IGIS Annual Report 1998-99

DEFENCE SIGNALS DIRECTORATE

124. Inspection activities involving DSD have included:-

125. The Director and I agreed that following each such activity I or my staff would discuss any concerns with an appropriate senior manager or liaison officer and any concerns needing to be put in writing would be addressed to the Director. In addition I have made a practice of following up such discussions with a letter outlining any issues raised during the inspection, to which in each case DSD has provided a response.

126. We have also agreed procedures that would operate should I form the view that any matter arising from an inspection needed to be brought to the attention of the Minister for Defence or the Prime Minister. No such matters arose during the reporting year.

Australian Communications

127. I and my staff undertook a regular program of inspection of DSD's compliance with the nationality rules, including inspecting the records DSD is required to keep under the rules. DSD does not monitor the domestic communications of Australians and is empowered to monitor foreign communications of Australians only in exceptional circumstances. Examples are when the communication may contain information relevant to the commission or intended commission of an indictable offence, or when a person has been deemed an agent of a foreign power.

128. The nationality rules require DSD to keep records of any authorities issued for the interception of communications involving Australians and of any material retained from incidental collection of communications involving Australians. Examination of these records revealed that DSD has a rigorous attitude towards compliance. In the small number of cases of inadvertent non-compliance DSD took appropriate corrective action.

129. We also examined each DSD decision to deem a person an agent of a foreign power. These cases are few in number and subject to regular review by the Director. In every case there was proper justification for the decision and in no case was the listing continued longer than was necessary and appropriate.

130. DSD reports the results of its interceptions to other agencies. Where Australians are mentioned in such reports, they must generally not be named but must be referred to in a way which does not permit third parties to identify them. DSD is required to keep, for inspection by the Inspector-General, records of all such instances and also records of requests by other agencies for access to the names of such persons. Such access may only be granted for particular purposes related to the bona fide operational needs of the requesting agency.

131. Examination of these records showed that DSD maintains properly conservative policies towards identifying Australians. In the light of one case
I suggested that DSD require requesting agencies to be very specific about the nexus between their functions and the information they were seeking. It would be insufficient, for example, to quote a section of the nationality rules which could justify release without explaining how the information sought related to the agency's functions and the use to which it intended to put the information. DSD accepted this and other suggestions I made for improved processes.

132. As mentioned in last year's annual report the nationality rules were substantially revised and reissued in 1998. There have been a number of issues of interpretation in relation to the operation of the rules, often emanating from within DSD and on each occasion DSD has discussed these matters with me. While it has been possible to resolve particular queries on most occasions, there have been instances where it is apparent that the rules might be better expressed. I have had some discussion with DSD about how minor modifications to the rules might be implemented given that the rules are endorsed at government level.

133. As noted earlier in this report (paragraphs 18-19) I responded to a request to appear on the Channel 9 TV show Sunday which broadcast a segment about DSD. Correspondence on this subject is provided at Annexes 1 and 2 of this report.

Archives

134. Examination of DSD's handling of archives applications revealed an appropriate degree of responsiveness.

Collection Activities

135. I inspected collection activities at some DSD facilities. I am confident, based on this and other inspection work, that these activities do not involve spying on the communications of the Australian community.

136. From time to time DSD implements new projects involving different approaches to collection of intelligence. In such cases it informs me of the nature of these projects and we discuss any issues that might arise concerning legality or propriety. My main concern in such cases is to ensure that adequate attention is given to such issues, including DSD obtaining legal advice where necessary.

Complaints about DSD

137. During the 1998-99 reporting period there were two new complaints about DSD which led to preliminary inquiries.

138. There was also one complaint about DSD that was dealt with administratively, without proceeding as far as a preliminary inquiry.

139. The level of complaints about DSD is generally low due to the fact that DSD collects foreign signals intelligence by technical means. It is therefore unlikely that members of the Australian public would have dealings with DSD.

140. The two complaints leading to preliminary inquiries are summarised below.

 

Was a DSD employee subjected to harassment both within and outside of the workplace? Was DSD's response to the alleged harassment appropriate?

141. In February 1999, a DSD employee approached my office with a series of employment related grievances.

142. After considering the matters that the complainant raised, I advised him that the Inspector-General did not have jurisdiction to pursue his complaint by virtue of section 8(5) of the IGIS Act, which states, in relation to DSD, that:

143. It was, however, possible to suggest an alternative grievance resolution mechanism, should the complainant remain dissatisfied after exhausting avenues of internal review.

Did DSD illegally monitor the communications of a lobby group?

144. In late May 1999, the national convenor of a single issue lobby group asked me to investigate whether DSD had illegally monitored the communications of the group.

145. The complainant subsequently asked me to investigate whether DSD collected the telephone numbers of members of this group and provided this information to a foreign intelligence service.

146. A preliminary inquiry was ongoing at the end of this reporting period.

 


1998-99