IGIS Annual Report 1998-99

Annex 1

Text of letter sent by IGIS to the 'Sunday' program

Mr Ross Coulthart
SUNDAY program
Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd
24 Artarmon Road
Willoughby NSW 2068

Dear Mr Coulthart

I refer again to your letter of 4 March.

Because a number of the questions in your list sought information which should more appropriately come from the Defence portfolio I provided a copy to DSD. I understand that you will shortly receive an official response from Mr Brady, the DSD Director. I have seen the response and am satisfied that it is truthful and goes as far as can reasonably be expected in providing meaningful information without compromising essential security interests.

The official response alludes to the role of this office in ensuring that DSD acts legally and with propriety. Noting that you would like me to describe just what it is that we do to achieve this, in this letter I propose to provide some amplification of this office's methodologies. You might also wish to refer to our web site at www.igis.gov.au, which contains, among other material, the text of all IGIS public annual reports.

You will be aware that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act (IGIS Act) provides the IGIS with royal commission-like powers when conducting inquiries into the activities of Australia's intelligence and security agencies, whether as the result of a complaint or of the IGIS's own motion.

In practice, in recent years it has not been necessary for the IGIS to conduct formal inquiries in order to undertake regular monitoring of the agencies' day-to-day activities. Arrangements with each of the agencies have enabled unfettered access to their personnel and records. My predecessors have developed, and I continue to develop, regular programs of inspections of the key documentation and the procedures in place to secure legality and propriety.

In this context it is worth mentioning that the government has accepted my recommendation that these inspections be accorded specific statutory recognition, and will shortly introduce amendments to the IGIS Act which will achieve this. The amendments will also, if enacted, empower me to report on matters arising from those inspections if necessary.

So far as DSD is concerned, the IGIS receives very few complaints, so the bulk of the office's work in relation to that agency is devoted to inspections.

The official response you will receive describes the Rules on Sigint and Australian Persons, a classified set of instructions issued to DSD and endorsed by the government. They bind all DSD staff and members of the Defence Force engaged in the collection and reporting of signals intelligence. The Rules, the latest version of which was developed in consultation with this office, contain a section which explains the role and powers of the IGIS, including the fact that the IGIS has the right of free entry to DSD, access to all documents and records, and the capacity to question DSD staff on any subject relevant to their work.

The Rules require that the Director of DSD maintain for inspection by the IGIS records of any authorities issued for the monitoring of communications involving Australians, and resulting intelligence reports, and provide these at any time the IGIS requires, but at least once a year. In practice I inspect such records approximately every two months.

The Rules also require the maintenance of a range of other records, which again must be available for inspection by the IGIS, and which I also inspect approximately every two months. Thus I am able to assure myself, for example, of the efficacy of DSD procedures designed to prevent the dissemination of information relating to Australian persons gained accidentally during the course of routine collection of foreign communications. If it becomes evident, as it may from time to time in the light of particular circumstances, that these or other procedures need modification I can and do recommend changes. DSD has invariably responded positively and promptly to such recommendations.

It has been the experience of this office that DSD management and staff take the Rules very seriously and instances of breaches are rare. Where there have been breaches they have been inadvertent and DSD has taken prompt corrective action.

DSD also consults the IGIS about the application of the Rules in cases of doubt, which inevitably arise from time to time. There has not been a case, to my knowledge, where after such consultation DSD has failed to follow the course of action suggested or approved by the IGIS.

Apart from the regular inspection activities described above, it has been the IGIS's practice to make periodic, though not as frequent, inspections of intelligence and surveillance facilities in Australia, including joint facilities.

More generally, DSD regularly briefs me and seeks my views on operational matters which may have implications for legality or propriety. Whenever I have sought information from DSD or access to records, staff or facilities there has never been the slightest hesitation in providing it. Also, by arrangement with the secretary to Cabinet, I have access to all submissions to and decisions of the National Security Committee of Cabinet which may be of relevance to the performance of my functions.

You have asked me to agree to an interview for inclusion in your program. I would have some reservations about giving an open-ended commitment to this but not, I hasten to emphasise, because I have the slightest disagreement with you on the legitimacy of responsible media discussion of the issues. I would be happy to discuss the question further with you once you have had the opportunity to consider my and Mr Brady's responses.

Yours sincerely

W J Blick

Inspector-General of
  Intelligence and Security

12 March 1999

 

1998-99