiries my office conducted is provided below.

Recruitment related complaints

During 2005–06 I received two complaints about ASIS’s selection practices which I decided to pursue as preliminary inquiries, compared to one in the previous reporting period, and three such inquiries in 2003–04.

Given the rate at which the AIC has grown and continues to expand, the number of recruitment related complaints received by this office is actually very small.

The complaints we receive tend to revolve around the timeliness with which selection and related security checking processes are undertaken, and also about a lack of meaningful feedback being provided to unsuccessful candidates.

On the former point, candidates are generally made aware that obtaining employment with an intelligence agency is not similar to gaining employment elsewhere in the public or private sector, and that intrusive and time consuming checking is a significant part of the process. Notwithstanding this, I am also conscious that agencies may be tempted to use the secrecy associated with these processes as a shield to cover deficient or sloppy practices.

In the course of the preliminary inquiries I conducted during 2005–06 I found evidence of some practices within ASIS which were not optimal. These have been brought to the Director-General’s attention.

The issue of providing meaningful feedback is more problematic. ASIS’s standard position over many years is that it does not provide performance feedback to unsuccessful job applicants. The justification for this is that the Service does not wish to reveal too much of its selection methods, for fear that possible weaknesses might be exploited and unsuitable persons selected for employment with the Service.

While I can understand and accept this rationale to a point, I believe that this argument does not stand up so well when the unsuccessful applicant is already employed elsewhere in the AIC, has a track record of many years employment and has already passed through all of the requisite security and employment related checks for their current employer.

It is natural for individuals in this circumstance, when told that they are unsuccessful, to speculate that there is a security-related concern rather than that they have simply been rated as unsuitable for other reasons.

Given that persons employed in the AIC ordinarily need to maintain high-level security clearances, any suggestion of a security question mark has the potential to cause distinct concern to an unsuccessful applicant.

I will continue to encourage ASIS to provide some feedback they provide to some unsuccessful applicants, especially current AIC employees, so as to minimise the genuine (but unnecessary) fears that some applicants hold.

Footnotes
27 Details of the budget increase are available in Budget 2006-07, Budget Paper No.2 available at http://www.budget.gov.
au/2006-07/bp2/html/bp2_expense.htm and also in the DFAT Portfolio Budget Statements 2006-2007 at http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/budget/2006_2007_pbs/index.html (both accessed on 1 September 2006).
28 IGIS Annual Report 2003-2004, pp. 6-7, 30-31.
29 Clause 1(6) of Schedule 2 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 refers.
30 PJCAAD Review of the Intelligence Services Amendment Bill 2003, Parliamentary Paper No. 71/2004 tabled on 11 March 2004.
31 An interesting article on journalists and sources is “Informed sources say whatever they like”, Cameron Stewart, The Australian,
3 August 2006, p. 14.
32 For earlier examples see G J Samuels and M H Codd, Commission of Inquiry into ASIS, 1994-1995, pp. 176-185.

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